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                                  Abstract  
 
Nigeria is an oil-driven economy with a high level of global integration. This thesis considers 
how oil- related fluctuations impact the economy by exploring three important aspects of the 
nexus between oil dependency and global integration.  
 
First, by modelling global integration through cross-country trade linkages, the thesis 
examines the impact of external (oil-related) shocks on Nigeria, and compares this with the 
impact of domestically generated shocks. The findings show that although oil price shocks 
cause real exchange rate appreciation and a consequent reduction of real GDP, these effects 
are not statistically significant. This implies that Dutch disease, particularly the spending 
effect of the disease, is not statistically significant in Nigeria. This is reasonable, as the 
country adopts the flexible exchange rate policy, which absorbs shocks and prevents “false” 
appreciation of real exchange rate. However, domestic shocks, specifically shocks to real 
GDP and inflation, have statistically significant impact in the country.  
 
Second, the international linkages between Nigeria and its main trade partners (i.e. US and 
Euro Area) are examined in terms of oil-related growth comovements, in order to test the 
decoupling hypothesis. This involves investigating whether or not the business cycles of the 
emerging and developing economy (Nigeria) has decoupled from those of the advanced 
economies (ADs). The rationale underlying the focus on oil-related comovements is that 
Nigeria is a major oil exporter and therefore oil price is likely to have a strong role to play in 
the transmission of international business cycles onto the country. The results show a 
statistically significant degree of growth comovements between the three economies under 
consideration, indicating that the decoupling hypothesis does not hold for Nigeria. 
  
Finally, the international linkages between Nigeria and the global economy are examined with 
respect to the effectiveness of Nigeria’s stabilization fund and oil-price-based fiscal rule. The 
results show that the two fiscal instruments are effective at cushioning the impact of oil 
shocks on the economy, in terms of both fiscal and broader macroeconomic effects. These 
findings suggest the increased resilience of Nigeria to global shocks originating from the ADs 
(as dominant importers of Nigeria’s exports). Complementing the findings with those on the 
decoupling hypothesis indicates that resilience does not require decoupling for Nigeria, which 
iii 
 
is consistent with the broad literature on the decoupling of the emerging market and 
developing economies (EMDEs) from the ADs.  
 
These results have policy implications for Nigeria. First, the country should maintain the 
adoption of the flexible exchange rate policy, because it has been effective as a shock 
absorber against Dutch disease. Second, broader macroeconomic policies are required to limit 
the adverse effects of internal shocks. Third, resilience does not appear to require decoupling 
for Nigeria, so long as effective arrangements are made to limit the effects of the shocks 
originating from the ADs. Fourth, Nigeria should maintain its stabilization fund and oil-price-
based fiscal rule, possibly complementing them with more countercyclical policies, in order to 
build stronger resilience to external shocks.          
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
1.1. Motivation for the Study 
 
Nigeria is an emerging market and developing economy (EMDE) with a high degree of global 
integration. Several factors have contributed to the high global integration of the country since 
its independence in 1960. 
 
Firstly, Nigeria’s increased exports of oil since the oil boom of the early 1970s has increased 
the country’s interactions with other oil exporters and with oil importers, particularly with 
developed countries (Odularu, 2008; Akinlo, 2012). The second contributing factor is trade 
liberalization policy as part of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of 1986 
(NCEMA, 2004; Anyanwu, 1992).  
 
Thirdly, the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) Act of 1995 was followed 
by increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Zakari et al., 2012; Nigerian Investment 
Promotion Commission, 2015). Fourthly, the Bank re-capitalization policy introduced in 2004 
strengthened the financial sector, leading to increased international confidence and 
international financial transactions (Bello, 2005; James and Pat, 2011; Bakare, 2011).  
 
Finally, the return of the country from political instability to democratic governance in 1999 
increased the confidence of the international community in the nation and led to a rise in the 
country’s political and social integration into the world economy. 
 
Furthermore, the oil boom of the 1970s made the country to become an oil-dependent 
economy, as the oil windfalls led to the neglect of the non-oil sector. Based on the relatively 
high global integration and the oil-dependent nature of the country, the question arises: what 
are the transmission mechanisms of the oil shocks experienced by the nation and what can be 
done to limit the effects of the shocks? The motivation for this thesis is to answer this 
question, examining both the observed and unobserved transmission channels of the shocks, 
together with the policy instruments to buffer their negative effects.  
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1.2. Objectives and Contributions of the Study 
 
The specific objectives of this thesis are to: 
 
(i) Compare the effects of externally generated (i.e. oil-related) shocks with domestically 
generated shocks on Nigeria. To the best of our knowledge, studies on external shocks 
focusing on Nigeria do not capture internal shocks from a global perspective. Generally, the 
literature on the EMDEs seems to focus more on external shocks, leading to a research gap. 
The main contribution of the thesis in this context is the evidence that the spending effect of 
Dutch disease is not statistically significant in Nigeria.  
 
(ii) Investigate whether or not Nigeria has decoupled from its industrialised trade partners by 
examining the business-cycle comovements between Nigeria and its main industrialized trade 
partners based on an oil-related unobserved factor. This involves testing the decoupling 
hypothesis for Nigeria. Based on the significant role of oil, the oil channel is a key channel 
through which international business cycles are transmitted, especially into the economy of a 
major oil exporter. Regarding this objective, the thesis contributes to the literature on the 
decoupling hypothesis which has little Nigeria-specific studies. 
  
(iii) Investigate the effectiveness of Nigeria’s stabilization fund and oil-price-based fiscal rule, 
which are major fiscal policy instruments designed to buffer against the negative impact of oil 
shocks. There are many empirical studies that have examined the effectiveness of stabilization 
funds and fiscal rules in resource-rich countries as a group, including Nigeria. But the 
Nigeria-specific studies in this line of study are done from a qualitative standpoint, where no 
econometric techniques are employed (e.g. Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007; Okonjo-
Iweala, 2008). Therefore, in this thesis we use econometric techniques to analyse the 
effectiveness of the two fiscal instruments in the country, contributing to filling the gap 
created by the little empirical work.   
 
1.3. Organization of the Thesis 
 
To achieve the above objectives the thesis is divided into six other chapters in addition to this 
general introductory chapter as discussed below. 
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Chapter 2: The Nigerian Economy 
 
This chapter gives a general overview of the Nigerian economy. The purpose of the chapter is 
to give the reader broad background knowledge of the country. The chapter shows that the 
country is a small and highly open economy that is well integrated economically, politically 
and socially with the rest of the world. The government operates a mix of discretionary and 
rule-based macroeconomic policies with oil playing a strategic role in economic performance. 
 
Chapter 3: Literature Review 
  
International transmission of shocks occupies a central place in the empirical chapters of the 
thesis. Therefore, chapter 3 reviews theories on international shocks. The theories are 
classified mainly into crisis and non-crisis models, with trade and financial linkages playing a 
central role in the latter class. This thesis primarily deals with the latter group of models, with 
oil-related models such as Dutch Disease models constituting a sub-division of the group. The 
theories are further classified into theories relating to fiscal and monetary shocks. This further 
classification is particularly relevant, in that it helps in relating the shocks analysed in the 
thesis to the mechanisms of cross-border spillovers. 
     
Chapter 4: The Relative Effects of External and Domestic Shocks on the Nigerian 
Economy: Evidence from the GVAR Model 
 
This chapter explores the relative impacts of external (oil-related) and domestic shocks within 
the framework of a global model that captures the high level of openness and the global 
integration of the Nigerian economy. The chapter focuses on oil-related issues, especially the 
Dutch disease channel of the resource curse. The GVAR model employed in the chapter 
consists of strategically selected countries of the world, with Nigeria added to the countries of 
the original model of Dees et al. (2007). The model used in the chapter aims to represent the 
global economy and its interlinkages, particularly with regard to trade. 
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Chapter 5: Growth Comovements between Nigeria and Its Industrialized Trade 
Partners: Does the Decoupling Hypothesis Hold for Nigeria? 
 
This chapter builds on the results of chapter 4, by exploring further the business-cycle 
linkages between Nigeria and its two main (industrial) trade partners, namely the US and the 
Euro Area. Such linkages have been investigated with observed factors or variables in the 
preceding chapter. Therefore, we undertake further analysis of the linkages in this chapter 
using a model that is capable of revealing unobserved factor(s) that drive the real GDPs of the 
three economies, with a focus on the oil channel of international transmission of business 
cycles. 
 
We focus on the oil channel of international transmission of business cycles for two primary 
reasons: (i) Nigeria is an oil-dependent country. (ii) Oil is a highly globalised product that has 
a major role in the international transmission of business cycles.  
  
Chapter 6: How Effective are the Nigerian Stabilization Fund and Oil-Price-Based 
Fiscal Rule as Buffers of Global Oil-Price Volatility? 
 
This chapter concludes the empirical analysis of the thesis by investigating the effectiveness 
of the stabilization fund, which is designed to work together with an oil-price-based fiscal rule 
to buffer the effect of the volatility of oil price on Nigeria.  
 
We investigate the effectiveness of the fiscal policy instruments with respect to fiscal impact 
and the reduction of macroeconomic (i.e. growth) volatility in the country. In Nigeria the 
instruments are designed to buffer the volatility of the oil price by de-linking public 
expenditure from oil revenue. Therefore, the effectiveness of the instruments can be measured 
by investigating the extent to which they limit the volatility. Besides, the effectiveness of the 
instruments can also be measured in terms of the behaviours of broad macroeconomic 
variables such as real GDP growth, since the de-linking will affect such variables.   
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
The chapter summarizes the results of the empirical studies of chapters 4 to 6 and links the 
results with the findings of other studies. The chapter concludes that externally generated oil 
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price shocks do not lead to the resource curse in Nigeria through the Dutch disease channel. 
However, internally generated shocks to real GDP and inflation have statistically significant 
impacts in the economy. This suggests the following things: (i) Other causative factors of the 
resource curse, namely institutional weakness and resource price volatility, seem to be the 
main causes of Nigeria’s resource curse. (ii) Domestic fluctuations may also have a role to 
play in Nigeria’s resource curse. 
 
We observe a statistically significant degree of growth comovements between Nigeria and its 
two main (industrial) trade partners caused by an oil-related unobserved factor.  This shows 
that Nigeria has not decoupled from the trade partners as a consequence of the former’s 
dependency on exporting oil. Furthermore, the study on the effectiveness of the fiscal 
instruments employed by Nigeria to buffer oil price volatility shows that the instruments have 
been successful. 
 
The findings of the three empirical chapters of the thesis suggest that Nigeria should maintain 
the adoption of the flexible exchange rate policy which it began to adopt since 1986, because 
it is effective in protecting the economy against Dutch disease; limit domestic shocks; and 
maintain the present stabilization fund and oil-price-based fiscal rule, possibly complementing 
them with more countercyclical policies. The chapter also discusses the limitations of the 
thesis and gives recommendations and suggestions for further research.  
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Chapter 2: The Nigerian Economy 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Nigeria has features distinguishing it from other countries. To this end, the objective of this 
chapter is to discuss the features of the economy. The chapter begins with an overview of the 
country’s key geographical and political features. Thereafter, there is a detailed discussion of 
the country’s economic features, before concluding remarks are made. 
 
2.2. The Geographical and Political Features of the Economy 
 
Nigeria is a West African country covering a total land area of around 356,667square miles 
(about 924, 000 square kilometres). It is the most populous country in Africa, with a 
population of about 173.6 million (2013 estimate). Nigeria’s bordering countries are the 
Republic of Benin in the west; Cameroon and Chad in the east; and Niger in the north.  
Although English is its official language, many local languages like Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, and 
Ijaw are spoken in Nigeria. The country adopts the federalist system of government, with a 
president, state governors, and local government chairmen. Presently it has 36 states, 774 
local government areas, and a federal capital territory. For ease of resource sharing, the 36 
states are divided into six geopolitical zones, namely North-West zone, North-East zone, 
North-Central (Middle Belt) zone, South-West zone, South- East zone, and South-South zone. 
 
As a West African country, the nation is part of the area called Sub-Saharan Africa, which lies 
south of the Saharan Desert and excludes North Africa, which is classified as part of the Arab 
world. As shown in Figure 2.2 Sub-Saharan Africa consists of Central Africa, Southern 
Africa, East Africa, and West Africa. The location of Nigeria in West Africa means the 
country has a tropical climate, so that the temperature of the region is relatively constant with 
an annual mean value of at least 18
0
C (64
0
F). Nigeria became independent from British 
colonial rule in 1960 and has had a mixture of 8 military and 5 civilian national leaders 
between the time of its independence and 1999. Since 1999 it has consistently had 
democratically elected civilian national leaders. Figure 2.1 presents the map of the country 
showing its states, federal capital territory, and neighbouring countries. 
 
20 
 
Figure 2.1: The Map of Nigeria 
 
Source: Nations online (www.nationsonline.org). 
 
2.3. Economic Development 
 
Nigeria may be summarily described as an oil-driven emerging and developing economy. The 
World Bank classifies it as a lower middle income economy (World Bank, 2014). The IMF 
classifies it as an emerging and developing economy in the World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
reports (IMF World Economic Outlook, 2014). Furthermore, the economy is classed as a low 
human development economy based on the Human Development Index (HDI) and Inequality-
Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) of the United Nations (United Nations Human 
Development Programme (UNDP), 2014). 
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Figure 2.2: The Regions of Africa 
 
Source: Regional Geography of the World: Globalization, People, and Places (http://2012books.lardbucket.org/).  
 
As explained by the United Nations, HDI is a composite index that measures human 
development with respect to the following three dimensions of development: long and healthy 
life, access to knowledge, and a decent standard of living. Computing the HDI requires 
building individual indices for the three dimensions of human development. On the other 
hand, the IHDI is computed by accounting for inequality in the population. 
 
2.4. The Role of Oil in the Economy 
 
Nigeria is abundantly endowed with oil. Consequently, it is one of the major net oil exporters 
of the world (see US Energy Information Administration, 2015; www.eia.gov ). The nation 
started to produce oil in 1958, but only became heavily dependent on the resource as 
consequence of the oil boom of the 1970s. This starting point for the heavy oil dependence is 
observable in the contributions of the oil and the non-oil sectors to the total export and 
government expenditure in the economy, as shown in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. Commenting on the 
degree of Nigeria’s dependence on oil, Mark Tomlinson, a former World Bank Country 
Director for the nation, described the country as “…the most dependent on oil of all countries 
in the world…” (OPEC Bulletin, 2002). He backed this assertion with the empirical evidence 
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of oil’s contribution of about 96% of the country’s total foreign exchange earnings. Ross 
(2003) also notes that oil has accounted for over 90% of the annual export income of the 
economy since the oil price shock of 1974. According to Ross, this trend made the country the 
most oil dependent economy in the world in 2000, with an oil export income of 99.6%, as 
shown in Table 2.1. The trend has not changed as shown in the works of Odularu (2008) and 
Akinlo (2012). As shown in Table 2.2, oil has dominant contributions to total revenues and 
exports in Nigeria between 1970 and 2009, particularly after the oil boom of the middle of 
1970s. 
 
The oil-dependent nature of the country led to the neglect and consequent weak development 
of the non-oil sector, particularly agriculture which had been central  to the economy before 
the oil boom of the 1970s (Oyejide, 1986; Azih, 2008; Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation, 2014). This is why consistent growth of the non-oil sector has become essential 
for export diversification and the sustainability of the overall growth of the economy. Hesse 
(2008) observes that export diversification enhances the per capita growth of developing 
economies, in contrast to most developed economies that perform better with export 
specialization. For example, the findings of Sannassee et al. (2014) in their study of 
diversification in Mauritius show that export diversification has positive effects on both short-
run and long-run growth, with a stronger impact in the long-run. 
    
Oil dependence also enhances income inequality in Nigeria. This inequality is a major factor 
causing the low human development mentioned earlier. Bakare (2012) states that “there is a 
disturbing income inequality in Nigeria,” based on the results of the author’s analysis on the 
subject. The poorest who accounts for half of the population receives only 10% of the national 
income of the country, according to Adegoke (2013). Furthermore, Aigbokhan (2008) 
analyses the link between growth, inequality, and poverty in Nigeria and observes that when 
growth increases, inequality increases, but poverty decreases. This suggests that the growth 
pulls up the income of the poorest less quickly than the income of the richer rises. 
  
Oil promotes inequality in the country mainly due to weak institution. For example, weak 
institution enhances the mismanagement of oil windfalls by the authorities. In a study of 17 
oil exporters Hooshmand et al. (2012) observe that oil rents have a negative impact on 
financial development through the channel of weak institutions in some oil exporting 
countries.  
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Mallaye et al. (2015) in a study of 40 countries including Nigeria, show that corruption is a 
major channel through which oil rent promotes inequality. The authors report a positive 
relationship between oil rent and inequality, because corruption increases when oil revenues 
increase. This phenomenon, as the authors note, agrees with the resource curse theory relating 
to the countries in question. 
 
The results of the oil-institution-inequality nexus are consistent with the findings of the 
Nigeria-specific studies on the subject (see Herbst and Olukoshi, 1994; Ndikumana and 
Boyce, 2012). Weak institutions have been strongly associated with the resource curse 
challenge facing the country (Sala-i-Martin Xavier and Subramanian Arvind, 2003). The 
manifestation of the curse is observable through the behaviour of variables like oil supply, oil 
revenue, the real exchange rate, the economic freedom index, oil-related violence, and the 
growth of  the economy (see Wit Martin and Crookes Doug, 2013; Ologunla et al., 2014; 
Opeyemi, 2012; Mähler, 2010). For example, Ologunla et al. (2014) show that the economic 
freedom index, which indicates strong institutions, is negatively related to resource 
dependency of a country. In this study the economic freedom index varies between 0 and 10, 
with a higher value indicating higher economic freedom; while oil export is the proxy for 
resource dependence. Mahler (2010) notes the contribution of oil-related violence to resource 
curse in the country, which is consistent with the findings of Rosser (2006).  
 
Rosser (2006) notes that civil unrest is one of the ways through which the resource curse 
manifests in resource-rich economies. There are two key types of violence in Nigeria. Firstly, 
there are frequent protests in the Niger Delta where the oil resource is mainly located, as the 
local population are aggrieved by the low level of development despite the amount of oil 
extracted and also aggrieved by the environmental damage associated with extraction. The 
Niger Delta region includes the following littoral and oil-producing states in the south of the 
country: Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Edo, Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, and Ondo. Secondly, there are 
many clashes between the ethnic groups within the oil producing region due to competition 
for oil wealth. There are over forty ethnic groups in the region. 
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Table 2.1: Twenty Most Oil Dependent Countries in 2000 (Fuel Exports as a Percentage of Total Exports) 
1  Nigeria  99.6  
2  Algeria  97.2  
3  Saudi Arabia  92.1  
4  Iran, Islamic Rep.  88.5  
5  Venezuela, RB  86.1  
6  Azerbaijan  85.1  
7  Oman  82.5  
8  Turkmenistan  81.0  
9  Syrian Arab Republic  76.3  
10  Bahrain  71.0  
11  Trinidad and Tobago  65.3  
12  Norway  63.9  
13  Kazakhstan  53.9  
14  Russian Federation  51.3  
15  Ecuador  49.4  
16  Colombia  41.4  
17  Papua New Guinea  28.8  
18  Indonesia  25.4  
19  Australia  21.9  
20  Lithuania  20.9  
Source: Ross (2003)   
 
Table 2.2: The Contributions of Oil to the Nigerian Economy (1970-2009) 
    Year Oil Revenue/Total Revenue (%) 
                    
Oil/ GDP (%) Oil Export/Total Export (%) 
1970 26.3 9.27 57.54 
1975 77.5 19.37 92.64 
1980 81.1 28.48 96.09 
1985 72.6 16.75 95.76 
1990 73.3 37.46 97.03 
1995 70.6 39.65 97.57 
2000 83.5 47.72 98.72 
2005 85.8 38.87 98.53 
2009 78.7 37.44 96.73 
Source: Akinlo, 2012.  
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Figure 2.3: Oil and Non-Oil Shares (%) of Exports in Nigeria in 1960 to 2010 
 
Data Source: Nigerian Central Bank Statistical Bulletin, 2010 Edition. 
 
Figure 2.4: Oil Revenue and Non-Oil Revenue Shares (%) of Total Government  
                    Expenditure in Nigeria in 1970 to 2010 
 
Data Source: Nigerian Central Bank Statistical Bulletin, 2010 Edition. 
 
2.4.1. How Nigeria Operates in the Global Oil Market  
 
Nigeria does not operate as an independent producer in the global oil market. It operates as a 
member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
1
 The objective of 
                                                          
1 OPEC is an international Organization created in 1960 by five founding members, namely Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. Other countries joined the organization later: Qatar (1961), Indonesia 
(1962), Libya (1962), the United Arab Emirates (1967), Algeria (1969), Nigeria (1971), Ecuador (1973), Gabon 
(1975) and Angola (2007). Gabon terminated its membership in January 1995 and rejoined the Organization in 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
3
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
9
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
7
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
8
Oil share in exports
Non-oil share in exports
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
8
Oil Revenue Share
Non-Oil Revenue Share
26 
 
the organization is: “to co-ordinate and unify petroleum policies among Member Countries, in 
order to secure fair and stable prices for petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and 
regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on capital to those 
investing in the industry” (OPEC website, 2015; www.opec.org ). The objective shows that 
the organization has the aim of having a balanced role that captures the welfare of producers, 
consumers, and investors in the world oil market. Unlike the non-OPEC suppliers that supply 
based on individual and unconstrained decisions, the supply of OPEC suppliers in the oil 
market is regulated through the quota policy of the organization that was introduced in 1982, 
while the forces of demand and supply play a major role regarding the prices at which both 
categories of suppliers sell in the market.  
 
Although the organization is classed as a cartel by many not all agree. Although the 
organization is largely influential in the oil market based on its relative oil reserves and costs 
of production as shown in Figures 2.5 and 2.6, it does not appear to have a predetermined 
motive to regulate supply and manipulate prices in order to maximize profit, as a classic cartel 
would . However, to oil importers and other exporters its responses to market conditions may 
make its operation look like that of a cartel. For examples, the studies of Rolf et al. (2014) and 
Griffin (1985) suggests that the organization operates like a cartel. But the work of Gurcan 
(1996) shows that the organization as a whole seems not to operate to regulate production in 
order to influence price, which is consistent with the finding of Dahl and Yucel (1991) 
regarding the non-cartel behaviour of the group of oil exporters. 
 
Although OPEC is influential in the world oil market, it still has to compete in the market 
with Non-OPEC suppliers. Examples of Non-OPEC suppliers are Russia, Mexico, Norway, 
and Canada. However, unlike OPEC producers, the non-OPEC suppliers have higher levels of 
supply in the market on average and tend to operate more like price-takers responding to 
prices by producing close to full capacity (US Energy Information Administration, 2015; 
www.eia.gov). The non-OPEC behaviour regarding price may be one of the reasons OPEC is 
viewed by some as a price setter and a cartel. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
July 2016; Ecuador suspended its membership from December 1992 to October 2007; while Indonesia 
suspended its membership from January 2009, reactivated membership in January 2016 and suspended 
membership again in November, 2016. Therefore, the organization presently has 13 members, including Nigeria. 
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The non-OPEC behaviour regarding price may also be one of the factors responsible for their 
higher level of supply in the market (see Figure 2.7). As the US Energy Information 
Administration (2015) notes, the non-OPEC suppliers tend to produce when it is profitable to 
do so, because the production activities are mostly controlled by private international or 
investor-owned companies. In contrast, the OPEC supplies are mostly controlled by national 
oil companies (NOCs) that usually have other objectives such as employment creation and 
infrastructure development, in addition to the profitability goal. Some of the other factors that 
may be responsible for the higher level of non-OPEC supply are: (i) Higher prices during the 
oil crisis of the 1970s which encouraged new investment in non-OPEC production. (ii) 
Increasing demand for oil in the world which leads to rising non-OPEC supply which is 
usually profit-driven as indicated earlier. (iii) Technological advancement in the world 
leading to new oil exploration and production technologies in the non-OPEC countries. (iv) 
New discoveries of oil in non-OPEC countries. 
 
The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) is the government-owned oil 
corporation serving as the enterprise through which the government regulates and participates 
in the oil industry. The Corporation was established in 1977 as a merger of the Nigerian 
National Oil Corporation (NNOC) and the Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR), in order 
to strengthen the representation of the Nigerian government in the petroleum industry. The 
NNOC was earlier established in 1971 for the purpose of nationalizing the petroleum sector 
and gaining control over the industry from the international oil companies (IOC) that had 
been dominant due to technological and financial advantages. The goal of becoming an OPEC 
member also motivated nationalization as OPEC requires that the governments of its members 
have large participation in their oil sectors (Nwokeji, 2007). As the author shows, the MPR 
was on the other hand created in 1975 to strengthen the operation of NNOC, leading to the 
transfer of the NNOC into the MPR. However, the NNOC and MPR were merged in 1977 to 
form the NNPC, because it was believed that the merger would enhance the achievement of 
the nationalization objective of the oil sector (Nwokeji, 2007; Thurber et al., 2010; Madichie, 
2012). 
 
The NNPC has subsidiaries relating to the key aspects of oil industry activities such as 
exploration, production, refining, distribution, and investment. It is through one of its 
subsidiaries called National Petroleum Investment Management Services (NAPIMS) that the 
Corporation controls the operations of the IOCs through Joint Ventures (JVs) and Production 
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Share Contracts (PSCs) between it on behalf of the Federal Government and the IOCs. The 
mission of NAPIMS is: “to enhance the benefits accruing to the Federation from its 
investments in the upstream petroleum industry through effective cost control and supervision 
of JV and PSC operations, as well as opening up new frontiers ” (NNPC Website, 2015, 
www.nnpcgroup.com).
2
  
 
Figure 2.5: OPEC and Non-OPEC Oil Reserves 
 
Source: OPEC Website, www.opec.org. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 The IOCs operating in the country are: Chevron, Exxon-Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, Texaco, Agip, Elf, and 
Total. It is through the JVs and PSCs between NNPC and the IOCs that the crude oil exports of Nigeria is 
produced. 
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Figure 2.6: The Real Cost of Production in OPEC and non-OPEC Countries 
 
         Source: Rolf et al. (2014) 
 
Figure 2.7: OPEC and Non-OPEC Oil Production Levels: 1974Q1-2012Q4 
   Source: Ratti, R.A. and Vespignani, J.L. (2014). 
 
2.5. Key Macroeconomic Policies of Nigeria 
 
The following sub-sections describe the key macroeconomic policies of Nigeria, namely 
fiscal and monetary polices. 
 
2.5.1. Fiscal Policy in the Economy 
 
The Nigeria Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF) is the main authority in charge of the fiscal 
policy. The Ministry is headed by the Minister of Finance who is also called the Coordinating 
Minister of the Economy. Deriving its power from the Finance Ordinance, the Ministry was 
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created in 1958 for the purpose of controlling and managing the public finance of the country 
(FMF, 2015). According to the author, some of the specific functions of the Ministry are: 
 
(i) Preparation of annual budgetary estimates for revenue and expenditure of the national 
budget. The proposed budget presented by the Ministry must be approved by the legislative 
arm of the government, then signed into law by the President of the nation, before it can be 
implemented (Ekeocha, 2012). 
   
(ii) Designing policies relating to fiscal and monetary issues. This function implies that 
although the Ministry is basically in charge of fiscal policies, its policies are coordinated with 
monetary policy.  
 
(iii)  Monitoring government revenue from oil and non-oil resources. The Ministry basically 
does this through its fiscal policies and budgetary functions. For example, the Ministry has 
adopted an oil-price-based fiscal rule, as indicated earlier in the General Introduction. This 
rule is employed by the Ministry in designing the annual budgets, as discussed in detail in 
chapter six. 
 
(iv) Working alongside international organizations such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) on behalf of the country. For example, the Minister of 
Finance of the country attends meetings organized by international organizations. 
 
(v)  Management of revenue allocations across the tiers of government. The Ministry oversees 
the allocations of revenue to the federal, state, and local governments of the country through 
the principles of fiscal federalism, which is discussed in detail in the following section.  
 
2.5.1.1. Fiscal Federalism in the Economy 
 
As indicated earlier, the system of government operating in Nigeria is federalism, which 
involves power sharing between the federal government, the 36 state governments, and the 
774 local governments. Fiscal federalism is the method of intergovernmental fiscal relations 
within the country in which there is constitutional provision for the fiscal powers and 
responsibilities of each level of government in relation to expenditures and revenues. 
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Table 2.3 presents expenditure assignment for the three tiers of government of the country, 
while Table 2.4 presents tax jurisdiction and revenue for the three levels of government. As 
revealed in Table 2.3, the central government is in charge of nationally strategic functions like 
provision of defence, while the local governments are in charge of grass root or local 
functions such as the management of land use. The residual power of the state governments 
indicated in the table refers to functions that are not assigned to the federal government or the 
local governments. The exclusive power is for the central government to conduct nationally 
strategic functions, while the concurrent power is for the central and state governments to 
carry out their shared functions (Akindele et al., 2002).   
  
Regarding revenue, as shown in Table 2.4, there are revenues that the tiers of government are 
empowered by the constitution to generate themselves through taxation and there are also 
taxation-based revenues distributed to them from a common purse. In the table, “law” points 
to the tier of government that is the source of the power backing the collection of tax, 
“collection” means the level of government that legally has the responsibility to collect tax, 
while retention/right to collect points to the tier of government or the account that has the 
legal right to be the owner or custodian of collected revenue. 
    
The revenues disbursed across the different tiers of government are usually based on a 
revenue allocation formula (RAF), which consists of two sub-formulae through which funds 
are distributed from a national account called the Federation Account, namely the horizontal 
and vertical allocation formulae (Lukpata, 2013; Salami, 2011). The vertical allocation 
formula indicates the percentages of revenue allocated to the three tiers of government from 
the Federation Account, while the horizontal formula shows the percentages of revenue 
allocated to the states and local governments only, based on the initial allocation of the 
vertical allocation formula.  
 
The RAF was initially based on the recommendations of ad hoc commissions/committees and 
the approval of the president of the country. Then in 1989 a permanent commission called the 
Revenue Mobilization, Allocation, and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) was established to 
recommend the RAF and deal with other related fiscal matters.  
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Table 2.3: Assignment of Expenditure Responsibilities to the Tiers of Government in Nigeria 
Federal Only  
Defence 
Foreign affairs 
International trade including export marking 
Currency, banking, borrowing, exchange control 
Use of water resources 
Shipping, federal trunk roads 
Elections 
Aviation, railways, postal service 
Police and other security services 
Regulation of labour, interstate commerce, telecommunications immigration 
Mines and minerals, nuclear energy, citizenship and naturalization rights 
Social Security, insurance, national statistical system (Census births, death, etc.) 
Guidelines and basis for minimum education 
Business registration 
Price control 
Federal-State Shared  
Health, Social welfare 
Education (post primary/technology) 
Culture 
Antiquities 
Monuments, archives 
Statistics, stamp duties 
Commerce, industry 
Electricity (generation, transmission, distribution) 
Research surveys 
States Only  
Residual power, i.e. subject neither assigned to federal nor local government level 
Local Governments Only  
Economic planning and development 
Health services 
Land use 
Control and regulation of advertisements, pets, small businesses 
Markets, public conveniences 
Social welfare, sewage and refuse disposal, registration of births, death, Marriages 
Primary, adult and vocational education 
Development of agriculture and natural resources 
Source: Jimoh, 2003. 
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  Table 2.4: Nigeria’s Tax Jurisdiction and Right to Revenue                                 
Tax                    Legal Jurisdiction Retention/Right to 
Revenue 
 Law Collection  
Import duties Federal Federal Federation Account 
Excise duties Federal Federal Federation Account 
Export duties Federal Federal Federation Account 
Mining rents and 
royalty 
Federal Federal Federation Account 
Petroleum profits tax Federal Federal Federation Account 
Capital gains tax Federal State State 
Personal income tax 
(apart from the ones 
listed below) 
Federal State State 
Personal income tax: 
armed and police 
forces, external affairs 
officers, residents of 
the Federal Capital 
Territory 
Federal Federal Federal 
Value added tax (sales 
tax before 1994) 
Federal Federal/State Federal/State 
Company tax Federal Federal Federation Account 
Stamp duties Federal State State 
Gift  tax  Federal State State 
Property tax and 
ratings 
State State/Local State/Local 
Licenses and fees Local Local Local 
Motor park dues Local Local Local 
Motor vehicle State Local Local 
Capital transfer tax Federal State State 
Pools betting and other 
betting taxes 
State State State 
Entertainment tax State State State 
Land registration and 
survey fees 
State State State 
Market and trading 
license and fees 
State Local Local 
 Source: Salami, 2011; Jimoh, 2003. 
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In carrying out its functions, the RMAFC is empowered by law to function as an autonomous 
entity that is not subject to the authority of any other organization. However, it works with 
relevant government agencies including the FMF as the main authority in charge of fiscal 
policy in the country (RMAFC, 2015). 
 
The Federation Account is kept by the Central Bank of the country and disbursement from the 
account to the three tiers of government is by a committee called the Federation Accounts 
Allocation Committee (FAAC). Key members of the committee include the Minister of States 
for Finance (chair), the Accountant General of the country, RMAFC, and the commissioners 
of finance of the 36 states of the nation (RMAFC, 2015; Lukpata, 2013; Salami, 2011). 
 
2.5.1.2. Fiscal Deficit in the Economy 
 
The behaviour of the fiscal deficit in Nigeria is largely influenced by oil  and the developing 
nature of the economy,. The following three features are observable in Figure 2.8: (i) The 
relatively high budget-surplus to GDP ratio around the middle of the 1970s, which is 
associated with the oil boom of the time. (ii) The dominance of fiscal deficits over the 1970-
2010 period. (iii) Fiscal deficit of less than 5% of  the GDP between 2000-2010, suggesting 
more fiscal discipline in the sub-period than over the previous period. This may be due to the 
effects of the stabilization fund and the oil-price-based fiscal rule established in the sub-
period. It may also be due to the country’s strive to meet the covergence criteria of the 
proposed West Africa Monetary Zone (WAMZ), which was initially designed to start in the 
early 2000s.
3
  
 
Furthermore, the comovements in the graphs of Figure 2.9, particularly some of the outliers of 
the graphs, give the perception of procyclicality of fiscal policy in Nigeria, which is a 
characteristic of fiscal policy that is common in developing countries (Talvi and Végh, 2005). 
These authors and others (e.g. Lane, 2003; Lane and Tornell, 1998) argue that political 
economy externalities associated with the diffusion of political power among different 
                                                          
3
Achieving a fiscal deficit of no more than 4% of the GDP by all the proposing members of the monetary union 
is one of the convergence criteria of the union. The monetary union was to start in 2003 with the following 
proposing members: Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Gambia. But the starting date has been 
postponed five times, because the proposing members have not all met the convergence criteria for starting it. 
The five postponements are: from 2003 to 2005, from 2005 to 2010, from 2010 to 2014, from 2014 to 2015, and 
from 2015 to 2020.  
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authorities may be the key factor causing the procyclicality of fiscal policy. The fiscal 
federalism adopted by the country which distributes power between the three tiers of 
government and multiple organizations and agencies within the different levels of government 
can lead to the proliferation of authorities that may be “competing” for their shares of the 
national resources. The quest to have the best share of the “national cake” by multiple 
authorities may put pressure on the national resources and cause government expenditure to 
increase during the booms and decrease during the recessions. 
 
For example, based on possible implicit rent-seeking motives, the 36 state governments and 
some individuals in political positions in Nigeria sued the Federal government over the 
illegality of the Excess Crude Account (ECA) established by the government for the purpose 
of saving surplus oil revenue during oil booms and dissaving during oil revenue shortfalls (see 
for examples, This Day Live Newspaper, 2014; channels TV, 2012). The central argument 
underlying the alleged illegality is that section 162(1) of the Nigerian constitution indicates 
that all revenues earned by the federal government, with the exception of certain proceeds 
from the personal income tax that only the federal government has the right to collect, should 
be kept only in the Federation Account and not in any other account. The exempted personal 
income tax proceeds include proceeds from the armed forces of the country, the Ministry of 
external affairs, the police force, and the residents of the Federal Capital Territory, as shown 
in Table 2.4 above. The developments affected the continuity of the building process of the 
ECA and led to its replacement by a sovereign wealth fund (see Sovereign wealth Fund 
Institute, 2015; http://www.swfinstitute.org). 
 
Therefore, the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority Act of 2011 was enacted, upon 
which the establishment of the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority (NSIA) is based. 
The 2011 Act authorizes the NSIA to function as an independent entity to manage Nigeria’s 
Sovereign Wealth Fund, which has three sub-funds jointly owned by the three arms of the 
government of the country, namely the Future Generations Fund, the Nigeria Infrastructure 
Fund, and the Stabilization Fund (see Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority, 2015; 
http://nsia.com.ng). As the author shows, in line with the names of the three sub-funds, they 
capture three main purposes: (i) saving for future generations; (ii) infrastructure development; 
and (iii) protection of the macroeconomy against external shocks associated with the 
dependence of the country on the export of hydrocarbons, particularly crude oil.  
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Figure 2.8: Fiscal Surplus/Deficit in Nigeria (1970-2010) 
 
Data Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin, 2010 Edition. 
 
Figure 2.9:Nominal GDP Growth Rate and Fiscal Surplus/Deficit in Nigeria  
                  (1970-2010) 
 
Data Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin, 2010 Edition. 
 
2.5.2. Monetary Policy in the Economy 
 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), headed by a Governor, is the main authority in charge of 
monetary policy in Nigeria, with legal authority over other banks. The Bank came into being 
in 1959, deriving its power from the Central Bank Act of 1958, which has different amended 
versions (CBN, 2015). The earlier Act of the Bank was replaced by the CBN Act of 2007. 
The operations of the Bank have been based on the framework created by the Acts. The 
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operations reflect the relationships of the Bank with the government, other banks in the 
country, and the economy as a whole. Discussions of the key features of  the operations are 
done as follows.  
 
2.5.2.1. Central Bank Independence 
 
According to CBN (2015), the CBN Act of 2007 gives the Bank full independence compared 
to the limited autonomy of the previous Act. However, the full independence is practically in 
terms of the Bank’s power to use monetary instruments. That is, the independence may be 
termed instrument independence, as distict from goal independence (Ojo, 2013). Crowe and 
Meade (2008) distinguish between the two types of independece, based on the works of 
Debelle and Fischer (1995) and Fischer (1995). Instrument independence implies that a 
central bank is legally free to use monetary policy instruments to achieve the goals set by a 
higher authority, which is usually the government.On the other hand, goal independence gives 
the bank the power to set monetary policy objectives.  
 
Based on the nature of the independence of the CBN, it is subject to the Nigerian federal 
government in some way, which may give room for political interference in the operations of 
the Bank. Such interference may cause weak coordination between fiscal and monetary 
authorities in the economy. 
   
2.5.2.2. Implicit Inflation Targeting 
 
The main objectives that the CBN pursues as stated in the CBN Act of 2007 (Federal 
Republic of Nigeria Official Gazatte, 2007) are: 
 
(a) Monetary and price stability. 
 
(b) Provision of legal tender currency. 
 
(c) Management of external reserves to protect the international value of the currency. 
 
(d) Fostering a sound financial system in the country. 
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(e) Serving as the banker of the Federal Government, and providing economic and financial 
advice to the government. 
 
A key feature of the 2007 Act distiguishing it from the 1958 Act and its amendments is that it 
has price stability explicitly stated as one of the objectives of the Bank (Ojo, 2013). 
Achieving low inflation gradually became the focus of the CBN since the introduction of the 
2007 Act, with the interest rate being the main policy instrument (Ojo, 2013; Nnanna, 2011; 
Chibundu, 2009), which is consistent with the policy implications of the New Consesus 
Macroeconomics (NCM) (Arestis, 2009).  
 
Unlike advanced countries like New Zealand, Canada, and United Kingdom; and emerging 
markets like Brazil, Chile, and South Africa that have formerly adopted the Inflation 
Targeting (IT) policy, Nigeria only adopts the partial dimension of the policy. Economies like 
the US, the Euro Area, Japan, and Switzerland also adopt some of the features of the IT, and 
like Nigeria the economies are not classified as IT economies in the literature (Roger, 2010). 
 
A key element of the IT framework is that the central bank of an economy directly and 
explicitly announces a particular numerical value of the inflation target as the primary and 
only goal of monetary policy, with inflation being the only monetary variable for which a 
target is announced (IMF, 2006; Ojo, 2013; Roger, 2010). Besides, it is also necessary in 
formal inflation targeting that inflation forecasts are obtained and published to serve as guides 
regarding possible inflation pressures. 
 
The CBN targets “single digit” inflation, using market-based instruments, particularly the 
interest rate, to achieve the “inflation target,” while pursuing the achievement of other 
monetary policy objectives, reflecting the indirect and implicit form of the policy. That is, the 
country’s inflation target is “single digit inflation” and price stability is not explicitly given 
the priority in the five objectives of the CBN stated above. 
 
2.5.2.3. Interest Rate as the Main Policy Instrument 
  
As indicated earlier, the interest rate is the main monetary instrument of the CBN in achieving 
the objectives. The dynamics through which the instrument works is that a central interest rate 
serves as the anchor for the other rates, so that variations in the anchor rate initiates desired 
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policy changes in the other rates and the system as a whole. The interest rates currently used 
in monetary policy by the CBN include: interbank discount rate, Treasury Bill rate, saving 
deposit rate, fixed deposit rate, lending rate, and Monetary Policy Rate (MPR), with the MPR 
serving as the anchor rate. 
 
The MPR was introduced in 2006 to replace the Minimum Rediscount Rate (MRR) which 
was the initial anchor rate. The MRR was replaced because it was not effective in anchoring 
other rates and impacting on the broad macroeconomy (Ononugbo, 2012). There has been 
improvement in the performance of monetary policy since the introduction of the MPR, 
particularly in terms of inflation rate (Mordi and Adebiyi, 2014), which is a main objective of 
the policy. Figure 2.10 below displays the average inflation rates in Nigeria before and after 
the introduction of the MPR.  
 
Figure 2.10: Average Inflation Rates in Nigeria   
Source: Mordi and Adebiyi, 2014. 
 
The success of the MPR may be associated with the market-based or indirect monetary policy 
approach under which the interest rate works. The approach has been the method of monetary 
policy adopted by the CBN since 1993. The market-based method of monetary policy is 
generally regarded to be the most effective approach. For example, direct monetary 
instruments like administrative control of interest rates may lead to inefficient resource 
allocation in the economy.  
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2.5.2.4. Monetary Policy Frameworks 
 
Generally, monetary policy approaches in Nigeria may be broadly divided into two phases, 
namely the exchange rate targeting phase (1959-1973) and the monetary targeting phase 
(1974-date), with the latter having direct (1974-1992) and market-based monetary targeting 
(1993-date) sub-phases (see for examples, Chibundu, 2009; Nnanna, 2001; Mordi and 
Adebiyi, 2014). The exchange rate targeting and direct monetary targeting frameworks 
involved administrative determination of  monetary variables. 
 
Exchange rate targeting started with fixing the exchange rate between the Nigerian currency 
and the British currency, while the direct monetary targeting involved the CBN setting the 
interets rate, identifying priority sectors of the economy, and directing banks on the allocation 
of credit to the sectors accordingly. Monetary aggregates were controlled through these 
processes. However, under the indirect monetary targeting, tools like the Open Market 
Operation (OMO) are employed to achieve the targets of monetary aggregates, which are 
determined in line with the the general macoeconomic policies of the country.  
 
Again, in terms of low inflation as a key monetary policy objective, monetary policy under 
the indirect monetary targeting regime has perfomed well on average, with headline inflation 
falling from over 70% in 1996 to below 10% in August 2013, as shown in Figure 2.11 below 
(Mordi and Adebiyi, 2014). According to these authors, real growth under the regime rose 
from about 0.8% in 1994 to about 6.6% in 2012, as shown in Figure 2.12 below. 
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Figure 2.11: Headline Inflation under Different Monetary Regimes in Nigeria 
 
Source: Mordi and Adebiyi, 2014. 
   
Figure 2.12: Real GDP Growth under Different Monetary Regimes in Nigeria 
Source: Mordi and Adebiyi, 2014. 
 
2.6. The Degree of Openness and Global Integration of the Economy 
 
Nigeria’s degree of openness and global integration is relatively high. Obadan (2008) notes 
that the level of the country’s trade openness is high, even compared to that of some industrial 
42 
 
economies. Figure 2.13 below shows the degrees of openness in Nigeria and selected 
developed countries, with respect to trade and other forms of cross-country flows.
4
  
 
Figure 2.13: The Degrees of Openness in Nigeria and Selected Developed Countries  
                      (1970-2010) 
 
Source of Data: KOF Swiss Economic Institute (www.kof.ethz.ch). 
 
Regarding globalization, Nigeria is ranked 81st in 2012 and 67th in 2013 in the world 
globalization ranking, based on the evaluation of 208 and 207 economies respectively (KOF 
Swiss Economic Institute, 2013, www.kof.ethz.ch). The globalization ranking is done annually 
based on an index that is computed by using economic, social, and political factors that affect 
the global integration of the economies evaluated. 
 
Trade plays a key role in Nigeria’s openness and globalization, because it is the dominant 
source of macroeconomic fluctuations in country as a trade-oriented economy. The US is the 
most important trade partner of the country as shown in Figures 2.14 and 2.15 below. Figure 
2.14 indicates that the US accounts for about 45% of Nigeria’s exports, while the European 
Union (EU) accounts for about 25% of the exports. According to Figure 2.15, Spain is the 
dominant market of Nigeria’s exports within the EU, as it accounts for over 30% of the 
exports to the Union. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 The degree of openness is defined as the aggregated percentage share of the flows in the GDPs of the 
considered countries. The flows consist of trade (% of GDP); foreign direct investment (FDI) and stocks (% of 
GDP); portfolio investment (% of GDP); and income payments to foreign nationals (% of GDP).   
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Figure 2.14: Nigeria’s Direction of Trade in Goods and Services (% of Total) in 1990 to 2007 
 
Source: Obiora (2009). 
 
Figure 2.15: Nigeria’s Main Exports Markets within the European Union (1990-2007) 
 
Source: Obiora (2009). 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
 
Since independence Nigeria has experienced various policy and institutional frameworks, as 
shown in the nature of its monetary and fiscal policies, which are a mix of discretionary and 
rule-based policies. The degree of the latter form of polices may increase in the economy 
when the proposed West Africa Monetary Zone is eventually formed. 
 
The chapter finds that oil has a central role in the fiscal policy of the country. This is revealed 
by the structural changes in vital fiscal varibles like government revenue, government 
expenditure, and fiscal deficit, particularly in the middle of the 1970s. Regarding monetary 
policy, there is the evidence of improved performance of the policy within the market-led 
framework involving indirect instruments, relative to the controlled policy framework that 
existed earlier. However, the relatively high level of the openness, the global integration, and 
the oil dependency of the economy has strategic roles to play in the fluctuations and the 
behaviours of the economy. This subject is examined further in the subsequent chapters of the 
thesis.    
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Chapter 3: Overview of the Theoretical Literature on the 
Transmission of Shocks 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Over the years, international shocks such as unexpected or unpredicted variations in economic 
and financial variables have affected countries, regions, and the global economy with varied 
signs (negative or positive), magnitude, speed of transmission, and persistence. Consequently 
shocks have received considerable attention in the literature. The literature has various 
theoretical models explaining the transmission of shocks. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present an overview of the theoretical literature on the 
transmission of international shocks, in order to provide the theoretical foundation of the 
empirical chapters of the thesis, which deal with different dimensions of the transmission of 
shocks. The first empirical chapter (chapter 4) deals with the transmission of oil and domestic 
shocks within a global framework (GVAR), linking the focus economy (Nigeria) with the rest 
of the world. The second empirical chapter (chapter 5) deals with common growth 
fluctuations between Nigeria, US and Euro Area, which are transmitted from the latter 
economies, particularly the US. The third and last empirical chapter (chapter 6) examines the 
effectiveness of Nigeria’s fiscal policy instruments in protecting the country against oil 
shocks transmitted from the global economy.  
 
The present chapter begins with the review of the theories of transmission of shocks under the 
two broad categories shown in the theoretical literature, namely crisis-based and non-crisis 
based theories. Generally, shocks are transmitted during tranquil and crisis periods. However, 
the theoretical literature also shows that macroeconomic (i.e. fiscal and monetary) shocks are 
transmitted via certain channels. Therefore, the chapter also examines the theories relating to 
the channels of the transmission of monetary and fiscal shocks.  
 
3.2. Theoretical Models of Shocks 
 
The theories relating to internationally transmitted shocks may be categorized into two: (i) 
crisis-based theories; and (ii) non-crisis-based theories. While the underlying factor of the 
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crisis-based theories is the existence of some “disaster” causing the transmission of 
fluctuations from an individual economy (or a group of economies) into other economies, the 
non-crisis-based theories are rooted in the normal interdependence between economies due to 
trade and financial linkages. We present detailed discussions on the two categories of theories 
as follows: 
 
3.2.1. Crisis-Based Theories 
 
Contagion is the key concept underlying the crisis-based theories. The concept has been 
defined variously in the literature. For example, Dornbusch et al. (2000) define contagion as 
an increase in cross-market comovement during a crisis episode. On the other hand, Edwards 
(2000) defines the concept as a condition in which the actual level of the transmission of 
international shocks is above the level expected by market agents. As argued by Edwards, this 
“residual-related” definition is consistent with the concept of contagion in the epidemiological 
literature, where the actual level of the manifestation of a disease above the expected level is 
regarded as contagion. 
 
The central point of the argument of Edwards (2000) is that the residual-based definition 
means that pure contagion occurs when there are internationally transmitted shocks that are 
not global shocks or shocks from related economies. As the author explains, the global or 
common shocks, like the global recession of 2007-2009, are the ones that affect the world 
economy as a whole; while the shocks from related economies are based on interdependence 
or similarity of features between the origins and destinations of the shocks, such as the case of 
the shocks originating from trade partners or the shocks between emerging markets. This 
implies that pure contagion occurs when international shocks excluding global shocks and 
shocks from related economics are transmitted during crisis. Pure contagion is therefore 
measured by the correlation existing between economies during crisis that is not explained by 
fundamentals.  
 
This notion of contagion is consistent with that of Masson (1998), who also distinguishes 
between contagion and the other two forms of shocks indicated by Edward (2000). Based on 
these two studies, we therefore have three main forms of international shocks, which may be 
measured through fundamentals and non-fundamentals accordingly: (i) Global or common 
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shocks which can be measured through fundamentals.
5
 (ii) Shocks from related or 
interdependent economies, which can also be measured through fundamentals.
6
 As shown by 
Dornbusch et al. (2000), these two forms of shocks would only cause contagion (i.e. 
fundamentals-based contagion) when they are associated with a crisis, as the shocks may take 
place both in crisis and tranquil times. (iii) Pure contagion, which is based on the behaviour of 
economic or market agents, reflecting that they are explained by non-fundamentals and not 
fundamentals. In line with the foregoing explanations, the crisis-based theories in the 
literature are discussed under two broad classes as follows:  
 
3.2.1.1. Agent-Based Contagion 
 
As noted above, this form of contagion, which is the cross-country transmission of a crisis 
without any observed variations in macroeconomic fundamentals, is called pure contagion. 
Some of the key theories relating to this form of contagion are discussed below.  
 
3.2.1.1.1. Multiple Equilibria Theory 
 
Basically, multiple equilibria is   an abnormal market condition in which there is more than 
one equilibria, because the supply curve cuts the demand curve more than once. This implies 
there is more than one market clearing price. In a multiple equilibria framework, contagion 
occurs when a crisis in one economy shifts another economy from a good to a bad equilibrium 
regardless of the state of the macroeconomic fundamentals. The shift is due to changes in the 
expectations of economic agents on the second economy. 
 
The crisis in the first economy causes a change in the investors’ beliefs in the second 
economy, causing the agents to sell their assets in the latter economy, despite the fact that 
there are no observed changes in its macroeconomic fundamentals. Examples of studies 
involving multiple equilibria are Masson (1998), and Jeanne (1997). These theories are useful 
in explaining phenomena like speculative attacks on economies with sound macroeconomic 
fundamentals. 
                                                          
5
Masson (1998) shows that common shocks can also take place when the policy actions of advanced economies 
have common effects on emerging markets. This makes the nature of the shocks global, since the economies of 
the world may be broadly divided into industrial and emerging groups. The author gives the term “monsoonal 
effects” to this type of shocks.   
6
 Masson (1998) terms this type of shocks as “spillovers.” 
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3.2.1.1.2. Endogenous Liquidity Theory 
 
Endogenous liquidity models argue that contagion is a consequence of international liquidity 
constraints initiated by a crisis in one country. For example, a crisis in one country may lead 
to a decrease in the liquidity of investors in the crisis country and forces them to sell their 
assets in the neighbouring countries to meet regulatory requirements to stay in the crisis hit 
market. Examples of theoretical studies of endogenous liquidity are Valdes (1998) and Calvo 
(1999). 
 
As this explanation shows, endogenous liquidity is different from exogenous liquidity. The 
former refers to the liquidity inherent in the assets of the investors, which may be called inside 
liquidity. On the other hand, exogenous liquidity is associated with the liability structure of 
the investors, such as their ability to borrow, which may be called outside liquidity.    
 
3.2.1.1.3. Herding 
 
Generally, herding describes the mutual behaviour of the individuals in a group without any 
pre-planned direction. Examples of studies on the theory of herding are the works of Calvo 
and Mendoza (2000) and Cipriani and Guarino (2010). 
 
Herding is associated with informational cascade, which occurs when certain agents follow 
the behaviour of other agents, because the former agents believe that the latter ones have 
better information. Therefore, herding models are basically social learning models involving 
agents obtaining information and learning from the behaviour of others, with the actions of 
agents revealing their private information and initiating public beliefs and common choices 
(Gale, 1996; Chamley, 2004). However, if agents move contrary to the behaviour of the other 
agents, contrarianism occurs instead of herding.  
 
3.2.1.2. Fundamentals-Based Contagion 
 
Fundamentals-based contagion is related to the transmission of world or local shocks between 
countries due to real and/or financial linkages. A key feature of this form of contagion is the 
negative effects of the crisis underlying the transmission of shocks between countries. This is 
because in tranquil times shocks associated with normal real and financial interdependence 
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between countries may have positive effects, but in crisis periods such effects may be 
negative. 
  
Some of the examples of theories relating to fundamentals-based contagion are in Pristker 
(2000) and Chang and Majnoni (2000). For instance, Chang and Majnoni (2000) present a 
model involving a country rolling over foreign debt, with the possibility of both fundamentals 
and self-fulling expectations of market agents causing contagion. In the model, there is an 
opportunity cost to the government of the domestic economy of obtaining foreign funds by 
selling new debt, which is associated to the returns of the alternative investments of foreign 
investors. 
 
Therefore, a crisis in foreign economies such as a monetary policy shock in industrial 
economies can increase the opportunity cost of foreign funds and cause the domestic economy 
to experience contagion, which is equivalent to what Masson (1998) terms “monsoonal 
effects.” Besides, a shock in an economy similar in nature to the domestic economy (e.g. a 
shock between two emerging markets) can also increase the opportunity cost and cause 
contagion in the home economy, which is what Masson terms “spillovers.” Two key 
fundamentals driving contagion in the model are the size of government debt and the maturity 
period of the debt. 
 
3.2.2. Non-Crisis-Based Theories 
 
The empirical chapters of this thesis relate to the non-crisis-based theories rather than the 
crisis-based ones. The core of the non-crisis-based theories is that cross-country shocks occur 
because of the trade and financial linkages between the countries of the world. This implies 
that whether there is tranquillity or crisis the linkages would transmit shocks between 
countries. 
 
Kose and Riezman (2001) present a model of a small open economy that captures the major 
characteristics of an African economy in order to analyse the relative effects of trade shocks 
in Africa. These characteristics include: (i) Heavy dependence on trade, particularly primary 
commodities as exports and intermediate inputs and capital goods as imports, which creates 
potential vulnerability to terms of trade shocks. (ii) Heavy indebtedness and the necessity of 
debt service, leading to susceptibility to fluctuations in the world interest rate. The authors’ 
50 
 
model is dynamic, stochastic, and multi-sectoral, where trade shocks are modelled as 
fluctuations in the prices of exports and imports, while financial shocks are variations in the 
global real interest rate. 
 
Mendoza (1995) constructed a small three-sector open economy model using an intertemporal 
general equilibrium approach to explore the role terms-of-trade shocks in the fluctuations of 
business cycles. The transmission mechanisms of the terms-of-trade shocks in the model are 
through international capital mobility, the cost of imported inputs, and the overall purchasing 
power of exports. As shown by the author, the constructed model is suitable to test certain 
regular empirical features of business cycles, one of which is the size, persistence, and 
procyclicality of terms-of-trade shocks. 
 
Gerlach and Smets (1995) employ a two-country model involving trade flows to show how 
speculative attacks on the currency of one country can lead to trade deficits and speculative 
attacks on the currency of the second country, causing the collapse of the exchange parities of 
the economies to be interrelated. A central assumption of the model is that the economies 
operate fixed exchange rate regimes, since the floating exchange rates should not be 
susceptible to speculative attacks.   
 
Karayalcin (1996) built a two-country model to explore the effects of a supply shock 
emanating from one of the countries and the transmission of the shock through the stock 
markets channel, assuming  adjustment costs affect the investment decisions of the firms. As 
indicated by the author, a central feature of the model is that it deviates from the assumption 
in the related literature that capital can be moved costlessly between countries. Summarily, 
the model involves the transmission of a “real” shock through a financial channel. 
 
Shimokawa and Kyle (2003) developed a portfolio selection model to explore the 
transmission of shocks through the financial linkages created by international bank lending. 
The authors note that a unique feature of the model is the nature of its banks’ profit function. 
The profit function has international and home parts. The nature of the model makes it 
possible to derive a simultaneous equations system through which the model is solved. The 
model captures the correlation between the domestic conditions of banks’ home economies 
and their lending behaviour. The findings demonstrate the possibility of transmission of 
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shocks from a lender country to debtor countries and the transmission of shocks between 
debtor countries through a creditor. 
 
3.2.2.1. Oil-Related Theories 
 
Based on the focus given to oil in this thesis, we choose to discuss oil-related theories that are 
associated with the non-crisis theories below. The oil-related theories were built to explain the 
transmission mechanisms and effects of oil price fluctuations on the economy. Therefore, the 
relationship between the non-crisis and the oil-related theories is that the former show the 
connection between cross-country shocks and international interdependence, while the latter 
reveal the transmission channels and impacts of oil price shocks on the economy based on the 
interdependence. 
 
The oils shocks can have permanent effects on the economy through rent seeking, the Dutch 
disease, and the like, as discussed below: 
 
3.2.2.1.1. Rent-Seeking Models 
 
Rent-seeking models show how individual economic agents seek to acquire more wealth from 
the economy’s resources at the expense of the welfare of other agents. The work of Tornell 
and Lane (1999) seems to be outstanding in the rent-seeking literature. The authors’ model 
consists of a two-sector economy where powerful groups exist and interact, with the 
interaction modelled as an infinite-horizon dynamic game. The existence of weak legal and 
political institutions of the economy enables the powerful groups to seek a greater share of the 
resources of the economy following a windfall (e.g. a windfall following a rise in resource 
price), leading to a redistributive struggle between the groups that eventually leads to 
resources been used on non-taxable and unproductive activities that may hinder growth. 
 
According to the authors, there is therefore a voracity effect in the above process, leading to 
an inefficient rise in redistribution which would not exist if the political and legal framework 
of the economy restricted the powerful groups and enhanced diffusion of power. One major 
implication of the behaviour of the rent-seeking powerful groups is that they may use their 
power to obtain economic policies that may hinder growth. For example, they may influence 
the optimal fiscal policy of the society, which may eventually cause rising inflation and a 
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growth slowdown. Other studies of the rent-seeking theory are Wick and Bulte (2006); and 
Torvik (2002). 
      
3.2.2.1.2. Dutch-Disease Models 
 
These models explain the negative impact of a resource boom on an economy through a 
mechanism involving the booming sector causing more expensive non-resource exports, the 
reallocation of resources from the non-resource sector (i.e. manufacturing sector) to the non-
tradable sector, and the eventual decline of the non-resource sector, as a consequence of 
exchange rate appreciating in real terms. 
 
Wijnbergen (1984) developed a model showing how oil can cause a decrease in aggregate 
income through the channel of learning by doing. When oil revenue increases in a country, the 
population seeks to use part of the increase for the consumption of non-traded goods, 
transferring resources from the traded sector to the non-traded sector. This consequently 
decreases learning by doing and production in the traded sector, leading to weaker aggregate 
income in the economy. More recent works on the Dutch disease theory are Sachs and Warner 
(1995); Matsen and Torvik (2005); and Torvik (2001). 
 
3.2.2.1.3. Models Explaining Oil-Shock-Macroeconomy Relationship with Focus on Oil 
Importers  
 
The theoretical literature also clearly shows the negative impact of positive oil price shocks 
on the economy of oil importers. The mechanism through which the increases in oil price 
shocks affect oil importers include the terms of trade at the macroeconomic level and the 
purchasing power of economic agents at the microeconomic level. The price increases are 
wealth transfers from oil importers to exporters, leading to effects similar to that of a tax on 
the consumption of economic agents, which eventually weakens their purchasing power. 
 
DePratto et al. (2009) built a New Keynesian general equilibrium open economy model to 
explore the effects of oil price increases on an oil importing economy. In the model oil price 
variations are transmitted through different channels, which allow the fluctuations to have 
short-term and long-term effects on output both via the demand-side and supply-side of the 
economy, with the latter and former captured through the IS curve and the Phillips curve 
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respectively. This makes it possible to compare short-term and long-term effects of oil shocks, 
as well as demand-side and supply-side effects. Other theoretical works on the impact of oil 
shocks on the economy of an importer are Rotemberg and Woodford (1996); and Fin (2000).  
    
3.3. Theories Relating to the Transmission of Fiscal and Monetary Shocks 
 
The theoretical literature shows that there are certain mechanisms through which fiscal and 
monetary shocks in individual economies are transmitted into other economies. Designing 
optimum policies requires that policymakers have accurate knowledge of these channels, 
considering the increasing interlinkages and interdependencies between the countries of the 
world. Globalization has changed the magnitude and structures of cross-country interactions 
and comovements (Frankel, 2000; Kose and Prasad, 2010), hence external developments have 
become key factors to consider in designing national policies. The main transmission 
channels of fiscal and monetary shocks shown in the theoretical literature are discussed 
below. 
 
3.3.1. Channels of Transmission of Fiscal Policy Shocks 
 
Fiscal shocks in individual economies lead to fiscal spillovers from source countries to 
recipient countries. The shocks occur due to changes in variables such as government 
expenditure, government revenue, and government budget balance. The spillovers emanating 
from the shocks are of various forms (Weyerstrass et al., 2006; Belke and Osowski, 2016): 
 
i. External vs Internal Spillovers:  External spillovers originate from the interlinkages 
between the recipients of spillovers and foreign countries. Internal spillovers occur between 
countries having economic integration or between the sectors of individual countries. For 
example, internal spillovers can occur between the members of the Euro Area or between the 
oil sector and the other sectors of an oil exporter such as Nigeria. 
 
ii. Direct vs Indirect Spillovers: Direct spillovers are the ones working via trade linkages. 
Increases or decreases in domestic demand originating from fiscal shocks are transmitted 
directly through the exports and imports of concerned economies. This implies that the 
exports and imports of trade partners will also be impacted. On the other hand, indirect 
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spillovers work via non-fiscal (i.e. monetary) variables such as interest rates and exchange 
rates. 
 
iii. Positive or Negative Spillovers: Positive spillovers are the ones that enhance the 
macroeconomic welfare of origin and recipient countries, while negative spillovers are the 
ones with negative impact. For example, the recession of 2007-2009 which originated from 
the US had negative fiscal effects on the US and other countries, hence the spillovers 
associated with the recession were negative ones. 
 
iv. Policy-Induced vs Shock-Induced Spillovers: Policy-induced spillovers point to the 
cross-border impact of fiscal policies adopted in individual countries, while shock-induced 
spillovers are caused by large and usually unexpected changes in the values of fiscal variables 
in source countries. In the context of this thesis, external and internal spillovers are 
particularly relevant, in that both external and internal shocks are captured in the empirical 
chapters.  
 
According to Alcidi et al. (2016), three main channels through which fiscal policy shocks are 
transmitted internationally are demand channel, competitiveness channel, and financial 
markets channel. The relative roles of the channels in individual countries depend on the 
structures of the countries, as shown in the discussions below. 
 
i. Demand Channel: Fiscal shocks in individual countries affect domestic demand and 
demand for imported goods, due to their impact on output. Export demand will change in the 
economies of trade partners because of the change in the demand for imports. This leads to 
the transmission of fiscal shocks from source countries into their trade partners. The output 
channel is also called the trade channel because of the role of trade in its operation. Kose and 
Raymond (2001) show through their model of a typical African economy such as Nigeria that 
the trade channel is the most important channel in Africa, with respect to contributions to 
variations in aggregate output. This is largely due to the large dependence of African 
countries on trade. Generally, empirical evidence shows that trade is the dominant channel of 
international transmission of business cycles (Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005; Dees et al., 
2007). 
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ii. The Competitiveness Channel: Fiscal shocks lead to changes in inflation in source 
countries and their trade partners. This causes changes in relative prices and hence the terms 
of trade, leading to spillover effects through the competitiveness channel, which is also called 
the terms of trade channel. The findings of Mendoza (1995) give important insight on the 
competitiveness channel for developing countries such as Nigeria. The author shows through 
a theoretical model of a small open economy that terms of trade shocks account for about 
50% of GDP variations in developing economies. 
 
iii. Financial Markets Channel: This channel consists of various financial mechanisms of 
cross-country spillovers, such as the interest rate and exchange rate mechanisms. Fiscal 
shocks in one country can cause changes in the interest rates and exchange rates of other 
countries, leading to interest rates and exchange rates spillovers. In the context of this thesis, 
the traditional small open-economy literature (i.e. Fleming, 1962; Mundell, 1963; Dornbusch, 
1976) shows that small economies such as Nigeria are small relative to the global economy, 
therefore the economies are exogenously impacted by variations in global variables and 
variables of large economies such as the US. This has relevance for the financial markets 
channel, in that variations in, say the US interest rate, will have spillover effects in Nigeria, 
while variations in the Nigeria’s interest rate will not have significant spillover effects on the 
US. The financial markets channel can also be associated with agent sentiments. Fiscal shocks 
can be triggered in the economy by financial news such as the announcement of government 
spending forecasts (Callegari et al., 2016). Such news can cause agent sentiments and cross-
country spillovers through financial contagion effects. The channel of stock markets is also a 
potential financial channel of international spillovers (Karayalcin, 1996), hence fiscal 
spillovers may also occur through the stock markets of developing countries, particularly 
frontier markets such as Nigeria. Some African economies, including Nigeria, are classified as 
frontier markets in international stock markets rankings. The stock markets of frontier markets 
play a large role in their economic activity, as the markets are experiencing increasing 
development and attracting investors (Nellor, 2008). Therefore, the markets constitute a 
significant potential channel of spillovers. 
 
3.3.2. Channels of Transmission of Monetary Policy Shocks 
 
Monetary policy shocks are transmitted via mechanisms relating to financial market prices 
and quantities (Taylor, 1995). Examples of the prices are short-term interest rates, long-term 
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interest rates, exchange rates, etc. On the other hand, examples of the quantities are bank 
credits, money supply, government bonds, etc. The theories of the transmission channels of 
monetary policy associated with the financial market prices and quantities may be classified 
into the following main categories (Boivin et al., 2010; Endut et al., 2015):  
 
i. The “Money” View: Theories under the money view relates primarily to the interest rate 
and exchange rate channels, hence this category can also be tagged the financial market prices 
view. Since the theories under the category deal with the effects of shocks on prices, they 
explain the spending behaviours of firms and households associated with variations in the 
prices. The interest rate plays a key role in the spillover effects of the theories. For example, a 
contractionary monetary policy in a country will affect agent behaviour about investment by 
increasing long-term interest rates and the cost of capital, which will eventually increase 
investment and interest rates in other countries.  The exchange rate also affects the 
transmission of monetary policy shocks via international trade, based a mechanism involving 
net exports. Under a flexible exchange rate policy, exports decrease and imports increase 
when there is exchange rate appreciation in the economy. A contractionary monetary policy 
shock in a country will make real interest rate to increase, which will lead to the inflow of 
capital into the nation, in line with the degree of financial openness of the economy. Domestic 
currency will appreciate due to the increase in capital inflow. Exports will increase and 
imports will decrease due to the appreciation of exchange rate, leading to a decrease in net 
exports. 
 
ii. Credit View: There are two main transmission channels under this view, namely the 
balance sheet and bank-lending channels. The channels operate based on the spending 
behaviours of agents during shocks. These behaviours relate to market imperfections: the 
balance sheet channel works through adverse selection and moral hazard, while the bank-
lending channel operates based on asymmetry information in the private markets where banks 
supply loans.  
 
a. Bank-Lending Channel: There are no perfect substitutes for retail bank deposits in the 
private markets where banks supply loans. Therefore, a shock, say an expansionary monetary 
policy shock, will increase bank deposits and the quantity of bank loans in the economy 
where the private markets operate, leading to an increase in investment by domestic firms, 
particularly small firms, that rely on loans as the main source of finance because they cannot 
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get funds from other sources (e.g. stock markets). The shock will also attract firms from other 
economies to invest in the domestic economy, which may lead to reduction of investment in 
the foreign economies, implying positive investment effects in the domestic economy and 
negative effects in foreign economies.  Shimokawa and Kyle (2003) show that monetary 
policy shocks transmitted through the bank-lending channel can be of two forms: spillover 
effects from creditor banks in advanced economies to debtors (developing countries); and 
common creditor effects involving spillovers between debtor countries due to common 
creditors. For example, a shock in a debtor country may reduce the profitability of a creditor, 
leading to reduction of credit and investment in other debtor countries. In the Nigerian 
context, the bank recapitalization policy introduced in 2005 to strengthen the banking sector 
has increased the effectiveness of banks (Bakare, 2011). This has consequently promoted the 
operation of the country’s bank-lending channel by increasing lending (Enoch, 2013). 
 
b. Balance Sheets Channel: As indicate earlier, this channel is associated with asymmetry 
information problems in privates markets, such as moral hazard and adverse selection. The 
central point about the channel is that the status of balance sheets is a mechanism of the 
response of the economy, via private markets, to monetary policy shocks. The net worth of 
agents correlates with agents’ collateral, as a reduction in the former causes a reduction in the 
latter, leading to a rise in adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the markets. The 
problems will make lenders to reduce loans, which will eventually cause reduction of 
spending and aggregate demand in the economy. The balance sheets channel plays a 
significant role in the transmission of monetary policy shocks into the Nigerian 
macroeconomic economy (Olowofeso et al. 2014).  The study of these authors is particularly 
relevant, in that it explores the transmission of monetary policy shocks through the balance 
sheets channel from a macroeconomic perspective, by examining the transmission of shocks 
via output and prices into the macroeconomy.   
  
3.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter reviews the theoretical literature on internationally transmitted shocks, with the 
aim of providing the theoretical foundation for the empirical analysis of the thesis. The review 
captures the main theories of transmission of shocks in the theoretical literature: theories of 
transmission of crisis-based and non-crisis-based shocks; and theories of transmission of 
fiscal and monetary shocks. The review shows that there is little Africa-specific work (e.g. 
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Kose and Raymond, 2011) on the transmission of shocks. This makes the analyses of the 
empirical chapters of this thesis relevant, as they contribute to filling the identified gap by 
providing empirical evidence on some aspects of the transmission mechanisms of the 
theoretical literature on Nigeria’s internationally transmitted shocks. However, there are some 
important findings got from the review of the present chapter. 
 
The chapter shows that recent crises such as those of Mexico (1994), Europe (1992-1993), 
and Asia (1997-1998) are widely captured in the crisis-based theories. The reason for this may 
be that the crises have significant effects on neighbouring economies and the world as a 
whole, compared to previous crises. This implies that the wide attention given to the crises is 
associated with the key underlying feature of the non-crisis-based theories: cross-country 
interdependence. This interdependence implies globalization or the intertwining of the 
economies of the world, which has been increasing over the years, with the increase 
enhancing cross-country transmission and impact of crisis. Furthermore, the non-crisis-based 
theories relating to oil reveal that oil price variations will always impact exporters such as 
Nigeria based on their interlinkages with other economies and individual internal weaknesses, 
whether there is crisis or not. However, based on the interlinkages, there is also the possibility 
that oil price fluctuations lead to a regional or global crisis. This implies that crisis affects 
interdependence, and interdependence affects crisis! 
 
Regarding the transmission of fiscal and monetary shocks, the chapter shows that African 
countries such as Nigeria which depend largely on trade and are indebted to developed 
countries will likely experience significant spillover effects of fiscal and monetary shocks via 
the exchange rate and interest rate channels. However, that many of these countries have 
adopted shock-absorbing polices to protect themselves from external developments because 
of previous experiences such as the debt crisis of the early 1980s necessitates empirical 
studies on the impact of shocks on the economies, as done for Nigeria in the empirical 
chapters of this thesis. 
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Chapter 4: The Relative Effects of Internal and External Shocks on the 
Growth of Nigeria: Evidence from the Global VAR Model 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
“When the U.S. sneezes, emerging markets catch a cold.” 
                                    (General Economic and Financial Adage) 
 
“… emerging markets are more vulnerable to external shocks than large and developed 
economies.” 
                                    (Bartosz Maćkowiak, 2007) 
 
“… it … seems plausible that there may be noticeable differences between the response 
of a highly open economy… and a relatively closed economy … to certain domestic 
shocks.” 
                                   (Erceg Christopher, Gust Christopher, and López-Salido David, 2010)   
 
As shown in chapter 2, Nigeria is an oil-driven emerging and developing economy with a 
high degree of openness and global integration. Since these features may make the effects of 
internally and externally driven fluctuations on the country distinctive, it is necessary to 
examine the effects of fluctuations on the country’s growth. Furthermore, in recent times the 
effects of shocks on the emerging and developing economies seem to be receiving increasing 
attention in the literature, probably because of the increasing trade and financial interlinkages 
between the economies and the rest of the world caused by globalization.
7
 
 
Therefore, in line with the channels of transmission of shocks reviewed in chapter 3, the 
objective of this chapter is to examine the effects of some selected external (oil-related) and 
internal shocks on the growth of Nigeria, using the Global VAR (GVAR) model introduced 
by Dees et al (2007). The role of openness and globalization in the transmission of the 
external and internal shocks is the key factor underlying the analysis of the chapter. The 
vulnerability of the emerging and developing economies to external shocks, particularly the 
                                                          
7
 For examples, see Chui et al, 2004; Desroches, 2004; Tchakarov and Elekdag, 2006; Calvo, 2007; Utlaut and 
Boye ,2010; Didier, et al., 2011;Adler et al., 2012. 
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ones that originate from the US, is widely known. However, similar susceptibility to 
internally generated fluctuations is possible in an emerging market with a high level of 
openness and global integration such as Nigeria, because domestic shocks may cause changes 
in openness-related domestic variables such as the elasticity of substitution between domestic 
and imported goods.  
 
The chapter contributes to the literature in two main ways: (i) It contributes to filling the gap 
on the little Africa-related work (Kose and Raymond, 2011) on internationally transmitted 
shocks, which is a finding of the literature review of chapter 3. (ii) It provides the first 
empirical evidence obtained through a global model such as the GVAR, to the best of our 
knowledge, on the role of openness and globalization in the transmission of both domestic 
and oil shocks for an oil-exporting country (Nigeria). Existing literature on oil-exporting 
countries focuses either on oil shocks only (e.g. Cashin et al., 2012; Mendoza and Vera, 
2010), or depends on models that do not capture cross-country openness and globalization 
like the GVAR, where domestic shocks are touched on (e.g. Mehrara and Mohaghegh, 2011; 
Omojolaibi, 2013).  
 
Among the channels of transmission of international shocks touched on in the literature 
review of chapter 3, the exchange rate channel is particularly relevant in the present chapter, 
in that the transmission of the effects of oil shocks via the channel is examined to determine 
whether or not the spending effect of Dutch disease, which involves real exchange rate 
appreciation and consequent fall in growth (i.e. negative correlation between real exchange 
rate and growth), exists in Nigeria. During oil price increases, the spending effect of Dutch 
disease may manifest in an oil dependent economy via the link between the tradable and non-
tradable sectors of the economy and real exchange rate. As shown in Brahmbhatt et al. (2010), 
in the theoretical model of Dutch disease, the prices of the tradable sector, which consists of 
oil and non-oil tradables in Nigeria’s case, are determined in the world market, while the 
prices of the non-tradable sector are determined in the domestic economy, which makes the 
real exchange rate to appreciate during oil price increases, since the real exchange rate is 
calculated as the price of non-tradables relative to the price of tradables. 
 
The results of the present chapter show that the spending effect of Dutch disease is not 
statistically significant in Nigeria, as the appreciation of real exchange rate and consequent 
fall in growth are not statistically significant. The main reason for this is that the country 
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adopts the flexible exchange rate policy, which prevents “false” appreciation or overvaluation 
of real exchange rate during oil price increases, because the policy is an effective shock 
absorber. The country also adopts a fiscal policy involving a stabilization fund working 
together with an oil-price-based fiscal rule to absorb oil price shocks and smooth oil revenue, 
which is shown to be effective in chapter 6 of the thesis. However, the results show that 
domestic shocks to real output and inflation have statistically significant impact on growth in 
the economy. Domestic shock to real exchange rate does not have statistically significant 
impact on growth, confirming the role of exchange rate as a shock absorber. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents the review of the 
empirical literature on shocks. Section 4.3 discusses the GVAR methodology. Section 4.4 
presents and discusses the empirical results of the analysis. Concluding remarks are given in 
section 4.5. 
 
4.2. Empirical Review 
 
The empirical review touches on studies on crisis-based and non-crisis-based shocks and 
discusses the mechanisms through which shocks are transmitted. In discussing the empirical 
studies on the non-crisis-based theories we undertake our discussion under two divisions, 
namely non-oil related and oil-related studies. The rationale behind this division is that oil 
shocks play a central role in the analysis of this chapter, which relates to the non-crisis-based 
theories. Generally, the empirical chapters of this thesis primarily relate to normal 
international interdependence and not cross-country crisis. The review shows that all the 
channels of international transmission of shocks discussed in chapter 3 are relevant. But trade 
channel is the most important channel for African economies such as Nigeria, due to 
dependency on trade. 
 
4.2.1. Crisis-Based Studies 
     
The empirical studies on cross-country transmission of crisis relate to the existence of 
contagion measured through fundamentals and investors’ behaviour. The studies employ 
methodologies designed to measure cross-market comovements due to a crisis. 
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Baur (2012) explores contagion from a global perspective by examining the contagion effects 
of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, both within and across 25 developed and emerging 
stock markets. The author studies contagion across financial sectors and between financial 
and real sectors by examining financial and real sector stocks. The results show that there was 
cross-country contagion of the financial sector; domestic contagion between the financial and 
real sectors; and cross-country contagion from the financial sector to the real sector. The 
authors indicate that none of the countries considered was unaffected by the crisis, which 
confirms the global nature of the crisis. The countries are ones playing key roles in the global 
economy, such as US, France, Germany, Italy, Spain (i.e. Euro Area countries), Japan, Brazil, 
Russian, India, China (i.e. BRIC), South Africa, etc. However, the US plays a dominant role 
in international spillovers. This makes some studies (e.g. Guesmi et al., 2013) to focus on the 
role of the US in cross-border transmission of crisis. 
 
Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013) examine an interesting mechanism of cross-border 
contagion called agents’ attention relocation. The authors show that the mechanism can make 
crisis to be transmitted between countries and regions without correlated fundamentals. 
Agents’ attention relocation is a process that relates to human psychology. The human brain 
has information processing limitations, hence there is information-related trade-off between 
giving attention to one market at the expense of another market. This makes attention to be an 
information-related resource. Suppose agents invest in two markets and volatility becomes 
high in one market due to crisis. Agents will give attention to the market with high volatility, 
which will lead to reduced expected returns in the second market because agents consider it to 
be riskier, since less information resource is processed on it because less attention is given to 
it. The reduction of expected returns will make agents to sell their assets, leading to low asset 
value and crisis in the second market, although its fundamentals are uncorrelated with those of 
the first market. The authors provide evidence supporting that the attention relocation 
mechanism was a channel of transmission of the Asian crisis of 1997 to Latin America. 
 
Although internationally transmitted crises have increased because of increasing 
globalization, policies and institutions can limit their effects. The effects of any form of crisis 
will be minimal in recipient economies having sound policies and institutions.  For example, 
Angkinand et al. (2010) show that although financial liberalization policy is a causative factor 
of banking crisis, good institutions in form of sound capital regulation and supervision reduce 
the probability of the policy causing crisis. One way through which financial liberalization 
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causes crisis is that it increases cross-border exposures, which affects cross-border stability of 
banks’ balance sheets by making shocks reducing liabilities in certain countries to reduce 
assets in other countries (Degryse et al., 2010).    
 
Calvo and Reinhart (1996) show that the comovements of equity and Brady bond returns 
between Latin American emerging markets increased after the 1994 Mexican crisis, consistent 
with the existence of contagion which is not associated with domestic fundamentals. The 
authors’ claim is mainly based on evidence from correlations and principal components. 
While the authors employ the correlations to investigate the degree of cross-country 
comovements of the equity and the Brandy bond returns before and after the crisis, they use 
the principal components to identify the unobserved factor driving the equity returns during 
the crisis, which is found to have significantly strong power in driving the returns. 
 
Focusing mainly on agent-based contagion, Baig and Goldfajn (1998) analyse financial-
market comovements between Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, and Thailand, in order 
to investigate whether the crisis that originated in Thailand in July 1997 due to the collapse of 
the Thai baht’s peg was transmitted to the other four countries. Using correlations, VAR, and 
linear regressions, the authors observe the evidence of contagion between the countries, 
mainly due to the herd behaviour of investors. However, the analysis also reveals that 
fundamentals play a role in the cross-country transmission of the crisis, albeit with relatively 
lower power. The authors therefore note that distinguishing between these two causes of 
contagion is required in dealing with financial contagion. 
 
Differentiating between the causes of contagion and their relative roles in the crisis is 
necessary in applying effective policies to deal with the challenge. For example, regarding the 
Asian crisis, many authors argue that agent behaviour was the primary factor that caused the 
crisis its regional transmission. But in an empirical review, Corsetti et al. (1998) show that the 
crisis was primarily caused by weaknesses in macroeconomic fundamentals. The authors 
explain that structural and policy weaknesses in the countries of the region constituted the 
main origin of the crisis, although market and agent reactions made the crisis stronger than the 
fundamental weaknesses would have accounted for. 
 
For example, the authors note that there was high degree of openness in most Asian countries 
in the period preceding the crisis and many East Asian countries experienced negative terms 
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of trade shocks in 1996 with the decrease in the price of some of their key exports. Besides, 
the authors also show that majority of the currencies that crashed in 1997 had experienced real 
appreciation prior to the crisis that led to loss of competiveness and current account 
difficulties. The real appreciation was due to the US dollar appreciating in the months 
preceding the crisis at a time when most of the crisis countries pegged their exchange rates to 
a basket of currencies in which the US dollar had a very strong effective weight. 
 
A common limitation of empirical studies on contagion seems to be that non-economic 
factors causing cross-country crises are not properly captured. For example, political factors 
may contribute significantly to the European 1992-1993 Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis 
(see Drazen, 1999), but this may not be sufficiently captured in the analysis of the crisis if 
non-economic factors are not give due attention. Basically, such political factors may be 
classed as fundamental causes of the European crisis, as distinct from agent-related causes.           
 
4.2.2. Non-Crisis-Based Studies 
 
Empirical studies on non-crisis-based transmission of shocks are based on the central factor 
underlying such transmission: cross-country interdependence relating to trade and financial 
flows. Gurara and Ncube (2013) examines the spillover effects of growth shocks from the 
Euro Zone and BRICs on the growth of African countries, using a GVAR model that links 
modelled countries together through trade flows, because most African countries are trade-
dependent economies. The model has wide coverage of African economies, in that it has 46 
African countries including Nigeria and 30 developed and emerging market countries. The 
considered African countries are not examined individually but on group basis. The countries 
are divided into the following three classes based on the characteristic of each country: factor-
driven African economies which are further divided as oil and non-oil exporters; investment-
driven African economies; and fragile and post-conflict African economies.  
 
The factor-driven economies are the ones which depend largely on basic factors of production 
such as labour and natural resources (part of land). Nigeria is classified as an oil-exporting 
factor-driven African economy in the analysis. The investment-driven economies are the ones 
with the capacity and desire to invest largely in technology. On the other hand, the fragile and 
post-conflict economies are the ones that have been affected by recent crisis, and generally 
have weak policies and institutions, when compared to other countries. 
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The three groups of African countries have varying responses to growth shocks from the Euro 
Zone and BRICs, as the results of the analysis show that growth slowdowns in the two non-
African economies have varying significant effects that vary due to groups-specific 
characteristics of the African countries. The study also examines the impact of quantitative 
easing (QE) of the US, Euro, UK, and Japan (G4) and finds that the unconventional monetary 
policy has moderate inflation and exchange rate effects in Africa. 
 
The work of De Waal (2014) focuses on international spillovers in South Africa and relates to 
the increasing importance of China in the world economy. The author argues that the trend of 
South Africa’s trade has changed in recent years, mainly due to China’s emergence in the 
global economy. Therefore, China has overtaken the US as the dominant trade partner of 
South Africa. The author therefore employs a GVAR model built with cross-country trade 
flows for 33 countries to investigate the impact of GDP shocks from the US and China on 
South Africa’s GDP and finds that over time the impact of China’s shocks has become higher 
than that of US shocks. The finding has relevance for policymaking in South Africa and other 
Africa countries. Africa’s policymakers need to consider the increasing role of China in 
designing policies. For example, China has invested largely in Africa in key areas such as the 
natural resources sector over the last decade (Yanzhuo, 2014).     
 
Kose and Riezman (2001) observe from empirical estimations of their dynamic, stochastic, 
equilibrium model designed to represent a typical African economy that trade shocks account 
for over 44% of the variations in aggregate output in the modelled economy, whereas world 
interest rate shocks only have minor influence on the economy, despite many of the African 
economies being significantly indebted. 
 
These findings are consistent with the results of Mendoza (1995), who observes that terms of 
trade shocks account for around half of GDP fluctuations in developing countries. African 
economies in particular seem to follow an export-led growth process leading to a strong role 
of the prices of exports and imports (largely the inputs used in producing the exports) in the 
fluctuations of growth in these countries. This implies that trade has a strong role in the 
dynamics of the business cycles of African economies not only in terms of output 
fluctuations, but also with respect to variations of vital variables like investment and labour 
supply (Kose and Riezman, 2001). 
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Hoffmaister et al. (1998) investigate the factors causing macroeconomic fluctuations in Sub-
Saharan Africa, by comparing the sources of fluctuations in CFA franc and non-CFA franc 
countries.
8
 The findings show that external shocks, particularly terms of trade shocks seems to 
have greater role in output and exchange rate variations in the CFA franc countries, compared 
to their non-CFA franc counterparts.  
 
As the authors note, the findings are more likely to be associated with the fixed exchange rate 
policy of the CFA franc countries, involving a fixed peg to the French franc in the sample 
period of the analysis (1971-1993), distinguishing these countries from the non-CFA franc 
economies which adopted adjustable pegs and more flexible exchange rate arrangements 
during the period. The CFA franc countries would probably have had a different experience 
regarding external shocks, if they had adopted the flexible exchange rate policy. According to 
Edwards and Yeyati (2003), the flexible exchange rate policy is an effective buffer of external 
shocks both in emerging and developed economies, allowing the countries adopting the policy 
to grow faster.
9
 
 
Bussière et al. (2009) employ the GVAR model consisting of 21 emerging and advanced 
economies to explore global trade flows, modelling imports and exports with other key 
variables, in order to capture the dynamics of the flows. The findings indicate the central role 
of the US in global trade flows. The US output shock significantly affects the exports of 
foreign countries, while the real appreciation of the US dollar also increases the exports of 
foreign countries, but the role of the appreciation is not as strong as that of the output in 
stimulating the exports.      
 
The work of Shimokawa and Kyle (2003) on international lending of commercial banks has 
vital empirical findings on the subject. Using data over 1989-1999 for the banks of France, 
                                                          
8
 The CFA franc group consists of 14 Sub-Saharan African countries, each belonging to one of two monetary 
unions using the CFA franc, namely West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and Central 
African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC). Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte D’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo belong to WAEMU; while CAEMC consists of Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. The CFA is the acronym for Communauté 
Financière Africaine (African Financial Community) within WAEMU and Coopération Financière en Afrique 
Centrale (Financial Cooperation in Central Africa) within CAEMC.   
9
 Examples of other studies indicating the role of the exchange rate policy as an effective external shock buffer 
are Edwards (2006) and Sek (2010).  
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Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US, which are the largest six international 
creditor countries, the authors observe, for example, that there is common creditor effect in 
the transmission of shocks relating to international bank lending. That is, a negative shock in 
a region consisting of borrowing countries may be transmitted across the region through a 
creditor that has concentration of loans in the area.  
 
Using a GVAR model capturing 33 countries, with data on financial and macroeconomic 
variables, Eickmeier and Ng (2011) explore the effects of credit supply shocks emanating 
from the US, the euro area, and Japan on other economies. The results reveal vital facts on 
international credit supply shocks, but the main finding is that among the three origins of the 
shocks, the negative shocks from the US have the strongest effects on the GDPs of foreign 
countries, confirming the strategic role of the US among the key financial centres of the 
global economy. 
 
4.2.2.1. Oil-Related Studies 
 
Regarding the importers of oil like the US, Roubini and Setser (2004) explain that oil price 
increases usually have negative impact on growth in the economy, with the degree of impact 
depending on magnitude of shock, persistence of shock, the intensity of oil dependency of the 
economy, and fiscal and monetary policy responses to the shock. In this line, the authors note 
the strong role of oil in recessions, noting that oil price increases have initiated or/and 
contributed to previous US and global recessions. As indicated under the discussion of 
theories, the terms of trade is a major channel through which oil price shocks affect oil 
importers. Backus and Crucini (2000) show that there is a strong relationship between 
changes in oil price and terms of trade in major advanced economies, many of which are oil 
importers. 
 
Treviño (2011) empirically investigated whether Dutch disease (DD) is present in the oil-
exporting countries of the CFA franc zone, by comparing the oil exporters and importers of 
the zone, using macroeconomic data. The author observes that the DD is present in the oil 
exporting countries, based on what the traditional DD theory predicts regarding real exchange 
rate appreciation and labour relocation when there is a resource boom. The theory shows that 
when there is a boom, persistent exchange rate appreciation and the shift of labour from the 
primary (agriculture) sector to the resource sector, indicate that the DD is present.  
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These findings agree with the results of Ismail (2010), who also find the evidence of the DD 
in oil exporting countries with microeconomic data. Ismail employed microeconomic data on 
the manufacturing sectors of selected countries including oil exporting countries to test for the 
presence of the DD in the selected oil exporters. The author argues that the primary advantage 
of the micro dataset over its macro counterpart is that the former better captures the 
heterogeneity of the considered sectors, leading to more robust estimates of possible divergent 
growth trends of the sectors. A central point to note about the considered empirical studies is 
that finding the evidence of the DD with macro and micro data suggests that the challenge is 
indeed present, at least in some resource-rich countries. 
 
Using a general equilibrium model, Angelopoulos and Economides (2008) empirically 
analyses the nexus between fiscal policy, rent-seeking, economic growth, and uncertainty 
about maintaining a political office in 25 OECD countries, and find that rent-seeking working 
via the pathway of fiscal policy has a negative impact on growth. The uncertainty about 
holding a political office makes the incumbent office holders to develop myopic attitudes 
towards policies, leading to a large government share of the economy. This may be the case, 
at least partially, in Nigeria, where Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) argue that weak 
institution and resource waste have largely contributed to resource curse. Weak institution 
usually promotes rent-seeking activities and wasteful spending in an economy. 
 
4.3. The GVAR Methodology 
 
The GVAR model was introduced by Pesaran et al. (2004) and extended by Dees et al. 
(2007). We adopt the model of Dees et al. (2007) in this chapter. The GVAR model is a 
global model consisting of individual country-specific VARX models, which are first solved 
separately and thereafter combined systematically to form the global VAR model which is 
finally solved as an overall system. The VARX models have country-specific domestic 
variables and weakly exogenous corresponding foreign variables. The foreign variables are 
built from the domestic variables by using the international trade flows between the countries 
in question. Financial or other kinds of flows may also be used, depending on the modelling 
objectives. But as Dees et al. (2007) show, using trade flows is the best way of capturing 
international linkages, as trade is the dominant means of international transmission of 
business cycles. The GVAR model may also include global variables such as oil prices. The 
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model of Dees et al. (2007) includes the oil price as a global variable and treats it as 
endogenous in the dominant country (i.e. US) and weakly exogenous in the other countries, 
because of the strategic role of the US in the global economy regarding the transmission of 
international shocks.
10
 
 
The GVAR strategy for solving a global model overcomes the curse of dimensionality 
associated with using the standard VAR approach to model cross-country inter-relationships. 
There will be a proliferation of unknown coefficients that will make estimation infeasible if 
the standard VAR is employed for cross-country inter-linkages. The GVAR strategy helps to 
overcome this limitation by treating foreign and global variables as weakly exogenous based 
on the rationale that each of the countries, with the exception of the dominant economy (i.e. 
US), is small with reference to the global economy. Chudik and Smith (2013) provide support 
for the US as the dominant economy in the GVAR model by showing that the country is the 
main source of global interdependence. The foregoing makes weak exogeneity to be a major 
assumption of the GVAR model and weak exogeneity test to be a part of the estimation 
procedure of the model. 
 
The weak exogeneity assumption is based on the assertion of the small open-economy 
macroeconomics literature that most economies, with the plausible exception of the US, are 
small relative to the world economy and that global variables are exogenous for small 
economies (see Fleming, 1962; Mundell, 1963; Dornbusch, 1976). The weak exogeneity 
assumption implies that foreign variables are long-run forcing for domestic variables in the 
country-specific VARX models of the GVAR model. That is, foreign variables affect 
domestic variables in the long-run, while the latter do not affect the former in the long run. 
But lagged short-run feedbacks between foreign and domestic variables are possible in the 
country-specific VARX models. 
 
Since there exists contemporaneous dependence of the country-specific domestic variables on 
the foreign variables, the country-specific VARX models are solved simultaneously for the 
domestic variables, by combining the individual models to form an overall global VAR 
system. In the overall global VAR system all variables (i.e. domestic and foreign variables of 
                                                          
10
 This is a major distinguishing feature between the GVAR models of Dees et al. (2007) and Pesaran et al. 
(2004), as the oil price is treated as weakly exogenous for all countries in the latter model. 
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the individual VARX models) are endogenous, implying that the overall system is not a 
VARX model. 
 
The described features of the GVAR model mean that the model makes interlinkages between 
modelled economies to be possible through the following channels:  
(i) The dependence of country-specific domestic variables on corresponding foreign variables. 
(ii) The dependence of country-specific domestic variables on common global variables.   
(iii) The contemporaneous interdependence between country-specific shocks.  
 
4.3.1. The Country-Specific VARX* Models 
 
To construct the GVAR model, suppose there are N+1 countries in the global economy, 
indexed by 𝑖 = 0, 1, 2, … , 𝑁, where N is the reference economy (i.e. US). The country-specific 
VAR model is a VARX* (p, q) model, where p, q are the lag orders of the domestic and 
foreign variables respectively. A VARX* (p, q) model is a VAR model with a weakly 
exogenous (X) foreign (*) variable. Suppose p, q are equal to two, the VARX (2, 2) model for 
𝑖𝑡ℎ country with constant and trend is: 
                  𝑿𝑖𝑡 = 𝒂𝑖0 + 𝒂𝑖1𝑡 + 𝚷𝑖1𝑿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝚷𝑖2𝑿𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝚼𝑖0𝑋𝑖𝑡
∗ +  𝚼𝑖1𝑿𝒊,𝑡−1
∗ + 𝚼𝑖2𝑿𝑖,𝑡−2
∗ + Ԑ𝑖𝑡 ,      
                                                                                                                                      (4.1) 
                where 
                          t = 1, 2 …., T  
                            i = 0, 1, 2 …, N                               
                            𝑿𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘 × 1  vector of domestic variables  
                            𝑿𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑘𝑖
∗ × 1 vector of foreign variables  
                            𝚷𝑖1 = 𝑘𝑖  × 𝑘𝑖 matrix of lagged coefficients associated with domestic     
                                        variables 
                            𝚷𝑖2 = 𝑘𝑖  × 𝑘𝑖 matrix of lagged coefficients associated with domestic  
                                         variables 
 
                             𝚼𝑖0 = 𝑘𝑖  ×  𝑘𝑖
∗ matrix of coefficients associated with foreign variables 
                             𝚼i1 = 𝑘𝑖  × 𝑘𝑖
∗  matrix of lagged coefficients associated with foreign    
                                   variables 
                             𝚼21 = 𝑘𝑖  ×  𝑘𝑖
∗  matrix of lagged coefficients associated with foreign 
                                    Variables 
                             Ԑ𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘𝑖  × 1 vector of idiosyncratic country-specific shocks with no serial 
                                      correlation 
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 The error-correction form of equation 4.1 is given by 
 
               ∆𝑿𝒊𝒕 = 𝒄𝒊𝟎 +  𝜶𝒊𝜷𝒊
′[𝒛𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 − 𝜸𝒊(𝑡 − 1)] + 𝚲𝒊𝟎∆𝑿𝒊𝒕
∗ + 𝚪𝒊∆𝒛𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝒖𝒊𝒕 ,          
                                                                                                                                            (4.2)      
where  
 
              𝒛𝑖𝑡 = (𝑿𝑖𝑡
′ , 𝑿𝑖𝑡
∗′)′                  
 
               𝜶𝒊 = 𝑘𝑖 × 𝑟𝑖 matrix of rank 𝑟𝑖, which is the matrix containing the speed of  
                        adjustment coefficients 
               𝜷𝒊 = (𝑘𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖
∗) × 𝑟𝑖 matrix of rank 𝑟𝑖, which is the matrix containing the  
                      cointegrating vectors. 
Using 𝜷𝒊 = (𝜷𝒊𝒙
′ , 𝜷𝒊𝒙∗
′ )′, the 𝑟𝑖 error-correction terms of equation 4.2 can be re-written as  
𝜷𝒊
′(𝒛𝒊𝒕 − 𝜸𝒊𝒕) = 𝜷𝒊𝒙
′ 𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝒊𝒙∗
′ 𝑿𝒊𝒕
∗ − (𝜷𝒊
′𝜸𝒊)𝑡  ,                                                                 (4.3)                 
which implies that cointegration is possible in 𝑿𝒊𝒕, between 𝑿𝒊𝒕 and 𝑿𝒊𝒕
∗  , and across 𝑿𝒊𝒕 and  
𝑿𝒋𝒕 when 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 
 
The VECM* models, which captures the short-run and long-run relations, are estimated 
separately for each country using reduced rank regression, with 𝑿𝒊𝒕
∗  taken as long-run forcing 
or weakly exogenous to the parameters of equation (4.2). For each country-specific model, 𝑟𝑖 
(the number of cointegrating equations), 𝜶𝒊 (the matrix containing the speed of adjustment 
coefficients) and 𝛽𝑖 (the matrix containing the cointegrating vectors) are determined.    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
The domestic variables included in the country-specific models are real output (𝑦𝑖𝑡), inflation 
rate (𝐷𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 ), real equity price (𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡 ), real exchange rate (𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡 ), short-term 
interest rate (𝑟𝑖𝑡), long-term interest rate (𝑙𝑟𝑖𝑡), and oil price (𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡 ) which is treated only as 
domestic in the US model and exogenous in all other country-specific models following Dees 
et al. (2007). Specifically, the variables are calculated as follows:  
                𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ln (
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
⁄ ) ,                      𝑝𝑖𝑡 = ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡) 
               𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡 = ln (
𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
⁄ ) ,                        𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 = ln(𝐸𝑖𝑡) ,                                      (4.4)           
               𝑟𝑖𝑡    = 0.25 ∗ ln (1 +
𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑆
100
⁄ ) ,           𝑙𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 0.25 ∗ ln (1 +
𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐿
100
⁄ )   
                𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡 )                                
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 where 
               𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = nominal gross domestic product of country i at time t, in domestic  
                             currency,     
               𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 = consumer price index in country i at time t, 
                 𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 = nominal equity price index in country i at time t, 
                 𝐸𝑖𝑡 = nominal exchange rate of country i at time t in terms of US dollars, 
               𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑆 =  short-run nominal rate of interest per annum in percentage, in country i at 
                          time t,  
               𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐿  = long-run nominal rate of interest per annum in percentage, in country i at time  
                         t  and 
               𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡 = price of oil (in US Dollar)   
                      
By the formulas used to calculate the short-term and long-term interest rates, the rates are 
adjusted from annual rates to quarterly rates. According to Dees et al. (2007), the oil price is 
treated as the domestic (endogenous) variable of the US model only because of the dominant 
role of the country in the transmission of international shocks, such as the evolution of 
macroeconomic shocks in the global economy. The country-specific foreign variables denoted 
by  𝑿𝒊𝒕
∗  are built from the domestic variables, using country-specific fixed trade weights as 
shown below: 
    𝑿𝑖𝑡
∗ = (𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ , 𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ , 𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡
∗ , 𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ , 𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗ , 𝑙𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗ )′,      
               𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑡 ,
𝑁
𝑗=0                                  𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=0 ,       
         𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡
∗ = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑒𝑞𝑒𝑞𝑗𝑡 ,
𝑁
𝑗=0                           𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑝𝑗𝑡,
𝑁
𝑗=1                             (4.5)                    
                𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗ = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑟 𝑟𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=0 ,                                  𝑙𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗ = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑙𝑟𝑙𝑟𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=0 . 
 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑦
,  𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑝
, 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑒𝑞
, 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑒𝑝, 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑟 , 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑙𝑟 are trade weights built from the share of country j in the 
total trade of country i. The fixed trade weights are constructed based on trade flows data 
spanning 2006-2009. The period 2006-2008 is selected in order to capture recent trade trends 
within the sample period (1979Q2-2009Q4) of our analysis, as the data for the 
macroeconomic variables cover 1979Q2-2009Q4.  Further details on data are given in section 
4.3.3 below. The trade weights could also be time-varying weights, but following Dees et al. 
(2007), we use fixed weights in our analysis. 
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4.3.2. The Overall Global Model   
                  
After the country-specific models above are estimated, the overall GVAR model is built  
by treating all the country-specific domestic and foreign variables as endogenous. The overall 
GVAR model is solved in terms of the endogenous variables collected in a  𝑘𝑖 × 1 global 
variable vector (𝑘 = ∑ 𝑘𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=0 ). To derive the solution to the overall global system, use 
𝒛𝒊𝒕 = (𝑿𝑖𝑡
′ , 𝑿𝑖𝑡
∗′)′ to re-write the VARX*(2, 2) models from equation (4.1) for each economy 
as 
       𝑨𝒊0𝒛𝒊𝑡 = 𝒂𝑖0 + 𝒂𝑖1𝑡 + 𝑨𝑖1𝒛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑨𝑖2𝒛𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝒖𝑖𝑡                                                       (4.6)      
       where 𝑨𝑖0 = (𝑰𝑘𝑖 − 𝚲𝑖0), 𝑨𝑖1 = (𝚽𝑖1, 𝚲1𝑖), 𝑨𝑖2 = (𝚽𝑖2, 𝚲𝑖2). 
       We can now derive the identity 𝒛𝑖𝑡 = 𝑾𝑖𝑿𝑡                                                                  (4.7)     
        where 
                  𝑿𝑡 = (𝑿′0𝑡, 𝑿′1𝑡, … , 𝑿′𝑁𝑡) is a 𝑘 × 1  vector of endogenous variables, and   
                  𝑾𝑖 = (𝑘𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖
∗) × 𝑘  link matrix obtained through the country-specific trade 
weights 𝑤𝑖𝑗.  
        Note that  𝑘𝑖  and 𝑘𝑖
∗ are the number of domestic and foreign variables respectively. 
        Using the above identity, we can re-write equation (4.6) as  
        𝑨𝑖0𝑾𝑖𝑿𝑡 = 𝒂𝑖0 + 𝒂𝑖1𝑡 + 𝑨𝑖1𝑾𝑖𝑿𝑡−1 + 𝑨𝑖2𝑾𝑖𝑿𝑡−2 + 𝒖𝑖𝑡                                        (4.8)        
        The individual country models are thereafter stacked to obtain 
         𝑮0𝑿𝑡 = 𝒂0 + 𝒂1𝑡 + 𝑮1𝑿𝑡−1 + 𝑮2𝑿𝑡−2 + 𝒖𝑡                                                             (4.9)         
         where 𝑮0 = (
𝑨00𝑾0
𝑨10𝑾1
⋮
𝑨𝑁0𝑾𝑁
), 𝑮1 = (
𝑨01𝑾0
𝑨11𝑾1
⋮
𝑨𝑁1𝑾𝑁
), 𝑮2 = (
𝑨02𝑾0
𝑨12𝑾1
⋮
𝑨𝑁2𝑾𝑁
) 
 
                         𝒂0 = (
𝒂00
𝒂10
⋮
𝒂𝑁0
),       𝒂1 = (
𝒂01
𝒂11
⋮
𝒂𝑁1
),      𝒖𝑡 = (
𝒖0𝑡
𝒖1𝑡
⋮
𝒖𝑁𝑡
)   
       Equation (4.9) is now pre-multiplied by 𝐺0
−1, since 𝑮0  is a non-singular matrix that is 
already known. The resulting GVAR(2) model is 
        𝑿𝑡 = 𝒃0 + 𝒃1𝑡 + 𝑭1𝑿𝑡−1 + 𝑭2𝑿𝑡−2 + 𝜺𝑡                                                                  (4.10)                  
        where 
                           𝒃0 = 𝑮0
−1𝒂0, 𝒃1 = 𝑮0
−1𝒂1, 𝑭1 = 𝑮0
−1𝑮1, 𝑭2 = 𝑮0
−1𝑮2, 
                           𝜺𝑡 = 𝑮0
−1𝒖𝑡 
74 
 
The GVAR model in equation (4.10) is solved recursively and may be used for forecasting, 
impulse response analysis, etc. We use the GVAR solution for impulse response analysis in 
this chapter. Note that if regional variables are desired in a GVAR model, the domestic 
variables for the region which will be included in the region-specific VARX* model are 
constructed from the variables of the countries forming the region as explained below: 
 
Suppose a regional variable, say real GDP yit, is required, it is built from country- specific 
variables 𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑡, by using a weighted average as follows:  
                 𝑦it=∑ 𝑤𝑖ℎ 
0 𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑡 ,
𝑁𝑖
ℎ=1                                                                                                                                             (4.11)                         
where  𝑦it is the output of country ℎ  in region i and 𝑤𝑖ℎ 
0  are the PPP-GDP weights (or some 
other desired type of weights) for a year or the average of more than one year.                     
 
4.3.3. Variables and Data 
 
The data of the domestic variables for the countries in the original GVAR model of Dees et al. 
(2007) are from the “2009 Vintage” GVAR database of the GVAR toolbox 1.1 (Smith and 
Galesi, 2011). The data cover 1979Q2-2009Q4. The data were the only GVAR data available 
when our analysis was done. The trade flow data in the “2009 Vintage” cover 1980-2009.11 
Detailed information about the data, including data sources, can be found in Technical 
Appendix B of the GVAR Toolbox 1.1 User Guide, authored by Smith and Galesi (2011). 
Nigerian data matching the “2009 Vintage” were added to the GVAR dataset. We use the data 
span 1979Q2-2009Q4 in our analysis because the GVAR data (i.e. GVAR Toolbox 1.1 data) 
available when the analysis was done cover this period. Table 4.1 presents the summary on 
the data used in the chapter.   
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 The trade flows data are in annual form, because the GVAR software (GVAR Toolbox 1.1) used for the 
GVAR estimation only supports annual trade flows.  
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Table 4.1: Data and Variables 
Variable Description Information on Nigerian Data 
 Trade Flows Trade between the countries of the 
global model. 
Nigerian data were obtained from the 
IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, 2014 
Edition. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡   Real GDP Volume Nigerian data obtained in annual form 
from the May 2014 Edition of the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
and converted to quarterly form 
through interpolation and extrapolation. 
𝐷𝑝𝑖𝑡    Domestic inflation calculated by using 
seasonally adjusted CPI.   
Nigerian CPI data were obtained in 
quarterly form from the April 2012 
edition of the IFS and seasonally 
adjusted. 
𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡    Real equity prices Nigerian data were not included due to 
data limitations. 
𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡   Domestic real exchange rate in term of 
US Dollar 
Nigerian data obtained in monthly form 
from the 2010 edition of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical 
Bulletin and converted into quarterly 
form using  the average of the values 
for each quarter. 
   𝑟𝑖𝑡   Short-term interest rates Nigerian data obtained in quarterly 
form from the April, 2012 edition of 
the IFS. 
𝑙𝑟𝑖𝑡    Long-term interest rate Nigerian data were not included due to 
non-availability of data.  
𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡   Oil price  
Purchasing Power Parity GDP This is used for the construction of 
Purchasing Power Parity GDP weights 
employed for the aggregation of 
countries into regions.  
 
   
 
The domestic variables included for each of the countries of original GVAR model of Dees et 
al (2007) are the ones in Table 4.1, except in cases where certain variables are not available 
due to data availability. As shown in Table 4.1, four variables are included for Nigeria. For all 
countries the corresponding foreign variables for the included domestic variables are 
constructed using the trade weights, as mentioned above. In our analysis we calculate trade 
weights based on trade flow data spanning 2006-2008. The period 2006-2008 is chosen to 
capture relatively current trade trends within the overall sample period of 1979Q2-2009Q4 of 
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the GVAR analysis. This approach follows the approach of Dees et al. (2007) who built trade 
weights from trade flows of years indicating current trade trends.  
 
Due to the fact that the US is the dominant country of the GVAR model, its country-specific 
VARX* model has a different specification in terms of domestic and foreign variables. In the 
US model real GDP, inflation, real equity prices, short-term interest rate, long-term interest 
rate, and the oil price are endogenous. The oil price is treated as endogenous as explained 
earlier. The weakly exogenous foreign variables for the US are foreign real GDP ( 𝑦𝑈𝑆,𝑡
∗ ), 
foreign inflation    (𝐷𝑝𝑈𝑆,𝑡
∗ ), and foreign real exchange rate  (𝑒𝑝𝑈𝑆,𝑡
∗ ). The foreign equity 
prices, foreign short-term interest rate and foreign long-term interest rate are not included in 
the US VARX* model, because they are not  to have a long-run impact (i.e. not long-run 
forcing) on their domestic counterparts, due to the dominant role of the US financial variables 
in the world economy (Dees et al., 2007). Table 4.2 below summarizes the domestic and 
foreign variables included in the country-specific models of the GVAR model, while Table 
4.3 presents the countries of the model. 
 
Table 4.2: Variables Included in Country-Specific VARX* Models of GVAR Model 
 All Countries Except US                 US 
Variables Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign   
Real GDP 𝑦𝑖𝑡 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  𝑦𝑈𝑆,𝑡 𝑦𝑈𝑆,𝑡
∗  
Inflation  𝐷𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝐷𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗  𝐷𝑝𝑈𝑆,𝑡 𝐷𝑝𝑈𝑆,𝑡
∗  
Real exchange rate 𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡-𝑝𝑖𝑡 −           − 𝑒𝑝𝑈𝑆,𝑡
∗ − 𝑝𝑈𝑆,𝑡
∗  
Real equity price 𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡 𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡
∗  𝑒𝑞
𝑈𝑆,𝑡
 − 
Short-term interest rate 𝑟𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗  𝑟𝑈𝑆,𝑡 − 
Long-term interest rate 𝑙𝑟𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗  𝑙𝑟𝑈𝑆,𝑡 − 
Oil Price − 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 
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Table 4.3: The Countries and Regions of the GVAR Model of the Study 
USA 
China 
Japan 
UK 
Euro Area 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Austria 
Finland 
Latin America 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Argentina 
Chile 
Peru 
Other Developed Economies 
Canada 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Rest of Asia 
Korea 
Indonesia 
Thailand 
Philippines 
Malaysia 
Singapore 
Rest of Western Europe 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Norway 
Rest of the World 
India 
South Africa 
Turkey 
Saudi Arabia 
Nigeria 
  
Based on modelling objectives, desired regions may be modelled using the groupings in this 
table accordingly. Following Dees et al (2007), only the Euro Area is modelled in our GVAR 
model, with the data for the monetary union aggregated by cross-section weighted averages of 
the domestic variables of the concerned countries, using the Purchasing Power Parity GDP 
weights, based on Purchasing Power Parity GDP data spanning 2006-2009.  
 
4.4. Empirical Results 
 
The empirical results of our analysis touch on the trade weights matrix calculated from the 
direction of trade statistics;  unit root tests of the stationarity of the data;  weak exogeneity 
tests of the suitability of the trade-weighted foreign variables and the oil price as  exogenous 
regressors of the country-specific VECMs;  cointegration tests through which the country-
specific VECMs are solved; and the impulse response functions through which the effects of 
the simulated shocks are explored. The results are presented below:  
 
4.4.1. Trade Weights Matrix 
 
Table 4.4 shows the trade weight matrix for Nigeria and the two economies (i.e. US and Euro 
Area) identified in the overall trade weight matrix as the economies with dominant trade in 
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Nigeria’s trade. The U.S. and Euro Area account for about 38% and 25% respectively as 
shown in Table 4.4, reflecting the central role of the two industrial economies regarding the 
transmission of external shocks to Nigeria.
12
 Therefore, we focus on these two economies 
among Nigeria’s foreign economies in the presentation of the results. Table A.1 in the 
appendix of this chapter contains the full trade weight matrix for all the economies of the 
GVAR model, as produced originally by the GVAR software. 
 
Table 4.4: Trade Weights Matrix  
Country/Region USA Euro Area Nigeria 
USA 0 0.15 
 
0.01 
 
Euro Area 0.17 
 
0 0.01 
 
Nigeria 0.38 
 
0.25 
 
0 
                                                                                                               
Note that in the GVAR model economies are captured by their macroeconomic variables (i.e. 
real GDP, inflation, real exchange rate, etc), while trade weights reflect trade flows between 
individual economies. This implies that the trade weights capture and link all the 
macroeconomic variables of the considered economies together.  
 
4.4.2. Unit Root Tests 
 
The stationarity properties of all the variables (i.e. domestic, foreign and global variables) of 
the GVAR model are examined in  level, and after first and second differencing, using the 
ADF and the   weighted symmetric estimation of the ADF type regressions (WF) introduced 
by Park and Fuller (1995). The WF technique has higher power than the ADF technique 
(Dees et al. 2007). The results of the tests show that the first differences of the oil price and all 
the endogenous variables included in the USA, Euro Area, and Nigerian models are stationary 
at the 5% level of significance, as shown in Tables 4.5-4.6 below. Similar results are obtained 
for the foreign variables of these economies. This suggests that the variables of the three 
economies are I (1). The full results of the unit root tests for all endogenous and foreign 
                                                          
12
Note that in the original output of the GVAR software, the trade weights sum up to 1 by column not row (see 
the GVAR Handbook of Smith, L.V. and A. Galesi, 2011). As noted by the authors, the original GVAR table 
needs to be transposed to make the weights to sum up to 1 by row. So, table 2 is a transposed form of the trade 
weights produced by the GVAR software on the US, Euro Area, and Nigeria. 
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variables of the GVAR model are presented in Tables A.2 and A.3 of the appendix of the 
chapter respectively. 
 
Table 4.5: Unit Root Tests for the Domestic Variables  
Domestic 
Variables 
Statistic Critical Value EURO NIGERIA USA 
y (with trend) ADF -3.45 -0.83 -3.54 -2.28 
y (with trend) WS -3.24 -1.18 -2.49 -2.45 
y (no trend) ADF -2.89 -1.28 0.35 -0.83 
y (no trend) WS -2.55 0.87 0.26 1.23 
Dy ADF -2.89 -3.71 -2.86 -5.00 
Dy WS -2.55 -3.90 -2.97 -4.74 
DDy ADF -2.89 -7.75 -8.16 -7.89 
DDy WS -2.55 -7.76 -8.41 -7.66 
Dp (with trend) ADF -3.45 -2.88 -4.39 -4.27 
Dp (with trend) WS -3.24 -2.01 -4.48 -1.34 
Dp (no trend) ADF -2.89 -3.15 -4.32 -4.40 
Dp (no trend) WS -2.55 -0.68 -4.46 0.04 
DDp ADF -2.89 -6.57 -7.61 -8.46 
DDp WS -2.55 -6.66 -7.78 -8.64 
DDDp ADF -2.89 -9.01 -10.94 -9.70 
DDDp WS -2.55 -8.89 -9.99 -9.43 
eq (with trend) ADF -3.45 -2.21  -1.46 
eq (with trend) WS -3.24 -2.46  -1.75 
eq (no trend) ADF -2.89 -1.61  -1.28 
eq (no trend) WS -2.55 -0.93  -0.61 
Deq ADF -2.89 -6.62  -6.12 
Deq WS -2.55 -6.76  -6.24 
DDeq ADF -2.89 -9.76  -7.84 
DDeq WS -2.55 -9.96  -8.02 
ep (with trend) ADF -3.45 -2.13 -2.06  
ep (with trend) WS -3.24 -2.36 -2.32  
ep (no trend) ADF -2.89 -0.55 -2.10  
ep (no trend) WS -2.55 -0.16 -2.32  
Dep ADF -2.89 -6.80 -6.51  
Dep WS -2.55 -6.83 -6.66  
DDep ADF -2.89 -9.88 -8.51  
DDep WS -2.55 -10.03 -8.75  
r (with trend) ADF -3.45 -3.15 -1.96 -3.64 
r (with trend) WS -3.24 -3.04 -1.86 -3.76 
r (no trend) ADF -2.89 -1.08 -2.37 -2.25 
r (no trend) WS -2.55 -1.18 -1.81 -1.65 
Dr ADF -2.89 -4.84 -6.98 -3.58 
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Table 4.5 (Continuation): Unit Root Tests for the Domestic Variables 
Domestic 
Variables 
Statistic Critical Value EURO NIGERIA USA 
Dr WS -2.55 -3.91 -7.20 -3.70 
DDr ADF -2.89 -8.55 -8.61 -6.02 
DDr WS -2.55 -8.38 -8.86 -7.24 
lr (with trend) ADF -3.45 -3.13  -3.92 
lr (with trend) WS -3.24 -3.05  -3.98 
lr (no trend) ADF -2.89 -1.05  -1.62 
lr (no trend) WS -2.55 -1.02  -1.51 
Dlr ADF -2.89 -5.36  -5.89 
Dlr WS -2.55 -5.14  -5.83 
DDlr ADF -2.89 -8.22  -7.04 
DDlr WS -2.55 -8.40  -7.73 
Note: ADF stands for Augmented Dickey-Fuller, while WS for weighted symmetric ADF; y for real output; Dp 
for inflation; eq for real equity price; ep for real exchange rate; r for nominal short-term interest rate; lr for 
nominal long-term interest rate. Test is based on the 5% significance level. 
 
   
Table 4.6: Unit Root Tests for the Global Variable  
Global Variables Test Critical Value Statistic 
poil (with trend) ADF -3.45 -1.46 
poil (with trend) WS -3.24 -1.28 
poil (no trend) ADF -2.89 -0.69 
poil (no trend) WS -2.55 -1.00 
Dpoil ADF -2.89 -6.38 
Dpoil WS -2.55 -6.49 
DDpoil ADF -2.89 -8.70 
Dpoil WS -2.55 -8.86 
 Note: ADF stands for Augmented Dickey-Fuller, WS for weighted symmetric ADF,  
and poil for global oil price. Test is based on the 5% significance level. 
 
 
4.4.3. Weak Exogeneity Tests 
 
Weak exogeneity testing is central to GVAR modelling. For example, if the weak exogeneity 
assumptions are rejected for all the foreign variables of the GVAR model, then the model 
cannot be solved. The exogeneity of foreign variables in the country-specific VECMs 
indicates that the variables are long-run forcing in relation to their domestic counterparts. The 
weak exogeneity test is based on the approach of Johansen (1992) and Harbo et al. (1998) and 
it involves testing the joint significance (i.e. F test) of the estimated error correction terms of 
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the country VECX* models of equation (4.2) for the foreign variables and the oil price in 
auxiliary equations to equation (4.2). 
 
The implication of the test is that in these auxiliary equations the error correction terms of 
equation (4.2) estimated for the domestic variables 𝑿𝑖𝑡 are not supposed to be jointly 
statistically significant, because the weak exogeneity assumption implies that there is no long-
run feedback from 𝑿𝑖𝑡 to the foreign variables  𝑿𝑖𝑡
∗ , while there is long-run feedback from 𝑿𝑖𝑡
∗  
to  𝑿𝑖𝑡. 
 
The weak exogeneity assumptions are accepted for all the foreign variables of the country-
specific models of the Euro Area, the US, and Nigeria, except US foreign inflation. The 
results of the exogeneity tests for Nigeria, the U.S, and the Euro Area are presented in Table 
4.7 below. The full results of the weak exogeneity tests for all the economies of the model are 
presented in Table A.4 in the appendix of the chapter. 
 
Table 4.7: Test for Weak Exogeneity at the 5% Significance Level, Using the F Statistic 
Country F test Critical 
Value 
ys Dps eqs eps rs lrs poil 
EURO F(2,98) 3.09 1.52 1.76 0.37  2.30 1.33 0.53 
NIGERIA F(1,103) 3.93 1.07 0.03 0.22  0.89 0.10 0.57 
USA F(2,102) 3.09 0.77 3.44  1.54    
Notes:  “poil” stands for global oil price; while the letter “s” points to “star”, added to differentiate the earlier 
indicated symbols of the domestic variables from their foreign counterparts. 
  
 
4.4.4. Cointegration Tests  
 
Once the variables to be included in the individual country models VARX* (𝑝𝑖, 𝑞𝑖) are 
determined, the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) is used to determine the lag orders for the 
corresponding cointegration VARX models.  The Johansen trace statistic is used to determine 
the number of cointegrating vectors. Table 4.8 below shows the cointegration results of the 3 
focus economies. The full cointegration results for all the economies of the analysis are 
presented in Table A.5 of the appendix. 
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Table 4.8: VARX* Order and Cointegrating Relationships of the Country-Specific Models 
 p q Cointegrating Relations 
Euro 2 1 2 
Nigeria 2 1 1 
USA 2 1 2 
 
 
4.4.5. Generalized Impulse Response Functions 
 
Our impulse response functions relate to simulated external (oil-related) and domestic shocks 
as shown below:  
 
4.4.5.1 External Shocks 
 
The main external shocks simulated are: (i) positive shock to global oil price treated as 
endogenous in the US model; (ii) positive shock to US real output; (iii) positive shock to Euro 
Area real output. The latter two shocks are oil-related because increases in the real GDP of the 
US and the Euro Area as large oil importers are expected to cause the oil price to increase. On 
the other hand, the oil price is treated as endogenous in the US model for the first shock 
because of the dominant role of the country in the transmission of global shocks to other 
countries, as mentioned earlier. All the impulse responses to the shocks are over a 40-quarter 
horizon. In the analysis we examine the impulse responses of the real GDPs of all the 
concerned economies, together with the impulse responses of oil price and the real exchange 
rate of Nigeria, in order to examine the spending effect of Dutch disease in Nigeria. Figures 
4.1-4.4 below present the impulse responses. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows that a positive shock to the oil price, treated as endogenous in the US model, 
tends to increase growth in the US and the Euro Area, but these effects are not statistically 
significant. Increase in domestic demand for energy in an oil importer such as the US may 
tend to increase growth if the energy is used for production. The plausible reason for the 
statistical insignificance of the effects is that the simulated oil shock is endogenously driven 
from the US, whereas oil shocks that impacted the US significantly, such as the shock of 
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1979, were exogenous to the US.
13
 The simulated oil shock leads to a statistically significant 
increase in global oil price by 10 to 20% over the simulated time horizon, which would bring 
oil windfall into Nigeria as an exporter of oil. Due to the shock, Nigeria’s GDP falls by less 
than 1% over the time horizon, while the real exchange rate of the country appreciates, but 
below 10% over the time horizon. But these effects are not statistically significant. This 
implies that the Dutch disease effect of oil windfall is not statistically significant in Nigeria. 
Appreciation of real exchange rate and consequent growth slowdown (i.e. negative correlation 
between real exchange rate and growth) during oil windfall is a sign of the spending effect of 
Dutch disease (Treviño, 2011).
14
 The finding on the non-existence of Dutch disease in Nigeria 
is consistent with other works on Dutch disease in the country (e.g. Budina et al., 2007; Sala-
i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). 
 
The spending effect of Dutch disease occurs when increased income caused by a resource 
boom leads to higher aggregate demand, and this consequently leads to increased relative 
prices of domestic goods and services (Treviño, 2011, Brahmbhatt et al., 2010). The wages in 
the booming resource sector increase and eventually lead to increased wages in the whole 
economy. The increased wages lead to higher demand for domestically produced goods and 
services and higher prices. The exchange rate mechanism plays a key role in this process, in 
that it is measured as the price of non-tradables relative to the price of tradables which consist 
of oil and non-oil tradables (Brahmbhatt et al., 2010). As shown by these authors in their 
explanation of the real exchange rate mechanism of the spending effect of Dutch disease, in 
the theory of Dutch disease the prices of the tradables are determined in the world market, 
while the prices of non-tradables are determined domestically, which makes oil booms to 
cause the appreciation of real exchange rate, measured as the price of non-tradables relative to 
the price of tradables.  
 
The increased domestic aggregate spending arising from the oil boom leads to higher demand 
and prices of non-tradables relative to the prices of the non-oil tradables (i.e. agriculture and 
manufacturing), which are determined in the international market. This tends to make real 
exchange rate to appreciate. However, such appreciation is “false” appreciation, in that true 
                                                          
13
 Dees et al. (2007), whose approach of treating the oil price as endogenous in the US we follow, also finds that 
the effects of oil price shocks on the US and Euro Area based on the approach are statistically insignificant. 
14
 The Dutch disease has another effect called the resource-movement effect, which involves the relocation of 
capital and labour from the rest of the economy into the resource sector during the boom of the resource sector. 
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appreciation is caused by increased exports relative to imports, triggered by increased 
production activity and output in the real sector (Tule and Osude, 2014).  
 
That the spending effect of Dutch disease is not statistically significant in Nigeria implies that 
“false” appreciation of real exchange rate is not statistically significant in the country, which 
makes sense in that the country adopts the flexible exchange rate policy, generally known to 
be an effective shock absorber (Edwards and Yeyati, 2003; Edwards, 2006; Sek, 2010). 
Nigeria began to adopt the flexible exchange rate policy in 1986. Before this time, oil price 
increases usually caused “false” appreciation of real exchange rate (Obadan, 2006). This 
necessitated the introduction of the flexible exchange rate regime, which has been effective in 
protecting the country against international developments. Soludo (2009), for example, shows 
that the policy was effective in limiting the impact of the 2007-2009 financial crisis on the 
country. Besides, Nigeria adopts a stabilization fund and an oil-price-based fiscal rule, 
designed to work together to absorb oil price shocks and smooth oil revenue, which are 
effective fiscal instruments, as shown in the analysis of chapter 6 of this thesis. Basically, the 
stabilization fund and fiscal rule will not be effective under the pegged exchange rate regime, 
in that the process of domestic adjustment to oil shocks will be hindered by the rigidity of the 
pegged system.  
.   
The effect of treating the oil price as endogenous in the US model is compared to treating the 
variable as endogenous in the model of a large oil exporter, namely Saudi Arabia (Figure 
4.2).
15
 In this case, in contrast to what happens when treating the oil price as endogenous to 
the US, there is a statistically significant negative growth effect in the US from the 4
th
 quarter 
to around the 28
th
 quarter, as the oil price shock is exogenous to the economy as noted earlier. 
The spending effect of Dutch disease is still statistically insignificant in Nigeria when oil 
price is treated as endogenous in the Saudi-Arabia model. Over the time horizon, the shock 
leads to a statistically significant rise in oil price by an average of 10% for about 8 quarters. 
Nigeria’s GDP falls with a maximum value of 1% and the real exchange rate of the country 
appreciates with a maximum value of 10%, but these effects are not statistically significant. 
Treating the oil price as endogenous in the Saudi-Arabian and US models separately makes it 
possible to simulate supply-driven and demand-driven oil shocks respectively.  
 
                                                          
15
 Note the treating the oil price as endogenous in the Saudi Arabia model involves solving the GVAR based on 
this specification before the oil shock is simulated. 
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As shown in Figure 4.3, a positive shock to the US real GDP has positive growth effects in 
both the US and the Euro Area. Over the time horizon, the oil price has an increasing trend 
with a maximum value lower than 10%, but the trend is not statistically significant. Nigeria’s 
GDP falls with a value below 0.5%, while the real exchange rate of the country appreciates by 
an average of 1%, but the effects are also not statistically significant, implying that the non-
existence of the spending effect of Dutch disease is maintained.  
 
The Euro Area experiences a positive growth effect of the positive shock to its real GDP, as 
shown in Figure 4.4. Furthermore, increase in the real GDP of the Euro Area does not lead to 
a statistically significant increase in the oil price. Nigeria’s real GDP tends to have positive 
values over most of the time horizon when its real exchange rate has a depreciating trend, 
compared to when it tends to appreciate, but these effects are still not statistically significant. 
   
Figure 4.1: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Positive Unit (1 S.E.) Shock to Global Oil Price in the US 
Model (Bootstrap Mean Estimates with 90% Bootstrap Error Bounds): Demand- Driven Oil Shock 
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            Figure 4.2: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Positive Unit (1 S.E.) Shock to Global Oil Price in    
            the Saudi-Arabian Model (Bootstrap Mean Estimates with 90% Bootstrap Error Bounds): Supply  
             -Driven Shock 
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       Figure 4.3: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Positive Unit (1 S.E.) Shock to US Real Output     
       (Bootstrap Mean Estimates with 90% Bootstrap Error Bounds)                              
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       Figure 4.4: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Positive Unit (1 S.E.) Shock to Euro Area Real  
       Output (Bootstrap Mean Estimates with 90% Bootstrap Error Bounds)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.5.2 Domestic Shocks 
 
As shown in Figures 4.5-4.7, domestic shocks are simulated as shocks to real GDP, inflation 
and the real exchange rate. The results are in line with a priori expectations in terms of the 
signs of the GIRFs. There is a statistically significant negative response of the real GDP to its 
own negative shock. The positive shock to inflation also has a statistically significant negative 
impact on real GDP. The response of GDP to the negative shock to real exchange rate is 
negative for most of the simulation horizon, which is to be expected for an open economy, but 
these effects are not statistically significant. This further indicates that flexible exchange rate 
absorbs shocks. The shock to real exchange rate would have led to statistically significant 
growth slowdown if not absorbed.   
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Figure 4.5: Generalized Impulse Response of a Negative Unit (1 S.E.) Shock to Nigeria’s Real Output 
(Bootstrap Mean Estimates with 90% Bootstrap Error Bounds) 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Generalized Impulse Response of a Positive Unit (1 S.E.) Shock to Nigeria’s Inflation 
(Bootstrap Mean Estimates with 90% Bootstrap Error Bounds) 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Generalized Impulse Response of a Negative Unit (1 S.E.) Shock to Nigeria’s Real Exchange 
Rate (Bootstrap Mean Estimates with 90% Bootstrap Error Bounds) 
 
 
4.5. Concluding Remarks 
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and the Euro Area, which are the two dominant trade partners of Nigeria. The external shocks 
show that the spending effect of Dutch disease is not statistically significant in Nigeria. There 
are three causative factors of the resource cause shown in the theoretical literature, namely 
Dutch disease, resource price volatility, and institutional weakness (Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian, 2003). Since Dutch disease is not statistically significant in Nigeria, the other 
two factors are mainly responsible for resource curse in the country. Policymaking in the 
economy should therefore focus on the two factors. 
  
Furthermore, since the effects of internal shocks to real GDP and inflation are statistically 
significant, policymaking needs to focus on limiting internal shocks. The effectiveness of the 
flexible exchange rate policy is shown in the results of the external and internal shocks 
examined, implying that the policy should be maintained in the country. Unlike countries with 
pegged exchange rates which tend to experience macroeconomic fluctuations due to 
vulnerability to shocks, economies with flexible exchange rates tend to be resilient to shocks. 
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Chapter 5: Growth Comovements between Nigeria and Its Industrialized 
Trade Partners: Does the Decoupling Hypothesis Hold for Nigeria? 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The decoupling hypothesis relates to business-cycle spillovers from advanced economies 
(ADs) to emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) such as Nigeria. The 
spillovers can occur via one or more of the channels of international transmission of shocks 
examined in the literature review of chapter 3, depending on the kinds of shocks from source 
economies. For example, there were business-cycle spillovers from the ADs to the EMDEs 
largely via the financial channels during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. Specifically, 
the present chapter provides empirical evidence relating to reduction of spillovers occurring 
via the mechanisms of cross-border spillovers discussed in chapter 3, as the decoupling 
hypothesis tests whether or not there is decrease of spillovers. Such empirical evidence is 
particularly relevant for Nigeria, because to the best of our knowledge there is only one 
decoupling work (i.e. Obiora, 2009) that focuses on the country, as discussed further in this 
introductory part of the present chapter.  
   
The decoupling hypothesis came into being because of the stronger growth performance in 
recent years of the EMDEs relative to the ADs (IMF, 2012). This new development led to 
observers speculating that the business cycles of the EMDEs have been decoupling from those 
of the ADs. Traditionally the rate of growth of the EMDEs largely depended on the rate of 
growth of the ADs. Therefore, the decoupling hypothesis involves testing whether the 
business cycles of the EMDEs are no longer as closely linked to the business cycles of the 
ADs as previously. The hypothesis has been tested in the literature for individual EMDEs, 
selected regions, and for the whole group of EMDEs.  
 
The literature shows that there are a number of factors that may enhance the decoupling of the 
EMDEs from the ADs. For example, consumption in the EMDEs has risen to the level where 
it may replace decreases in exports when consumption in the US falls (Obiora, 2009). Intra-
group trade and financial linkages have also increased within the EMDEs, leading to possible 
decreases of spillovers from the US and other industrial economies (Kose, 2008; Kose et al., 
2008).  
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The objective of this chapter is to empirically investigate whether or not the decoupling 
hypothesis holds for Nigeria with regard to its two main trade partners identified in chapter 
four, namely the Euro Area and the US. Since Nigeria is a major oil exporting country, the oil 
price is likely to have a significant role to play in the transmission of international business 
cycles into the economy. Therefore, the analysis of this chapter primarily involves the 
dynamic factor model (DFM) with oil-related exogenous covariates. The DFM has strong 
power to reveal hidden or unobserved joint movements in data.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, no study has analysed the decoupling hypothesis for Nigeria by 
exploring the oil channel through a DFM that includes oil-related variables, which creates a 
gap in the literature. For example, Kose et al. (2008) analyse the decoupling hypothesis in a 
DFM involving 106 countries that includes Nigeria, based on three dependent variables, 
namely GDP, investment, and consumption, without using any oil-related exogenous 
variables. Besides, Obiora (2009), which is the only decoupling work focusing specifically on 
Nigeria to the best of our knowledge, investigates whether the hypothesis holds for the 
country by using a  Vector Autoregressive model to analyse the relative importance of 
spillovers to the nation through the trade, financial, and commodity price channels, but this 
does not involve any unobserved factor.  
 
The major limitation in Obiora (2009) is that it does not capture unobserved movements in the 
spillovers between Nigeria and its industrial trade partners. This thesis addresses this 
limitation in the analysis of the present chapter with the use of the DFM, as the technique 
captures hidden movements in data. In discussing the power of the DFM, Kose et al. (2008) 
note that “the DFM is in fact a decomposition of the entire joint spectral density matrix of the 
data.”   
  
Overall, the results of the chapter show a statistically significant degree of growth 
comovements between the three economies under consideration, reflecting that the decoupling 
hypothesis does not hold for Nigeria. The present chapter makes important contributions to 
the literature in the following ways: (i) The findings of the chapter contribute to empirical 
works relating to the theories of international transmission of shocks, as the observed 
comovements are fluctuations originating from Nigeria’s industrial trade partners and 
transmitted to Nigeria via the mechanisms of cross-border spillovers. (ii) The findings also 
contribute to the decoupling hypothesis literature which has little Nigeria-related studies. 
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The remaining parts of the chapter are organized as follows: Stylized empirical discussions on 
the decoupling hypothesis are done in section 5.2. Section 5.3 discusses the variables and data 
used in the study. The methodology and econometric frameworks are expounded in section 
5.4. The empirical results are presented in section 5.5 and discussed further in section 5.6. 
Concluding remarks are given in section 5.7. 
 
5.2. The Decoupling Hypothesis: Stylized Empirical Discussions 
  
The decoupling of the EMDEs from the ADs has two forms, namely real decoupling and 
financial decoupling. Real decoupling concerns the desynchronization of the business cycles 
of the countries of the two economic groups, which can be measured through “real” variables 
such as GDP and trade flows, while financial decoupling requires insignificant financial 
spillovers or the absence of financial contagion between the economies of the two groups, 
which can be measured through financial variables such as stock prices and interest rates 
(Cutrini and Galeazzi, 2012). This chapter addresses real decoupling. 
 
Kose and Prasad (2010) provide excellent discussions of global growth trends involving the 
EMDEs and ADs. As shown by these authors, the contributions of the ADs to global growth 
followed a decreasing trend over the Bretton Woods (1960-1972), pre-globalization (1973-
1985), and globalization (1986-2009) periods, in contrast to the shares of the AMDEs which 
had an increasing trend over these periods, as indicated in Table 5.1. This table also shows 
that these trends continued in the most recent years (2008-2009) of the sample. 
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Table 5.1: Distribution of Global GDP (Measured in Percentages) 
 
Notes: The values are the shares of GDP in total world GDP calculated by using PPP exchange rates. EU-15 
consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK, while the major emerging markets include Brazil, China and 
India. 
Source: Kose and Prasad (2010). 
 
Three emerging markets, namely Brazil, China, and India made significant contributions to 
the improved growth performance of the EMDEs, with China having the strongest share 
among the three outstanding countries, as indicated in Figure 5.1 below.
16
 Kose and Prasad 
(2010) also note the dominant contributions of the US to the trade and financial linkages of 
the EMDEs. 
 
Figure 5.1: Contributions to World Growth (Measured in Percentages) 
 
Notes: The values are measured in PPP exchange rates. Countries considered separately are not included in the 
economic groups to which they belong. 
Source: Kose and Prasad (2010). 
                                                          
16
 The three economies are part of the group of large developing countries tagged the BRICs in the literature, 
which has been observed to have outstanding growth. In fact, it has been predicted that the growth of BRICs 
would overtake the growth of the G6 (US, Japan, UK, Germany, France, and Italy) by 2050 (see Bell, 2011; 
Wilson and Purushothaman, 2003).   
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Apart from the definition of decoupling involving business-cycles desynchronization or 
disconnection, the concept of decoupling may also be defined in terms of the relative shares 
of country-specific, regional, and global factors in the economic performance of EMDEs 
(Kose et al., 2008); and the degree of resilience of the EMDEs to shocks from the ADs 
(Pesce, 2014). Increases in the relative contributions of country-specific and regional factors 
in the economic performance of a country/region at the expense of the share of global factors, 
and a rise in the degree of resilience may point to decoupling. In this chapter, we measure 
decoupling based on the definition involving desynchronization, by examining the correlation 
or comovement of the considered variables. 
 
Studies of real decoupling may be categorized into two main classes. The first class of studies 
are conducted from the perspective of the aggregate growth performance of the EMDEs, 
looking for evidence of divergence from the growth of ADs (see for examples, Economic and 
Financial Affairs, 2011; Dervis, 2012). The main finding of the studies in this class shows that 
the increasing aggregate growth performance of the EMDEs over the ADs in recent years is a 
consequence of the divergence of the long-run aggregate growth trends of the two groups and 
not due to the short-run cyclical components of growth. This evidence of business-cycle 
comovement between the two groups contradicts the decoupling hypothesis.  
 
Dervis (2012) agrees with this argument writing that: “Growth in emerging market and 
developing economies is less dependent on advanced economies over the long run, but in the 
short run they dance together.” Figure 5.2 shows the overall growth performances of the two 
economic groups without decomposition into cycles and trends, while Figure 5.3 displays the 
convergence and divergence of the cycles and the trends respectively.  
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Figure 5.2: Real GDP Growth in Emerging Market and Developing and Advanced Economics  
                   (Annual % Changes; 1980-2011) 
 
  
   Source: Economic and Financial Affairs, 2011. 
 
Figure 5.3: Cycles and Trends of Annual GDP Growth Rates in Emerging and Advanced 
                 Economies (1980-2011) 
 
  Notes: Trends are in % annual growth rates and cycles in % of trend. 
  Source: Economic and Financial Affairs, 2011.  
 
The studies of the second class focus on investigating whether individual EMDEs or EMDE 
regions have been decoupling from the ADs, particularly the US. Unlike the studies of the 
97 
 
first class which employ aggregate variables, the studies of the second class use variables 
relating to individual countries and regions. Besides, unlike the studies of the first class, the 
studies of the second class have mixed findings. Some of the findings show that no 
decoupling has taken place (for examples, Willett et al., 2011; Wälti, 2009; Lam and Yetman 
(2013); Wyrobek and Stańczyk (2013); Jayaram et al. (2009); Obiora (2009)). Other findings 
provide evidence of the desynchronization of the business cycles of certain emerging and 
developing countries and regions from the business cycles of the advanced economies (for 
examples, Park and Shin, 2009; He and Liao, 2011; Kose et al., 2008). 
 
The differences in the findings of the two classes of studies suggest that the increasing growth 
performance of the EMDEs in recent years may be a concomitant of varying contributions of 
the individual economies to the aggregate . While some, such as  China, Brazil and India, may 
be growing significantly , others may be experiencing lower growth rates. This implies that 
there may be varying shares of country-specific, regional, and global factors in the economic 
performances of these countries. Besides, they may have varying level of resilience to shocks 
from the ADs. This necessitates case-by-case empirical studies in dealing with the decoupling 
hypothesis. 
  
Besides, case-by-case empirical studies are required because economic theory has contrasting 
arguments regarding the subject of decoupling. Theories relating to international 
comovements suggest that trade linkages, which vary across individual EMDEs, enhance 
cross-country spillovers and output comovements. But theories based around the principle of 
comparative advantage also show that if increased trade linkages lead to higher specialization 
in the production of the EMDEs, then the level of international output comovement between 
the EMDEs and their industrial trade partners may fall. 
 
At this juncture, we address the question: ‘What factors can make real decoupling likely, 
particularly in resource-rich economies like Nigeria?’ Dealing with this question is necessary, 
because as Cutrini and Galeazzi (2012) note, while there is agreement on the possibility of 
financial decoupling in the literature, some authors seem to believe that the idea of real 
decoupling is a fallacy. For example, panic may motivate  investors to move their assets from 
traditional markets to new ones, leading to significant changes in traditional cross-country 
financial comovement and decoupling. But this process may not lead to real decoupling, since 
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real decoupling involves macroeconomic fundamentals which may not desynchronize 
quickly. 
 
The empirical literature suggests four factors that may enhance the growth of an EMDE and 
make its business cycles  less dependent on that of its industrial trade partners. Firstly, intra-
regional trade may enhance the decoupling of a resource-rich economy. The economy’s 
increasing intra-regional linkages may diversify international trade away from industrial trade 
partners like the US and reduce international business-cycle linkages. For example, the 
analysis of Ilahi and Shendy (2008) on the intra-regional growth linkages between the oil-
producing countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and eight countries in the Middle 
East suggest that the linkages strengthen the growth of the region and increases the potential 
for decoupling from the industrial countries. 
 
Reducing the degree of reliance on the resource sector by developing the non-resource sector 
is a second factor through which the decoupling potential may be strengthened, since this 
diversifies the economy and enhance growth. Diversification usually enhances growth in 
developing economies (Hesse, 2008; Sannassee et al., 2014). 
  
Thirdly, the nature of growth also contributes to the ability to decouple. The possibility of an 
EMDE decoupling from the ADs will increase, if the former does not rely solely on the 
export-driven growth strategy, as shown in Cutrini and Galeazzi (2012). The authors argue 
that the increased integration of the EMDEs into the global economy over the past two 
decades was largely due to the fact that they have been following an export-led growth 
strategy, which does not enhance decoupling because it hinders the growth rate of internal 
demand.  
 
Fourthly, improved institutional quality in the resource-rich economies will also enhance their 
ability to decouple, as shown in the work of Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) on 
Nigeria. Good institution will help to limit the resource-growth paradox. Logically, this must 
be done first before any significant decoupling process can exist. 
 
At this point we present the review of the methods adopted in analysing decoupling in the 
literature. Cutrini and Galeazzi (2012) presents a review of the econometric techniques 
employed in the empirical literature to analyse decoupling, together with the countries, data 
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frequencies, periods, and findings associated with the techniques. The findings are mixed as 
indicated earlier: some show the evidence of decoupling, while some do not. As shown in 
Table 5.2 below, examples of econometrics techniques mentioned by Cutrini and Galeazzi 
(2012) in their review are dynamic factor model, synchronicity measure, dynamic 
correlations, and panel VAR, all of which have the ability to measure comovement.  
 
 
Table 5.2: A Summary of Empirical Studies on Real Decoupling 
 
 Source: Cutrini and Galeazzi (2012). 
 
 
The comovement of a group of economic series points to the existence of a common feature 
of the series caused by common components like cycles and trends. The common feature 
implies it is possible to reduce a large number of series to a more parsimonious and most 
likely a more informative form, which can be modelled through cointegration techniques for 
non-stationary series and models such as dynamic factor models for stationary series (Vahid 
and Engle, 1993; Centoni and Cubadda, 2011). The cointegration of variables having 
stochastic trends means that they have some common stochastic trends affecting their long-
run fluctuations, with the trend capturing all the random shocks having permanent effects on 
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the variables. On the other hand, a dynamic factor model produces an unobserved factor 
representing an unobserved common characteristic in a group of stationary series.  
 
A vital implication of the papers of Table 5.2 is that there are mixed findings on the 
decoupling of individual EMDEs and EMDE regions as indicated earlier, which may be due 
to country-specific and region-specific characteristics and the periods covered in studies. 
Again, this makes country-by-country approach to studying decoupling necessary. The need 
for this approach is even shown by the mixed findings of more recent studies. For example, 
Pesce (2014) employs a time-varying panel VAR with factorization of coefficients to explore 
the average responses of the EMDEs to shocks from the ADs, using an annual dataset (1978-
2010) consisting of 21 ADs and 57 EMDEs and observe that although the resilience of the 
EMDEs has increased over time, they are still vulnerable to the shocks emanating from the 
ADs, suggesting that the EMDEs have not decoupled from the ADs. On the other hand, the 
findings of Claassen et al. (2013) suggest the decoupling of the EMDEs from the ADs, based 
on dynamic factor analysis involving quarterly data (1973Q3-2011Q2) for a sample of 32 
EMDE and AD economies. The aim of the analysis is to determine the extent to which 
common components cause comovements in vital variables (e.g. real GDP, exchange rate, 
imports, exports) for the economies considered.   
 
5.3. Variables and Data 
 
The variables used in the study are the GDP of Nigeria, the US and the Euro Area, and the 
global oil price. The GDP and global oil price data employed are the same as used in Chapter 
4 of the thesis. The oil price cycles and trend are generated from the oil price through the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Table 5.3 below presents the summary of the information on the 
data used in the study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
101 
 
Table 5.3: The Data of the Study 
Variable Source of  Data Form of  Data 
 
Euro Area real GDP GVAR database  Quarterly (1979Q2-2009Q4) 
 
USA real GDP GVAR database Quarterly (1979Q2-2009Q4) 
 
Nigeria’s real GDP  GVAR database (added to the 
database as discussed in chapter four) 
Quarterly (1979Q2-2009Q4)   
 
 
Oil Price GVAR database  Quarterly (1979Q2-2009Q4)  
 
Oil price trend HP Filter applied to oil price of GVAR 
database 
Quarterly (1979Q2-2009Q4)  
  
 
 
 
5.4. Methodology and Econometric Framework 
 
Unit root tests are undertaken to examine the stationarity of the considered variables. 
Cointegration techniques are employed to analyse the long-run relationship between the three 
GDPs and the oil price. This is to serve as the initial analysis of comovement. Thereafter, the 
DFM, our main technique, is estimated for further comovement analysis, after which the 
covariate model is employed for the robustness check of the DFM. The cointegration analysis 
is particularly relevant because existence or non-existence of cointegration is a relevant factor 
of comovement. Hidden or unobserved joint movements which the DFM is modelled to 
capture may not exist, if considered variables do not move together over the long-run. 
 
5.4.1. Unit Root Tests 
 
Basically, we employ the same unit root methods used in the GVAR model discussed in 
chapter four, which are the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and weighted symmetric (WS) 
approaches. As stated in chapter four, the WS technique is more powerful than the ADF 
technique (Dees et al. 2007). Examining the stationarity of considered variables via unit root 
tests helps in determining the appropriate techniques of cointegration to be employed. 
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The Johansen cointegration technique is appropriate for I (1) variables and when there is the 
likelihood of more than one cointegrating relationships. Cointegration techniques such as the 
Bounds testing technique proposed by Pesaran et al. (1999) are not appropriate when there is 
the likelihood of more than one cointegrating relationships.     
 
5.4.2. Cointegration Tests 
 
The Johansen (1991, 1995) technique is employed to test for the existence of cointegration 
between the oil price and the three GDPs under consideration. The Johansen cointegration 
technique is based on maximum likelihood estimation, with two different likelihood ratio 
tests, namely the trace and the maximum eigenvalue tests. The technique involves the 
estimation of a VECM of the form  ∆𝑦𝑡 =∝ 𝛽
′𝑦𝑡−1 + ∑ Λ𝑖Δ𝑦𝑡−1
𝑝−1
𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 , where  𝑦𝑡 is the 
(K×1) vector of US real GDP (usagdp), Euro Area real GDP (eurogdp), Nigeria’s real GDP 
(niggdp), and oil price (oil), which are I(1) variables; ∝ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽 are (K × r ) parameter matrices 
of rank r < K;  Λ𝑖  are the matrices of parameters; and 𝑢𝑡 is the vector of serially uncorrelated 
errors. 
 
As indicated earlier, a major advantage of the Johansen approach is that in a dataset 
containing two or more series it can estimate more than one cointegrating relationship. This 
helps in giving theory-consistent interpretations of the cointegration results, since 
cointegration relationships usually have theoretical meanings. With respect to ability to 
estimate more than one cointegrating relationship, the Johansen approach has higher power 
over other cointegration methods such as the Engle-Granger procedure (Engle and Granger, 
1987), the Phillip-Ouliaris approach (Phillip and Ouliaris, 1990), and the technique of Pesaran 
et al.  (1999).  
 
5.4.3. Dynamic Factor Model 
 
Cointegration is expected to give us an initial perception of the existence of comovement 
before we employ the DFM, which is our main technique. Generally, as Kose et al. (2008) 
explain, the DFM is able to produce results that common alternative techniques of analysing 
comovement like static correlation may not produce. The authors explain the features that 
make the DFMs advantageous over the alternatives in this respect. Firstly, the dynamic nature 
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of the DFMs enables them to capture such dynamic properties of a dataset as autocorrelations 
and cross-autocorrelations. 
 
Secondly, the DFM has the ability to detect the common component of a set of variables and 
the responses of the variables to the component. This means, the DFM can, for example, 
identify the varying responses of the GDPs of Nigeria, the Euro Area, and the US to the 
unobserved factor and assign the appropriate sign to the factor loading of each GDP series. 
 
Finally, the DFM makes it possible to specify or identify multiple unobserved factors driving 
considered variables, so that comovements across all the variables and the subsets of the 
variables can be explored, implying that the relative roles of the factors can also be examined. 
This feature is particularly useful for analysis involving multiple factors. 
 
The DFM therefore can capture the features causing the comovements of variables within a 
dataset. According to Kose et al. (2008), “the DFM is in fact a decomposition of the entire 
joint spectral density matrix of the data.” The DFM was proposed by Geweke (1977) with the 
central principle that a few latent or unobserved factors drive the comovements of a vector of 
observed time-series variables. The model can also be used to explore comovements driven 
by a single unobserved factor.  
 
We model our DFM based on the conjecture that a latent oil-related factor drives the 
comovement between the real GDPs of Nigeria, the Euro Area, and the US. The factor has 
oil-related exogenous covariates, which are the trend and the cycles of the oil price obtained 
through the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. The covariates are employed with the belief that 
they will help to capture the business-cycle linkages between Nigeria and the two industrial 
trade partners, since the former is a major oil exporter, while the industrial countries are major 
oil importers. 
  
Therefore, in our DFM the three considered real GDPs denoted by niggdp, eurogdp, and 
usagdp for Nigeria, the Euro Area, and the US respectively, are linear functions of the 
unobserved factor, which in turn is a function of the oil price trend and the oil price cycle 
denoted by oiltrend and oilcycle respectively and a second-order autoregressive process, as 
shown in the equations below:    
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  Α𝑓𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                        (5.1)   
                
𝑓𝑡 = Β𝑧𝑡 + Π1𝑓𝑡−1 + Π2𝑓𝑡−2 + 𝑣𝑡                                                                             (5.2) 
 
where  𝑦𝑖𝑡 = is a 𝑘 × 1 vector of  niggdp, eurogdp, and usagdp 
 
Α =  𝑘 × 𝑛𝑓 matrix of parameters which are the factor loadings   
 
𝑓𝑡 = 𝑛𝑓 × 1 vector of unobserved factors, which is a column vector because we have only 
        one factor 
 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝑘 × 1   vector of disturbances 
   
Β = 𝑛𝑓 × 𝑛𝑧 matrix of parameters  
 
𝑧𝑡 =  𝑛𝑧 × 1  vector of oiltrend and oilcycle   
 
Π𝑖 =  𝑛𝑓 × 𝑛𝑓  matrix of autocorrelated parameters for 𝑖 ∈ { 1, 2, 3}  
 
𝑣𝑡 =  𝑛𝑓 × 1  vector of disturbances 
 
Equation 5.1 can be written more explicitly for the three GDPs under consideration as 
follows: 
 
𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡 =  Α1𝑓𝑡 +  𝑢1𝑡                                                                                          (5.3) 
 
𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑛𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡 =  Α2𝑓𝑡 +  𝑢2𝑡                                                                                          (5.4) 
 
𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡 =  Α3𝑓𝑡 +  𝑢3𝑡                                                                                          (5.5) 
 
where eurogdp, niggdp, and usagdp stand for the real GDPs of the Euro Area, Nigeria, and the 
US respectively.  
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the oil price cycles and oil price trend used in our DFM are obtained from the oil price 
through the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter procedure, which is explained in the next section.  
 
5.4.3.1. The Hodrick-Prescott Filter 
 
The HP filter, which was introduced by Hodrick and Prescott (1997), is a technique that is 
used for decomposing a series into its long-term trend and short-term cyclical components, in 
order to remove the short-term component and obtain a smooth long-term component. The 
filtering procedure of the HP filter is an optimization process that produces the smooth series 
from the original series by minimising the variance of the latter around the former. Suppose a 
series 𝑦𝑡 consists of a trend component 𝑧𝑡  and a cyclical component 𝑐𝑡, so that  𝑦𝑡 =  𝑧𝑡 +
𝑐𝑡 . Based on a penalty parameter 𝜆 that constrains the second difference of  𝑧𝑡, the smooth 
trend component is obtained by minimizing: 
 
∑ (𝑦𝑡 − 𝑧𝑡)
2 𝑇𝑡=1 +  𝜆 ∑ ((𝑧𝑡+1 − 𝑧𝑡) − (𝑧𝑡 − 𝑧𝑡−1))
2𝑇−1
𝑡=2                                                    (5.6) 
 
Since 𝑦𝑡 =  𝑧𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡,  equation 5.6 is also the same as: 
 
∑ (𝑐𝑡)
2𝑇
𝑡=1 +  𝜆 ∑ ((𝑧𝑡+1 − 𝑧𝑡) − (𝑧𝑡 − 𝑧𝑡−1))
2
 𝑇−1𝑡=2                                                                (5.7)  
 
The smoothness of the trend component depends on the value of the parameter 𝜆, reflecting 
that the trend becomes smoother as 𝜆 → ∞ . Hodrick and Prescott (1997) recommend varying 
values of  𝜆  for different periodicity of the data used in the filtering process as follows:   
 
  𝜆 = (
100 for annual  data
   1,600  for quaterly data
     14,400  for monthly data
)                                                                           (5.8) 
In this line, we set 𝜆 to be equal to 1,600 in our study, since we employ quarterly data for the 
analysis.   
 
5.4.4. Covariate Model: Robustness Check of the Dynamic Factor Model 
 
We undertake a robustness check of the DFM with the unobserved factor in a covariate model 
where the Nigerian GDP is regressed in turn against the unobserved factor, the lagged terms 
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of the GDPs of the US and the Euro Area, and the lagged terms of the Nigerian GDP. As 
indicated by Stock and Watson (2010), the predicted factor of a DFM can be employed for 
postestimation regressions of various purposes.  
 
The covariate model consists of three equations. In the first equation, the Nigerian GDP is 
regressed against the predicted unobserved factor, which acts as a standardized variable across 
the three GDPs, since it captures their comovements. In the other two equations, the lagged 
forms of the GDPs are included accordingly as covariates, since the GDPs have individual 
localized independence and can change the results of the first equation. The hypotheses 
relating to the three equations of the covariate model are therefore as follows: 
 
Hypotheses for first equation of covariate model:  
 
H0: Unobserved factor does not have impact on regressand (Nigerian real GDP) similar to the 
impact of DFM 
 
H1: Unobserved factor have impact on regressand (Nigerian real GDP) similar to impact of 
DFM 
 
Hypotheses for second equation of covariate model: 
 
H0: The presence of US and Euro Area covariates does not change the results of the first 
equation 
 
H1: The presence of US and Euro Area covariates changes the results of the first equation 
 
Hypotheses for third equation of covariate model: 
 
H0: The presence of Nigerian covariate does not change the results of the second equation 
 
H1: The presence of Nigerian covariate changes the results of the second equation 
 
The hypotheses of the three equations are designed to test whether or not the unobserved 
factor obtained from the DFM truly serves as the standardized variable capturing 
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comovements across the three GDPs under consideration. The real GDP of the focus economy 
(Nigeria) is therefore regressed against the unobserved factor in the first equation, while 
covariate effects of included covariates are examined in the second and third equations of the 
covariate model. The existence of covariate effects points to the robustness of the DFM. 
 
The first equation of the covariate model is: 
 
𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑛𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑓𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                                                                       (5.9)                                         
                                                         
where  𝑛𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  =  Nigeria’s real GDP 
  
𝑓𝑡       =  unobserved factor 
 
𝑢𝑡     = error term 
 
The second equation of the model extends the first equation by including twelve lags each of 
the real GDPs of the Euro Area and the US as covariates, making the model to have lagged 
covariates: 
 
𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑛𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡 =  𝜋0 +  𝜋1𝑓𝑡 +  𝜋2𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡−1 … 𝜋13𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡−12 +
𝜋14𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡−1 … 𝜋25𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡−12 + 𝑣𝑡                                                         (5.10)                                                                                                             
 
where   𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 = the real GDP of the Euro Area 
 
               𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  = the real GDP of USA 
                                                  
                       𝑣𝑡   = error term 
 
The third equation of the model extends the second equation by also including twelve lags of 
the Nigerian GDP as covariates, making the model to have an autoregressive feature. The 
covariates are expected to change the impact of the unobserved factor of equation 5.9, as 
mentioned earlier. The third equation is as follows: 
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𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑛𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡 =  𝜋0 +  𝜋1𝑓𝑡 +  𝜋2𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡−1 … 𝜋13𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡−12 +
𝜋14𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡−1 … 𝜋25𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡−12 + 𝜋26𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑛𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡−1 … +  
𝜋37𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑛𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡−12 + 𝑧𝑡                                                                                                     (5.11)                                                                     
 
where 𝑧𝑡   = error term 
 
The chosen number of lags (i.e. twelve) of the covariates is based on empirical discretion. The 
number of lags should be sufficient to capture the dynamics of the business cycles of the 
economies. 
 
5.4.5. The Relationship between Oil Price and Unobserved Factor: Evidence from 
Statistics 
 
Together with the above robust check, statistics showing the nature of the relationship 
between the oil price and the estimated unobserved factor are also estimated. This is to done 
to confirm the relationship between the two variables shown in the results of the DFM, as this 
will further reveal the level of the success of the estimated DFM.  
 
The statistics estimated capture vital statistical characteristics like volatility, correlation, and 
covariance, making it possible to examine the role of oil in the international business cycles 
transmission relating to the three economies in question. 
 
5.5. Empirical Results 
 
We present and discuss below the empirical results of the analysis, capturing unit root tests; 
cointegration tests including their lag-length selection criteria; the DFM; the covariate model; 
and the statistics showing the relationship between the oil price and the unobserved factor. 
 
5.5.1. Unit Root Tests 
 
As shown in the Tables 5.4 both the ADF and WS approaches indicate that the three GDPs 
and the oil price are stationary after first differencing, reflecting that the variables are all I (1). 
As indicated earlier, the WS technique has stronger relative performance power over the ADF 
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method, suggesting that the I (1) status of the variables is proven to be valid by the similar 
results of the methods of varying strength of performance.  
 
Table 5.4: Unit Root Tests for Real Output and Global Oil Price at the 5% Significance Level 
Specification Test Critical 
Value 
Euro Output Nigeria 
Output 
US  
Output 
Oil Price  
With trend ADF -3.45 -0.83 -1.36 -2.28 
 
-1.46 
With trend WS -3.24 -1.18 -1.71 -2.45 
 
-1.28 
No trend ADF -2.89 -1.28 -1.34 -0.83 
 
-0.69 
No trend WS -2.55 0.87 0.40 1.23 
 
-1.00 
First Difference ADF -2.89 -3.71 -4.19 -5.00 
 
-6.38 
First Difference WS -2.55 -3.90 -4.22 -4.74 -6.49 
Notes:  As in chapter four, ADF stands for Augmented Dickey-Fuller, and WS for weighted symmetric ADF. 
Based on the prompting for options by the GVAR software regarding the unit root tests, we choose the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC) for the lag order selection and 4 as the maximum lag order, since our data are in 
quarterly form.   
 
  
5.5.2. Cointegration Tests 
 
Table 5.5 presents the VAR lag selection criteria statistics for the cointegration tests. We 
employ the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC), the Hannan and Quinn Information 
Criterion (HQIC), and the Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) in selecting the 
optimum VAR lag for the cointegration, using the levels forms of the considered variables, 
which are the oil price and the three GDPs under consideration. As shown in Table 5.5, the 
optimum number of lags chosen by the three information criteria is 2. Based on the finding on 
the optimal lag, we proceed to undertake the cointegration test, using one lag of each of the 
differenced variables. The cointegration results for the trace and maximum eigenvalue 
statistics are presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.7.  
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Table 5.5: VAR Lag Selection Criteria of Cointegration Test  
Lag AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 -6.70 -6.67 -6.61 
1 -22.54 -22.35 -22.07 
2 -23.54* -23.20* -22.70*  
3 -23.54 -23.04 -22.32 
4 -23.35 -22.70 -21.76  
Notes: AIC represents Akaike’s Information Criterion; HQIC stands for Hannan and Quinn Information 
Criterion; SBIC represents Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion; while * points to optimal lag.  
 
 
Table 5.6:  Trace Test of Johansen Cointegration 
                                                                            Trace  Test 
 Number of Lags = 1 
 
               With Constant 
 
                             With Trend 
 
H0 Trace 
Statistic 
5% 
Critical 
Value 
1% Critical 
Value 
Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value 1% Critical Value 
r ≤ 0 81.52 47.21 54.46 89.51 54.64 61.21 
r ≤ 1 34.90*** 29.68 35.65 36.94*** 34.55 40.49 
r ≤ 2 11.46** 15.41 20.04 15.25** 18.17 23.46 
r ≤ 3 2.26 3.76 6.65 3.94 3.74 6.40 
Notes: r represents the maximum rank of cointegration, while *** and ** denote the rejection of the null 
hypothesis at 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
 
 
Table 5.7: Maximum Eigenvalue Test of Johansen Cointegration 
                                                                Maximum Eigenvalue Test  
Number of Lags = 1      
 
               With Constant                         With Trend 
 
H0 Maximum 
Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
5% 
Critical 
Value 
1% Critical 
Value 
 
 
Maximum 
Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
5% Critical Value 1% Critical Value 
r = 0 46.62 27.07 32.24 52.57 30.33 35.68 
r = 1 23.44*** 20.97 25.52 21.69***;** 23.78 28.83 
r = 2 9.20** 14.07 18.63 11.31 16.87 21.47 
r = 3 2.26 3.76 6.65 3.94 3.74 6.40 
Note: r represents the maximum rank of cointegration, while *** and ** denote the rejection of the null 
hypothesis at 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
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As shown in the foregoing discussions, the cointegration tests are undertaken for the oil price 
and the three GDPs under consideration over 1979Q2-2009Q4. Table 5.6 indicates that the 
trace test (both with constant and trend) produces r ≤ 1 at the 1% level of significance and r 
≤ 2 at the 5% level of significance, implying that with constant and trend we have at least 1 
cointegrating equation and at least 2 cointegrating equations at the 1% and 5% levels 
respectively.  
 
According to 5.7, the Eigenvalue test (with constant) produces r = 1 at the 1% level of 
significance and r = 2 at the 5% level of significance. On the other hand, the Eigenvalue test 
(with trend) produces r = 1 at both the 1% and 5% levels of significance. This means that for 
the Eigenvalue test with constant, there is exactly one cointegrating equation at the 1% level 
of significance and exactly 2 cointegrating equations at the 5% level of significance; while 
with trend there is exactly 1 cointegrating equation at the 1% and 5% levels of significance. 
These findings suggest the existence of long-run relationships between the three GDPs and 
the oil price. This gives the initial evidence of some form of comovements between the four 
variables, making it plausible to employ the DFM, whose results are presented next, for 
further analysis. 
 
5.5.3. Dynamic Factor Model 
 
As noted earlier, the DFM is the main econometric technique of this chapter. The results of 
the model capture the coefficients of the oil-related exogenous variables; the coefficients of 
the lagged terms of the unobserved factor; and the factor loadings relating to each of the 
considered dependent variables. Table 5.8 below presents the results.   
 
As shown in this table, the unobserved factor denoted by f has statistically significant 
negative and positive autoregressive parameter impacts on it. The oil price trend and oil price 
cycles also have statistically significant positive and negative effects respectively on the 
unobserved factor.  The unobserved factor represents the comovement of the GDP series of 
the three economies considered.   
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Table 5.8: Dynamic Factor Model of the Real GDPs of Nigeria, the Euro Area,  
                 and the US 
                                                                                            Wald chi2 (7)   = 5567.83 
                                                                                        Prob > chi2      = 0.00                                                                                 
       Coef.   Std. Err.   Z P>|z| 
 
 
f                      
                      f 
    
                         
                   L1 
            
1.50*** 
               
0.20 
                 
7.38 
                    
0.00 
   
                   L2 
                        
-0.58*** 
               
0.19 
                       
-3.11 
                  
0.002 
         
           oilcycle 
                        
-1.84** 
               
0.84 
                       
-2.2 
                    
0.03 
          
           oiltrend 
              
0.13** 
               
0.06 
                 
2.35 
                    
0.02 
Dln(niggdp) 
                      f     
            
0.001** 
             
0.001 
                   
2.35 
                    
0.02 
Dln(usagdp) 
                      f   
            
0.001** 
             
0.001 
                   
2.11 
                    
0.04 
Dln(eurogdp) 
                     f  
            
0.001** 
           
0.0004 
                   
2.14 
                    
0.03 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of  
significance respectively. 
 
 
As noted before, comovement statistically means a “common move” in a set of series 
captured through a more parsimonious and likely more informative series or structure (Vahid 
and Engle, 1993; Centoni and Cubadda, 2011). For the three GDPs under consideration, the 
common component causing comovement may relate to shocks affecting the three series, as 
displayed by the graph of the common unobserved factor, which captures the global 
recessions of the early 1980s and the late 2000s, as shown in Figure 5.4 below.
17
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
Adding the GDPs of more countries in the analysis may enable the graph to reveal more recessions within the data 
span of the study, apart from those of early 1980s and late 2000s. The recession of the early 1980s was experienced by 
both advanced and developing countries, with the latter group of countries experiencing a debt crisis; while the 
recession of the late 2000s involved a financial crisis originating from the US and transmitted to Europe and the rest of 
the world in turn, with advanced and developing economies significantly affected.   
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Figure 5.4: Graph of Predicted Unobserved Factor (1979Q2-2009Q4) 
 
Source: Author 
 
Therefore, the high negative impact (-1.84) of the oil cycles on the factor is largely due to the 
fact that oil price spikes are usually associated with global growth slowdowns and sometimes 
recessions, with the oil importing industrial economies, particularly the US, playing a leading 
role in the cross-country transmissions of the growth difficulties (see Kose et al, 2003; 
Roubini and Setser, 2004; Hamilton, 2009; Tapia, 2013). The studies show that oil price 
increases have a role to play in each of the post-73 global recessions, but not all such shocks 
caused a recession. 
 
Specifically, the recessions of the early 1980s and the late 2000s that are shown as part of the 
comovement between the three countries under consideration were not solely consequences of 
oil price shocks, but oil price increases played significant roles in them. The recession of the 
early 1980s was largely caused by a restrictive monetary policy in the US, which led to a 
recession in the country and an eventual global recession, but the oil price spike that was 
associated with the Iranian revolution of 1979 had a role to play in the downturn. On the other 
hand, the US housing bubble was a primary causative factor of the recession of the late 2000s, 
but as Hamilton (2009) indicates, the oil price increases of 2007-2008 played a role in the 
downturn.   
 
Furthermore, as shown by the factor loading, the correlation between the unobserved factor 
and each of the GDPs of Nigeria, the US, and the Euro Area is statistically significant, with a 
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value of 0.001, reflecting that the impact of the factor on each the three GDPs is about 0.1%. 
The three GDPs therefore move together based on about the same impact of the common 
factor on them. Finally, the Wald test results in the table are for all the parameters of the table. 
The null hypothesis for the test is that all the parameters are zero, and as the results show, the 
null is rejected. This means that the considered coefficients are jointly statistically significant. 
 
5.5.4. Covariate Model 
 
The covariate model is employed to check the robustness of the DFM, as mentioned before. 
The covariate model involves the three equations of the model indicated earlier as shown 
below in Table 5.9. The first equation of the covariate model involves regressing the Nigerian 
GDP against the unobserved factor, which is a regressor acting as a standardised variable 
across the three GDPs under consideration, as distinct from the GDPs themselves, which have 
individual localized independence, as noted earlier. Localized independence is one of the key 
features of covariates, justifying the use of the lagged terms of the three GDPs as covariates. 
 
As shown in Panel A of Table 5.9, the unobserved factor has a statistically significant positive 
impact of about 0.10% on the Nigerian GDP, which is consistent with the positive correlation 
between the factor and the GDP in the DFM results of Table 5.8. However, as shown in Panel 
B of Table 5.9, the positive impact of the factor on the Nigerian GDP increases to about 
0.20% when the lagged terms of the GDPs of the US and the Euro Area are added as 
exogenous covariates.  
  
Panel B also shows that the added covariates have varying individual effects on the Nigerian 
GDP. Over a three-year period (i.e. twelve quarters), the lagged terms of the US GDP have 
three negative and one positive statistically significant impacts and a negative net-impact (i.e. 
positive-negative impacts) on the Nigerian GDP. On the other hand, the lagged terms of the 
GDP of the Euro Area have two statistically significant positive impacts and hence a positive 
overall impact over the same time horizon. 
  
These effects are consistent with the impacts of the oil shocks triggered by the growth of the 
US and the Euro Area, which are simulated in chapter four. In the simulation, the growth of 
the US leads to a statistically significant increase of the oil price and a fall in the growth rate 
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of Nigeria. On the other hand, the growth of the Euro Area causes a rise in the oil price, but 
the increase is not statistically significant and the growth rate of Nigeria does not fall.  
 
  Table 5.9: Covariate Model  
            Panel A: Equation 
5.9 of Covariate  
Model (without 
lagged covariates) 
Panel B: Equation 
5.10 of Covariate 
Model (with lagged 
covariates) 
Panel C: Equation 5.11 of 
Covariate Model (with lagged 
covariates and autoregressive 
feature )  
Dependent  Variable: 
Dln(niggdp) 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
factor  .001*** .002*** .0003 
Dln(usagdp) L1.  -.41** -.15 
L2.  -.31** -.06 
L3.  -.01 .17* 
L4.  .077 .06 
L5.  .22* .13 
L6.  .15 .02 
L7.  .15 .15* 
L8.  .10 -.004 
L9.  -.01 -.07 
L10.  -.06 .01 
L11.  .05 .15* 
L12.  -.18* -.11 
Dln(eurogdp) L1.  -.20 .05 
L2.  .04 .03 
L3.  .01 -.13 
L4.  -.18 -.17 
L5.  -.06 .05 
L6.  -.07 .07 
L7.  .35** .23** 
L8.  .26 -.06 
L9.  .26* .09 
L10.  .19 .03 
L11.  .25 .22** 
L12.  .14 -.10 
Dln(niggdp) L1.    .81*** 
L2.   -.08 
L3.   .04 
L4.   -.48*** 
L5.   .46*** 
L6.   -.05 
L7.   .03 
L8.   -.37*** 
L9.   .33** 
L10.   .04 
L11.   -.07 
L12.   .10 
Constant  .001 -.01*** -.004* 
F                  
13.30***   
                       
5.01*** 
                                      
11.32*** 
R-squared  0.10  0.60  0.85 
  Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance respectively. 
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Panel C shows that the impact of the unobserved factor on the Nigerian GDP becomes 
statistically insignificant, when the lagged terms of Nigerian GDP are added as additional 
covariates. This further confirms the comovements between the three GDPs under 
consideration, due to the factor. Because the factor is the cause of the comovement, the 
factor’s impact on the Nigerian GDP should become insignificant when the lags of the three 
GDPs are present as regressors. These findings show the robustness of the factor and the 
DFM. 
 
Furthermore, the inclusion of the lagged terms of the Nigerian GDP as covariates changes the 
impact of the US GDP, which now only has positive statistically significant impacts on the 
former GDP, with three of such impacts existing within the three-year horizon. However, the 
positive impacts of the GDP of the Euro Area are maintained, after the inclusion of the 
Nigerian covariates. The impacts of the lagged terms of the Nigerian GDP over the three-year 
horizon are both positive and negative, with three positive and negative impacts respectively 
and a positive net impact. The overall impacts of the Nigerian covariates are also higher than 
the impacts of the US and Euro Area covariates, with the statistically significant impacts of 
the former covariates being about five times greater than those of the latter ones. This is 
consistent with the results showing the greater role of domestic shocks over external (oil-
related) shocks in Nigeria in chapter four. 
 
Finally, as indicated before, the unobserved factor has a high inverse relationship with oil 
price cycles, which is the component of the price with frequent variations (i.e. volatility). The 
means that the earlier indicated nature of the factor is inversely associated with oil price 
volatility, implying that the statistical insignificance of the factor in Panel C alludes to low 
impact of oil price volatility. Since oil price volatility is one of the causes of the resource 
curse (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003), that the US GDP has only statistically 
significant positive impact on the Nigerian GDP in Panel C may point to the fact that low oil 
price volatility limits the resource curse in Nigeria.   
 
5.5.5. The Relationship between Oil Price and the Unobserved Factor: Summary 
Statistics 
 
In addition to the robustness check of the DFM undertaken through the covariate model, in 
this section we provide descriptive statistics (i.e. mean, median, correlation, etc) in Table 5.10 
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relating to the relationship between oil price and the unobserved factor. The statistics shown 
in the table, particularly the correlation and covariance, are consistent with the inverse 
relationship between the oil cycles and the unobserved factor in the DFM results.  
 
As indicated in Table 5.10, the correlation and covariance between the oil price and the 
unobserved factor are -0.39 and -0.60 respectively. These values clearly show that the 
variables tend to move in opposite directions, which is mainly due to the slowdowns and 
recessions caused by oil price spikes, as mentioned earlier. As shown in the table, the 
fluctuation or volatility of the price of oil, by say a standard deviation of 0.53 will cause a 
larger degree of fluctuation in the unobserved factor by a standard deviation of 2.91. This 
suggests that an oil price spike of about 50% in magnitude may lead to growth downturns that 
are larger than the size of the oil shock in the concerned economies, due to the unobserved 
factor, which is consistent with the negative covariance and correlation values.      
 
Conceptually, covariance measures the degree to which two variables change together, which 
is statistically measured by the product of the two variables, after they are deviated from their 
means. But the value of covariance may be difficult to interpret, if the units in which the 
considered variables are measured are different. This limitation is overcome in the formula of 
correlation, which is covariance divided by the standard deviations of the considered 
variables, because the numerator and the denominator of the formula are in the same units. 
  
Table 5.10: Statistics on the Relationship between Oil Price and Global Unobserved Factor 
 ln(Oil) Unobserved Factor 
Mean 3.30 5.41 
Std. Dev. 0.53 2.91 
Min 2.41 -6.28 
Max 4.81 11.35 
Correlation  
ln(Oil) 1 -0.39 
Covariance  
ln(Oil) 0.28 -0.60 
Unobserved Factor -0.60 8.45 
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5.6. Discussion of Findings 
 
The results of this chapter contain findings relating to both Nigeria’s decoupling and resource 
curse, the latter being a key subject of the findings of chapter four. Therefore, in this section 
we discuss the findings of the present chapter under two sub-headings below, relating the 
findings to the empirical literature. 
 
5.6.1. The Decoupling of Nigeria from Its Industrial Trade Partners 
 
The results of tables 5.4-5.10 show that the decoupling hypothesis does not hold for Nigeria, 
regardless of the form of analyses (cointegration, dynamic comovement or individual country 
impacts). This is perhaps not surprising given the role of oil price in the business-cycle 
linkages between the country and its considered industrial trade partners. 
 
That the decoupling hypothesis does not hold for Nigeria is consistent with the findings of 
other studies of the literature regarding the decoupling of the EMDEs from their industrial 
counterparts. Such studies focus on individual EMDEs (e.g. Jayaram et al., 2009; Wyrobek 
and Stańczyk, 2013); regions consisting of selected EMDEs (e.g. Cutrini and Galeazzi, 2012; 
Lam and Yetman, 2013); and the aggregate of all EMDEs (e.g. Economic and Financial 
Affairs, 2011; Dervis, 2012). 
 
However, to the best of our knowledge, the only study that tests the decoupling hypothesis 
specifically for Nigeria is Obiora (2009). The work of this author is similar to the work of this 
chapter, in particular with respect to the countries covered, the channels of international 
linkages considered, the role of oil in the linkages, and the overall findings. The author 
identifies the US as the largest trade partner of Nigeria, and the European Union as the second 
largest partner, based on Direction of Trade data, with the European Union consisting five 
(i.e. Spain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy) of the eight countries forming the 
Euro Area in our study.  
 
Regarding the channels of international linkages, Obiora (2009) examines the relative roles of 
trade channel, financial channel, and the channel of commodity prices in the transmission of 
international spillovers from trade partners to Nigeria. Oil has a strong role in the spillovers, 
because it accounts for a large share of the trade channel. Besides, oil price is part of the 
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prices constituting the commodity prices channel. Concerning the overall findings, the author 
finds that the decoupling hypothesis does not hold for Nigeria, based on the dominance of the 
trade and the commodity prices channels relative to the financial channel, with the US playing 
a leading role in the transmission of the spillovers. Generally, the trade and financial linkages 
between the EMDEs and their industrial counterparts constitute a major factor that may not 
make the former economies to decouple from the latter ones.  
 
5.6.2. Oil Price Volatility and the Resource Curse: The Nigerian Case 
 
Key economic attributes of oil include non-renewability, high globalization, and price 
volatility. The first attribute means that oil is a resource given by nature and that it cannot be 
synthesized. The second attribute points to the dominant role as a source of energy. The third 
attribute, which relates to the discussion of this section, points to the time-varying standard 
deviations of oil price, which creates time-varying uncertainty. This means that oil price 
volatility is different from oil shock. Oil price volatility may be defined as the frequent 
deviations in oil prices, while oil price shocks point to large deviations in the prices (Ebrahim 
et al, 2014). 
 
As indicated before the results of our covariate model show that when oil price volatility is 
weak, there are no negative statistically significant impacts from US GDP on Nigerian GDP 
over a three-year horizon, in contrast to when the volatility is not weak. This is because oil 
price volatility hinders growth by creating uncertainty. In fact, oil price volatility and oil price 
uncertainty can be used as synonymous terms (Jo, 2012). This means that the actual levels or 
values of oil price are different from the volatility or uncertainty associated with frequent 
variations of the price. 
 
A major channel through which oil price volatility hinders growth is the decision making 
process of economic agents, namely firms, households, and governments. The agents usually 
delay the decisions relating to investment, consumption, production, and the like, when there 
is uncertainty about the price of oil, which eventually hinders the overall growth of the 
economy (Ebrahim et al, 2014). Other studies showing the negative impact of oil price 
volatility on growth are Elder and Serletis, 2010; Jo, 2012; Ferderer, 1996; and Guo and 
Kliesen, 2005. Finally, an obvious implication of the finding on volatility is that the US is a 
stronger source of oil price volatility than the Euro Area.  
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5.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter analyses the comovement of the real GDPs of Nigeria and its two main trade 
partners, in order to examine whether any degree of decoupling exists between Nigeria and 
the two industrial economies. Since Nigeria is a major oil exporter and oil is a strong source 
of international transmission of business cycles, we choose to analyse the decoupling by 
focusing on the oil channel. 
 
We employ data on the real GDPs of the considered economies and the oil price from the 
GVAR database used in chapter four. Using the HP filter, we obtain the oil trend and cycles 
from the oil price. The main model used for the study is the DFM, in which we model an oil-
related unobserved factor driving the three GDPs under consideration. The results show that 
the unobserved factor drives the three GDPs in the same direction, with positive factor 
loading of about 0.001 for each GDP.  
 
We also test the robustness of our DFM. This mainly involves a covariate model in which the 
Nigerian GDP is regressed against the unobserved factor and covariates. The robust check 
shows that the unobserved factor is robust in the covariate model. Based on these findings, the 
decoupling hypothesis cannot be accepted for Nigeria. Finally, it is worth noting that since 
there are other channels (e.g. financial channel) of international linkages between Nigeria and 
its two main industrial trade partners, apart from the oil channel, further research capturing 
the other channels is needed to explore their roles in the linkages.                                                                               
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Chapter 6: How Effective are the Nigeria’s Stabilization Fund and Oil-
Price-Based Fiscal Rule as Buffers of Global Oil Price Volatility?  
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The present chapter focuses on the analysis of resilience to spillovers via the channels 
examined in the literature review of chapter 3, by examining the effectiveness of Nigeria’s 
stabilization fund and oil-price-based fiscal rule. The emerging market and developing 
economies (EMDEs) have shown more resilience to spillovers from advanced economies 
(ADs) in recent years, largely due to better policies (IMF, 2012). Many of the EMDEs have 
adopted better policies to protect themselves against developments originating from the ADs, 
due to lessons learnt from crises of the past, such as the debt crisis of the early 80s. 
Particularly, developing oil-exporting countries such as Nigeria have designed fiscal policies 
to reduce their susceptibility to oil shocks.  
 
Nigeria’s susceptibility to the volatility of the international oil market originated with the oil 
boom of the 1970s (Baunsgaard, 2003; Odularu, 2007; Akinlo, 2012). This presented the 
country with the challenge of macroeconomic volatility triggered largely by oil price 
volatility. World Bank (2003) compares the standard deviations of key economic indicators of 
several countries and found that the Nigerian economy was among the most volatile in the 
world between 1961 and 2000.  
 
Though the volatility of oil price is external to the Nigerian economy, an internal factor 
exacerbating the macroeconomic volatility of Nigeria is the tie between public expenditure 
and oil revenue, as shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. The vulnerability of the nation to oil price 
volatility therefore necessitated decoupling government expenditure from oil revenue. To 
achieve the decoupling objective and limit macroeconomic volatility, a stabilization fund and 
an oil-price-based fiscal rule were introduced in the country in 2004. 
 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate the effectiveness of the stabilization fund and 
the oil-price-based fiscal rule in achieving the mentioned objective. There is little Nigeria-
specific empirical work exploring the effectiveness of the stabilization fund and fiscal rule. 
Nigeria-specific studies in this strand of the literature are largely done from a qualitative 
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perspective, without the use of econometric tools (e.g. Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, 
2007; Okonjo-Iweala, 2008). This chapter therefore contributes to filling this gap. 
   
The analysis of the chapter has two main sections, which deal with the broad macroeconomic 
and fiscal policy impacts of the stabilization fund and fiscal rule. The first section deals with 
the broad macroeconomic impact, by employing the GARCH-in-Mean (GARCH-M) model to 
examine whether or not the two fiscal policy instruments reduce the volatility of growth.  The 
second section deals with the fiscal policy impact of the two fiscal policy instruments, by 
examining the behaviours of government expenditure and oil revenue before and after the 
year (2004) the instruments were introduced in the country. 
 
The results of the chapter show that the stabilization fund and fiscal rule are effective in 
Nigeria, which is consistent with the findings of other studies on the general impact of the 
instruments in resource-rich economies employing them (e.g. Sugawara, 2014; and Asik, 
2013). Specifically, the findings of the present chapter is consistent with the observations of 
Nigeria-related studies (e.g. Nellor, 2008; Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007; and 
Okonjo-Iweala, 2008) regarding the effectiveness of the fiscal instruments in controlling the 
boom-bust pattern associated with the volatility of oil price in the country. 
 
The effectiveness of the Nigeria’s stabilization fund and fiscal rule points to the resilience of 
the economy to global shocks, which are usually caused by the industrial countries. The 
resilience of the EMDEs to shocks originating from the ADs in recent years is one of the 
reasons for the speculation on the decoupling of the former from the latter. However, the 
findings of chapter 5 and the present chapter show that resilience may not mean decoupling 
for the EMDEs, based on the Nigerian case study. This finding is consistent with the findings 
of other studies regarding the EMDEs (e.g. IMF, 2012; Economic and Financial Affairs, 
2011).   
       
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: A general overview of stabilization funds and 
fiscal rules are presented in section 6.2. The data used in the chapter are discussed in section 
6.3. The econometric framework employed in the chapter is discussed in section 6.4. Section 
6.5 presents the empirical results. Discussions of findings are done in section 6.6, while 
concluding remarks are given in section 6.7. 
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Figure 6.1: Fluctuations in Nigeria’s Oil Revenue and Government Expenditure (1971-2005) 
 
Source: Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007. 
 
      Figure 6.2: Oil Price, Oil Revenue, Total Revenue, and Total Expenditure in Nigeria (1970 to 2000)   
 
      Source: Baunsgaard, 2003. 
 
These figures clearly indicate the features of oil revenue and government expenditure in 
Nigeria. Key ones among the features include the link between oil revenue and government 
expenditure, because changes in the latter follows changes in the former closely; large 
changes in oil revenue of the mid-70s and late-70s due to oil price shocks; and the significant 
separation of expenditure from revenue beginning from the year (2004) the Nigerian 
stabilization fund and fiscal rule were introduced, which gives the initial perception about the 
effectiveness of the fiscal instruments and makes further analysis plausible.   
 
124 
 
6.2. Stabilization Funds and Fiscal Rules in Oil-Rich Economies: A General    Overview 
 
Stabilization funds and fiscal rules are vital fiscal instruments that are widely used as buffers 
of shocks in resource-rich economies. In the context of resource-rich economies, stabilization 
funds are resource-based funds established for resource revenue smoothening, in order to 
prevent the uncertainty and risk associated with the fluctuation of the prices of the resources 
from affecting the budget (e.g. see Bagattini, 2011). For example, Scherer (2009) explains the 
role of stabilization funds in protecting oil exporting countries from the macroeconomic risk 
caused by oil price volatility. 
 
To guard against the adverse impact of oil price volatility on fiscal policy in oil-rich 
economies, Shabsign and Ilahi (2007) note two factors that necessitate smoothing fiscal 
policy variables such as government expenditure and resource revenue through stabilization 
funds, in order to domestically protect the economy against the uncertainty of the 
international oil market.  
 
Firstly, international capital inflows are usually procyclical so when the oil price falls oil 
exporters experience difficulty in securing external borrowing. Secondly, net the benefits of 
increasing public spending on large investment projects during booms is reduced by the cost 
of leaving the projects uncompleted during oil price falls. Uncompleted projects often lead to 
challenges such as unpaid wages and the accumulation of government debt, and a bias 
towards short term projects which may hinder long term growth. 
 
Bagattini (2011) provides an excellent discussion of the characteristics of stabilization funds, 
which mentions the following aspects of the funds: the objective or purpose for establishment; 
the rules for managing the inflow and outflow of resources; the relationship to the government 
budget; the structures, institutions, and transparency; the use of resources and discretion; and 
the size of assets, as shown in Table 6.1.  
 
The purpose of establishment relates to the underlying aim of a stabilization fund, which is 
usually to stabilize the economy by protecting from fluctuating resource prices; savings for 
intergenerational equity; limiting government spending; diversifying the economy by 
investing in non-resource sectors; or a combination of these aims, which may not make the 
fund’s primary objective explicit. Achieving the objectives of a stabilization fund requires that 
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the fund is complemented with other policies and the broader institutional setting of the 
economy, as the fund is not a substitute for the latter (Rodrik, 2005). For example, the fund is 
not a substitute for the rule of law or employment regulations. 
 
The rules for inflow and outflow of resources refer to the pre-determined legislated rule 
through which resources go in and out of a stabilization fund. The rules may stipulate 
thresholds determined for resource prices or revenues through which funds go in and out. 
Resources are saved in the fund when the market price is above the threshold level, while 
resources are withdrawn when the price is below the threshold level. Furthermore, the rules 
may also specify targets for government expenditure, savings level, etc. Therefore, the rules 
are intended to determine the amount of resources in a stabilization fund through the 
thresholds and targets. 
 
With regard to the relationship to the budget,  a stabilization fund may be employed as a tool 
of extra budgetary financing  or a stabilization fund may be integrated into the budget, so that 
the fund serves as a “within budget” instead of an extra budgetary instrument. 
 
The structures, institutions, and transparency of a stabilization fund refer to the organizational 
setting, the procedure of management, and the openness of management of the stabilization 
fund respectively. Central to these characteristics is the authority (e.g. Ministry of Finance, 
Central Bank, panel of experts etc) operating the fund. 
 
The use of resources includes investing, earmarking, and employing the resources for the aims 
discussed under “purpose of establishment.” On the other hand, discretion points to the extent 
to which discretion is used relative to rules by the authority managing the fund. Basically, the 
existence of rules limits the extent to which discretion is used and vice-versa.  
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Table 6.1: Characteristics of Stabilization Funds 
Source: Bagattini (2011). 
 
Finally, the size of asset is the quantity of financial resources owned by a stabilization fund, 
which can be measured by the value of total equity of the fund or asset ratios to GDP, exports 
or government revenue. For example, in resource-dependent countries such as Nigeria, asset 
ratios to exports and government revenue tend to be relatively high, because the economies 
are resource-driven and not diversified. Basically, the size of asset of a stabilization fund 
depends on certain factors, namely the age of the fund, the level of investors’ confidence in 
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the fund, and the degree of public pressure to spend from the resources of the fund, 
particularly during windfalls. Older stabilization funds tend to have higher asset size, 
particularly if the stabilization funds are well managed. Higher investors’ confidence tends to 
make investors to increase their investments in stabilization funds. Finally, if there is no 
public pressure to spend from the resources of stabilization funds, the savings of the funds 
tend to be higher, which will lead to higher size of asset. 
 
Regarding the success of stabilization funds, many studies find that they are effective fiscal 
instruments in resource-rich economies (e.g. Fasano, 2000; Bagattini, 2011; Sugawara, 2014; 
Shabsigh and Ilahi, 2007; Davis et al., 2001). However, a potential factor that may hinder the 
effectiveness is weak level of institutions, according to Ossowski et al. (2008), who note the 
role of broader institutions (e.g. accountability, sound public administration, and 
transparency) in the success of policy in oil-rich economies. As earlier mentioned, 
stabilization funds are not supposed to be substitutes for broader institutions (Rodrik, 2005). 
 
Fiscal rules usually play a role in the effectiveness of stabilization funds. Dixon and Monk 
(2011) propose the role of fiscal rules in a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) for developing 
(African) resource-rich economies “cascade”. The cascade has three forms of funds, namely 
stabilization fund, development fund, and saving fund, with stabilization fund taking priority 
over the other two forms of funds, and the fiscal rule serving as the tool for channelling 
resources into the stabilization fund and the budget, and with the connection between the 
stabilization fund and the budget creating a valve for dealing with the contingency of resource 
price volatility, as shown in Figure 6.3.  
 
According to the authors, the rationale for prioritizing the stabilization fund over the other two 
funds is the dominance of the volatility challenge of resource prices over development and 
intergenerational saving challenges within the framework of developing economies. The 
authors argue that it is only when the volatility challenge is successfully overcome that 
developmental projects and intergenerational saving of the development and saving funds 
should be pursued in turn, with the resources for the two funds generated through stabilization 
fund.  
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Figure 6.3: Proposed Framework of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) in Developing (African) Countries 
Source: Dixon and Monk (2011). 
 
 
As shown in this figure, fiscal rules have a significant role to play in the proposed SWF 
framework of Dixon and Monk (2011). Generally, fiscal rules are permanent restraints on the 
fiscal policy imposed through long-run constraints on budgetary aggregates (IMF, 2009; 
Budina et al., 2012). The budgetary aggregates that the rules constrain determine their types. 
In this line, the authors mention four basic types of fiscal rules: debt rules, budget balance 
rules, expenditure rules, and revenue rules.  
 
Debt rule restrains public debt by setting a limit on it, usually as a ratio to GDP; a balance 
budget rule aims to achieve a particular level of targeted fiscal policy variables such as debt-
to-GDP ratio, which may be achieved by restraining both public revenue and expenditure; an 
expenditure rule sets a limit on government spending; while a revenue rule sets a limit on 
revenue. Each of the rules has advantages and disadvantages as shown in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2: The Features of the Different Types of Fiscal Rules 
Source: Budina et al. (2012). 
 
Like stabilization funds, fiscal rules have also been found to be effective instruments in 
various economies at national and supranational levels (e.g. European Commission, 2006; 
Kopits, 2000; Debrun et al., 2008). But good institutions are also required to get the 
maximum results from fiscal rules. Everything seems to centre on good levels of institutional 
quality in the developmental process of an economy. Even geography as the determinant of 
the existence of natural resources and international trade as the channel through which the 
resources are exchanged for money will only have optimal impact on growth in an economy if 
there are good institutions (Rodrik et al., 2002). 
 
Regarding Nigeria, the oil-price-based fiscal rule, which was designed to work together with 
the stabilization rule of the country, has operated under varying levels of institutions since it 
was introduced. It operated only as an administrative rule from 2004 till 2007. But it became a 
“law” when it was integrated into the law of the nation in 2007 when the Fiscal Responsibility 
Act (FRA) was enacted.  
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The FRA is an Act that was put in place to promote the efficiency of fiscal policy procedure 
and implementation in the country (Nigerian National Assembly, 2007). For example, apart 
from the oil-price-based fiscal rule, the FRA requires the preparation of the Medium-Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF), which is a multi-year budgeting approach that involves the 
allocation of public resources on a rolling basis over a medium-term period consisting of three 
financial years (Nigerian Federal Ministry of Finance, 2010).  
  
The fiscal rule operates by restraining government expenditure through oil revenue 
smoothing, which involves setting a volatility-absorbing reference oil price through which the 
revenue will be channelled into the budget, so that in the process the expenditure is de-linked 
from the revenue and the domestic volatility associated with oil price is constrained. The 
stabilization fund of the country, which was first called Excess Crude Account (ECA), serves 
as the account for saving the excess of budgeted oil revenues when the international oil price 
is higher than the reference price, so that withdrawals could be made from the account when 
the world price is below the benchmark price. The ECA was replaced by Nigeria’s Sovereign 
Wealth Fund (NSWF) in 2012,   following debate on the constitutional foundation of the 
former (see Nigeria Sovereign Wealth Institute, www.nsia.com.ng, 2015), as explained in 
chapter two. 
 
The debate on the illegality of the ECA and its consequent replacement may also be 
interpreted to imply the shift of the operation of the stabilization fund from a weak to a good 
institutional framework. The stabilization fund was not initially established in line with 
section 162(1) of the Nigerian constitution, which stipulates that all revenues earned by the 
federal government, with the exception of certain proceeds from personal income tax that 
only the federal government has the right to collect, should be kept in an account called the 
Federation Account and not in any other account. 
 
Besides, the ECA was not established as a legal entity in the eyes of the law and it operated 
only as an administrative arrangement (see Azaino, 2012). These weaknesses were overcome 
when the NSWF was established based on the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority Act 
of 2011, which authorizes the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority (NSIA) to function as 
an independent entity to manage the NSWF. 
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6.3. Data 
 
We use the following data: (i) Nigerian data spanning 1979Q2-2009Q4 on real GDP, 
inflation, real exchange rate, and short-term interest rate, sourced from the GVAR dataset 
employed in chapter four. (ii) Constructed quarterly stabilization fund and fiscal rule dummy 
for Nigeria, which equals 1 in a year when the fiscal instruments are present in the country 
and 0 otherwise. To capture the role of the stabilization fund in reducing the transmission 
from oil price to real GDP, we interact the dummy with the oil price. (iii) Annual time series 
data (1970-2010) on nominal government expenditure, nominal oil revenue, and GDP price 
deflator, obtained from the 2010 edition of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical 
Bulletin. The price deflator is used to deflate the government expenditure and the oil revenue 
series to obtain their real values.
18
 (iv) Constructed annual stabilization fund and fiscal rule 
dummy, used in the analysis relating to government expenditure and oil revenue. Table 6.3 
presents the summary of the information on the data used in the study. 
 
Table 6.3: The Data of the Study 
Variable Source of Data Form of Data/Remark 
Nigeria’s real GDP GVAR database  Quarterly (1979Q2-2009Q4) 
Nigeria’s inflation GVAR database  Quarterly (1979Q2-2009Q4) 
Nigeria’s real exchange rate GVAR database  Quarterly (1979Q2-2009Q4) 
Nigeria’s short-term interest rate GVAR database  Quarterly (1979Q2-2009Q4) 
Oil price GVAR database Quarterly (1979Q2-2009Q4) 
Quarterly Nigeria’s stabilization fund 
and fiscal rule dummy 
Constructed dummy 
interacted with the first 
differences of the log of oil 
price. 
Quarterly (1979Q2-2009Q4)/dummy 
variable takes a value of 1 from 2004. 
Annual Nigeria’s stabilization fund 
and fiscal rule dummy 
Constructed dummy Annual (1970-2010)/dummy variable 
takes a value of 1 from 2004. 
Nigeria’s nominal oil revenue CBN Statistical Bulletin, 
2010 
Annual (1970-2010) 
Nigeria’s nominal government 
expenditure 
CBN Statistical Bulletin, 
2010 
Annual (1970-2010) 
Nigeria’s GDP price deflator CBN Statistical Bulletin, 
2010 
Annual (1970-2010) 
Notes: The stabilization and fiscal rule dummy is constructed based on their year of introduction in Sugawara 
(2012); and IMF (2009) and IMF (2015) respectively. 
                                                          
18
 We employ the price deflator instead of the CPI for the deflation, because the former reflects the prices of all 
the goods and services produced in the economy which makes it relatively suitable for the deflation. 
132 
 
6.4. Econometric Framework 
 
The econometrics techniques used in the chapter are discussed as follows:   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
6.4.1. GARCH-in-Mean Model 
 
The Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH)-in-mean 
(GARCH-M) process is employed to examine the impact of stabilization fund and fiscal rule 
on the volatility of real GDP in Nigeria. Basically, the GARCH-M model is a better model 
than the standard GARCH model, in that the mean equation of the latter does not have the 
GARCH term (i.e. measure of volatility) as the mean equation of the former does. Before the 
introduction of the stabilization fund and fiscal rule in Nigeria, the variability of government 
spending caused by the variability of oil revenue was impacting on real GDP. The GARCH-
M specification picks up this and also makes it possible to test it the two fiscal instruments 
reduce the variability. Specifically, a GARCH-M (1, 1) model is employed for the analysis. 
 
Modelling the Nigerian real GDP as I (1) in line with the unit root test results of chapters 4 
and 5 of the thesis, the mean equation of the GARCH-M (1, 1) model is of the form:  
 
𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡/𝐼𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡−3 +
                                𝛽4𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡−4+∝ 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻)𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                                     (6.1)        
                     
which indicates that the Nigerian real GDP, rgdp is a function of its 4 lagged terms, the log of 
the conditional variance (i.e. GARCH), and ut, conditional on the information available up to 
time t-1. 
 
The conditional variance equation of the GARCH-M (1, 1) model is of the form: 
 
𝜎𝑡
2= 𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝑢𝑡−1
2 + 𝜋2𝜎𝑡−1
2  + 𝜔(𝐷𝑈)𝑡                                                                              (6.2)                                                                                                                                                        
 
where 𝜎𝑡
2 = conditional variance at time t 
 
𝑢𝑡−1
2 = lagged squared error term at time t-1, which is the ARCH term 
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𝜎𝑡−1
2 = conditional variance term at time t-1, which is the GARCH term  
 
(𝐷𝑈)𝑡= stabilization fund and fiscal rule dummy 
 
Furthermore, in dealing with GARCH-M (1, 1), it is necessary to try different 
parameterization forms of the model, in order to keep to the basic assumptions of ARCH 
modelling which are:  
 
(i) Non-negativity assumption, which states that the parameters 𝜋0, 𝜋1, 𝜋2  in equation 6.2 are 
not negative numbers.  
(i) 0 ≤  𝜋0, . . . 𝜋2 ≤ 1, which means that the parameters can be zero or greater than zero, but 
cannot be greater than one.  
   
6.4.2. Techniques for Exploring the Behaviours of Government Expenditure and Oil  
          Revenue 
 
In this section we focus on the behaviours of Nigeria’s government expenditure and oil 
revenue before and after stabilization fund and the fiscal rule were introduced in the country 
in 2004, using data spanning 1970-2010 as mentioned earlier.
19
 Using 1970-2003 and 2004-
2010 as sub-periods, the analysis is based on the following econometric techniques:  
(a) Standard deviation, correlation, and covariance, which measure the volatility and the 
comovement of the two variables respectively.  
(b) Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model, which measures 
volatility clustering.   
(c) Dummy-based structural break test to investigate whether or not there is a structural break 
from the year the stabilization fund and the fiscal rule were introduced.   
 
The formulas and equations of the econometric techniques of the analysis are: 
 
                                                          
19
 Data on the government expenditure and the oil revenue are only available in annual forms, because the 
variables are key annual budgetary variables. Furthermore, the 1970 to 2010 period is employed for the analysis 
to capture the key global oil shocks that have taken place in the global economy, particularly the oil shocks of 
the early 1970s when the country began to depend on oil.  
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6.4.2.1. Standard Deviation 
 
The formula of the standard deviation is: 
 
𝑆𝐷 = √∑(𝑋 − ?̅?)2 𝑛 − 1⁄                                                                                                  (6.3)                                                                                                   
 
where  SD = standard deviation 
 
              X = each value of considered variable, which is Real Government Expenditure  
              (RGE) or Real Oil Revenue (ROR) in this case 
 
              X̅ = mean of considered variable  
 
              n = number of values in considered series 
 
6.4.2.2. Correlation and Covariance 
 
The formula of covariance is: 
 
COV(ROR, RGE)   =  ∑[(𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝑂𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )(𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑡 − 𝑅𝐺𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) 𝑛 − 1⁄ ]                                     (6.4) 
 
where COV(ROR, RGE)   = covariance between ROR and RGE      
                 
ROR= real oil revenue 
 
 RGE = real government expenditure  
 
 n = number of observations 
 
  ROR̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  = mean of ROR 
 
  RGE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  = mean of RGE 
                                   
135 
 
On the other hand, the formula for the correlation, which is related to covariance, is: 
 
𝑟(𝑅𝑂𝑅)(𝑅𝐺𝐸) = 𝐶𝑂𝑉(𝑅𝑂𝑅, 𝑅𝐺𝐸) 𝑆(𝑅𝑂𝑅)𝑆(𝑅𝐺𝐸)⁄                                                                 (6.5) 
 
where r(ROR)(RGE) = coefficient of the correlation between ROR and RGE         
 
  COV(ROR, RGE)   = covariance between ROR and RGE  
 
                     S(ROR) = standard deviation of ROR     
     
                    S(RGE) = standard deviation of RGE 
 
 
6.4.2.3. Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity Model 
 
The Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model employed 
is a GARCH (1, 1) model with a conditional mean equation of the form: 
 
𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑅𝐺𝐸)𝑡/𝐼𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑅𝑂𝑅)𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                                                      (6.6)                            
                     
which  indicates that 𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑅𝐺𝐸)𝑡is a function of 𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑅𝑂𝑅)𝑡 and ut,  conditional on the 
information available up to time t-1. 
 
The conditional variance equation of the GARCH (1, 1) model is of the form:  
 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝑢𝑡−1
2 + 𝜋2𝜎𝑡−1
2  + 𝐷𝑈 ∗  𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑅𝑂𝑅)𝑡                                                                (6.7)                                                        
 
where 𝜎𝑡
2 = conditional variance at time t 
 
𝑢𝑡−1
2 = lagged squared error term at time t-1, which is the ARCH term 
 
𝜎𝑡−1
2 = lagged conditional variance term at time t-1, which is the GARCH term 
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DU = stabilization fund and fiscal rule dummy 
 
Note that different parameterization forms of the GARCH model need to be tried, in order to 
keep to the earlier mentioned assumptions of the ARCH process.  
 
6.4.2.4. Dummy-Based Structural Change Test 
 
In the equation of the structural change test we regress RGE on ROR and on a dummy that 
equals 1 from the year the Nigerian stabilization fund and fiscal rule were introduced (i.e. 
2004), with the dummy interacted with ROR:   
 
Dln(𝑅𝐺𝐸)𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐷𝑈 + 𝛾2Dln(𝑅𝑂𝑅)𝑡 + 𝛾3(𝐷𝑈𝑡 ∗ Dln(𝑅𝑂𝑅)𝑡) + 𝑢𝑡                           (6.8)                                                                                                                                                                          
 
where 𝐷𝑈𝑡  =  stabilization fund and fiscal rule dummy 
 
𝐷𝑈𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑙𝑛(𝑅𝑂𝑅)𝑡 = dummy in multiplicative interaction with ROR  
 
𝑢𝑡  = error term 
 
6.5. Empirical Results 
 
We present the results of the analysis as follows: 
 
6.5.1. GARCH-M Model of Growth Volatility 
 
Table 6.4 presents the descriptive statistics of the first difference of the log of real GDP of 
Nigeria, which is the main variable of focus in the GARCH-M analysis. Table 6.5 presents the 
results of the GARCH-M analysis. In arriving at the results of the GARCH-M (1, 1) model, 
we try different parameterization forms of the ARCH and GARCH terms, and the 
contemporaneous and lagged terms of the DU term (i.e. the stabilization fund and fiscal rule 
dummy), keeping to the earlier mentioned assumptions of the ARCH model. In the 
parameterization process, the GARCH term of the model becomes zero, while the ARCH 
term remains in the model.  
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Furthermore, in the parameterization process, the contemporaneous term of DU has 
statistically significant negative impact on the volatility of the first difference of the log of 
real GDP of Nigeria, implying that the presence of stabilization fund and fiscal rule causes 
volatility break of growth in the country. This finding points to the effectiveness of the two 
fiscal instruments in limiting macroeconomic volatility in the Nigerian economy.  
 
Table 6.4: Summary Statistics of  
                  Nigeria’s Real GDP 
 Dln(rgdp) 
 Mean 0.007 
 Median 0.008 
 Maximum 0.024 
 Minimum -0.023 
 Std. Dev. 0.010 
Notes: rgdp denotes the real GDP of 
 Nigeria. 
 
Table 6.5: GARCH-M Model of Nigeria’s Real GDP 
  
Dependent Variable: 
Dln(rgdp) 
Coef. Prob. 
Mean Equation 
ln(GARCH) -0.0004 0.406 
Cons. -0.001 0.822 
Dln(rgdp) (-1)  0.770*** 0.002 
Dln(rgdp) (-2) -0.017 0.951 
Dln(rgdp) (-3) -0.050 0.707 
Dln(rgdp) (-4) -0.166 0.102 
Variance Equation 
Cons. 1.60E-05*** 0.000 
RESID(-1)^2 0.914** 0.049 
DU -5.74E-05*** 0.0004 
DU(-1) -2.27E-05 0.220 
Durbin-Watson stat               1.617 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels of significance respectively; ln(rgdp) is  
modelled as I (1), based on the unit root tests results of chapters 
4 and 5 of the thesis. 
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6.5.2. Delinking Government Expenditure from Oil Revenue  
  
The results under this section focus on the behaviours of real government expenditure and real 
oil revenue in Nigeria before and after the introduction of stabilization fund and fiscal rule in 
Nigeria. The results touch on stationarity tests, correlation, covariance, standard deviation, 
structural break, and the GARCH process, as presented in Tables 6.6-6.8. Generally, the 
results show that the stabilization fund and fiscal rule are effective in separating government 
expenditure from oil revenue in Nigeria, which is consistent with GARCH-M results. We 
begin the presentation of the results under this section with unit root results. 
 
6.5.2.1. Unit Root Tests 
 
We employ the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Philips-Perron (PP) techniques for the 
unit root tests. The results show that Nigeria’s Real Government Expenditure (RGE) and Real 
Oil Revenue (ROR) are both I (1) as shown in Table 6.10. 
 
Table 6.6: Unit Root Tests 
                  ADF 
              With Trend                   
                                PP 
                        With Trend            
 
Variable ADF 
 Test 
Statistics  
1% 
Critical 
Value 
5% Critical 
Value 
PP 
Statistics 
1% Critical 
Value 
5% Critical 
Value 
ln(RGE) -2.806 -4.251 -3.544 -2.275 -4.242 -3.540 
ln(ROR) -2.860 -4.251 -3.544 -3.332 -4.242 -3.540 
Dln(RGE) -5.310 -4.260 -3.548 -5.731 -4.251 -3.544 
Dln(ROR) -4.587 -4.260 -3.548 -6.668 -4.251 -3.544 
Note: RGE = Real Government Expenditure; and ROR = Real Oil Revenue.  
 
The results imply that we should employ the first differences of RGE and ROR in the 
regressions of structural change and GARCH. 
 
6.5.2.2. Structural Change Test 
 
The dummy-based structural change test shows that there is a structural change in Nigeria 
from the year (i.e. 2004) the country’s stabilization fund and the fiscal rule were introduced. 
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As shown in Table 6.7, the structural change occurs mainly in the differential slope 
coefficient and not the differential intercept, with the slope having a statistically significant 
coefficient of -0.57, indicating a negative relationship between oil revenue and government 
expenditure and suggesting the de-linking of the two variables. These findings point to the 
effectiveness of Nigeria’s stabilization fund and fiscal rule.  
 
Table 6.7: Dummy-Based Structural Change Test on the Regression of Nigeria’s Real Government  
                  Expenditure and Real Oil Revenue  
Dependent Variable: Dln(RGE)  
 Coef. Std. Err.      t P>|t| 
Dln(ROR)  0.56 0.17 3.19*** 0.003 
DU 0.05 0.07 0.63 0.53 
DU*Dln(ROR) -0.59 0.19 -3.12*** 0.004 
Cons. 0.02 0.06 0.41 0.69 
F-statistic 3.52 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.03 
 
Notes: DU is the dummy representing Nigeria’s stabilization fund and fiscal rule; while *** denotes statistical   
significance at 1% level of significance. The standard errors are in robust forms. 
 
6.5.2.3. Standard Deviation, Correlation, and Covariance 
 
Under this section we focus on the standard deviations of RGE and ROR, and the correlation 
and covariance between the two variables, before and after the introduction of stabilization 
fund and fiscal rule in 2004, in order to capture the impact of the fiscal policy instruments on 
the volatility and the comovements between the two variables respectively.  
 
As shown in Table 6.8, the introduction of the stabilization fund and fiscal rule seems to limit 
the volatility and enhance the decoupling of the two variables. The volatility of the two 
variables reduces after the introduction of the fiscal instruments. The correlation and 
covariance between them also become negative in the post-fiscal instruments period, 
suggesting the decoupling. Further evidence of the reduction of volatility in the Nigerian 
macroeconomy caused by the fiscal instruments is shown in Table 6.9, where the standard 
deviations of selected macroeconomic variables of the country are presented.  
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  Table 6.8: Standard Deviation, Correlation, and Covariance of RGE and ROR 
Before Stabilization Fund and Fiscal Rule (1970 
-2003) 
Stabilization Fund and Fiscal Rule Period (2004-
2010) 
 Dln(RGE) Dln(ROR)  Dln(RGE) Dln(ROR) Remark 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.46 0.50 0.12 0.38 Reduction of 
volatility after 
the 
introduction of 
stabilization 
fund and fiscal 
rule. 
Correlation 
between 
Dln(RGE) 
and 
Dln(ROR) 
0.60 -0.10 Decoupling 
after the 
introduction of 
stabilization 
fund and fiscal 
rule. 
Covariance 
between 
Dln(RGE) 
and 
Dln(ROR) 
0.13 -0.004 Decoupling 
after the 
introduction of 
stabilization 
fund and fiscal 
rule. 
 
 
  Table 6.9: Standard Deviations of Nigeria’s Real GDP, Inflation, Real Exchange Rate and Short-term  
                   Interest Rate  
Variable 1979Q2-2003Q4 2004Q1-2009Q4 Remarks 
Real GDP 1.43 0.12 Reduced volatility after 
the introduction of 
stabilization fund and 
fiscal rule 
Inflation  0.05 0.02 Reduced volatility after 
the introduction of 
stabilization fund and 
fiscal rule 
Real exchange rate 0.57 0.18 Reduced volatility after 
the introduction of 
stabilization fund and 
fiscal rule 
Short-term interest 
rate 
0.011 0.007 Reduced volatility after 
the introduction of 
stabilization fund and 
fiscal rule 
  Notes: The four variables are from the GVAR dataset used in chapter 4 and are all in logged forms. 
 
6.5.2.4. GARCH Model 
 
The GARCH (1, 1) model basically involves regressing DlnRGE on DlnROR in the mean 
equation, with the dummy representing the stabilization fund and fiscal rule interacted with 
ROR and included in the conditional variance equation. The results suggest that the 
introduction of the two fiscal instruments causes a volatility break in the conditional variance 
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equation, as shown by a highly statistically significant negative coefficient of -0.29 in Table 
6.10. The ROR has a strong positive statistically significant impact on the RGE in the mean 
equation as expected, while the GARCH term in the variance equation shows a statistically 
significant GARCH effect.  
   
  Table 6.10: GARCH Model of RGE and ROR 
 Coefficient P-value 
 Mean Equation 
Cons. 0.003 0.95 
Dln(ROR) 0.49*** 0.00 
Variance Equation 
RESID(-1)^2 0.06 0.34 
GARCH(-1) 0.94*** 0.00 
DU*Dln(ROR) -0.29*** 0.00 
R-squared               0.30 
  Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level of significance, while DU  
  represents the dummy variable for the Nigerian stabilization fund and fiscal rule.   
 
6.6. Discussion of Findings 
 
Stabilization funds across the countries of the world are funded through different means. 
Some funds are funded from the proceeds of commodities, while some are funded from non-
commodity sources. Among the stabilization funds that are commodity-funded, some are oil-
funded, while some are not oil funded. The stabilization fund of Nigeria is primarily funded 
by oil, with a fiscal rule working together with the fund (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 
2015; Budina et al., 2012; IMF, 2009). The results of all the econometric techniques used in 
the analysis show that the fiscal instruments are effective. This is consistent with the findings 
of the literature on Nigeria-related studies (e.g. Bagattini, 2011; Sugawara, 2014; Okonjo-
Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007; Okonjo-Iweala, 2008) and even studies not involving 
Nigeria (e.g. Fasano, 2000; Shabsigh and Ilahi, 2007).   
 
Fasano (2010) reviews natural resource funds in five countries (Norway, Chile, Venezuela, 
Kuwait, and Oman) and one U.S. state (State of Alaska) and finds that the funds are effective 
in separating budget expenditure from revenue. However, Fasano also reports varying overall 
outcomes, due to varying objectives of funds, institutional frameworks, challenges associated 
with keeping to operational rules, and quality of broader fiscal policy. All the resource funds 
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reviewed are oil-based, except Chile’s fund which is copper-based. The findings are therefore 
consistent with the impact of Nigeria’s oil-based fund observed in this chapter.  
     
Bagattini (2011) undertakes country-specific empirical analysis for each of 10 countries  (i.e. 
Nigeria, Kazakhstan, Trinidad and Tobago, Algeria, Ecuador, Russia, Peru, Azerbaijan, Iran, 
and Chad), using a computed indicator of fiscal success
20
 as the outcome, over the period of 
1992-2007, with further analysis involving panel data. The values of this “success” variable 
before and after the introduction of stabilization fund are estimated and compared for each 
fund separately.    
 
The results of the country-specific analysis show improved fiscal success in 9 of the 
considered countries following the adoption of stabilization funds. Only Chad has a (small) 
decrease in fiscal success after the establishment of stabilization fund. The results of the panel 
data analysis confirm the country-specific findings, by showing that stabilization funds have 
negative and positive effects on public debt and non-resource balance respectively, implying 
that the funds limit dependency on resource revenues to finance public expenditure. The 
impact of fiscal policy on the non-resource fiscal balance is important for the sustainability of 
fiscal position in resource-producing countries, as overall balance is largely influenced by the 
unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of the oil balance, making the non-oil balance to be a 
vital indicator of the effectiveness of fiscal policy (Barnett and Ossowski, 2002).
21
 
 
The findings of Bagattini (2011) are also consistent with the results of this chapter. 
Specifically, the effectiveness of Nigeria’s fund is shown in Bagattini’s Nigeria-specific 
results and confirmed in his panel results. The pre-fund and post-fund values of the “success” 
variable for Nigeria’s fund are 2.5 and 3.3 respectively showing a significant improvement in 
the level of fiscal success. This suggests a significant impact of the Nigerian fund on  the 
country’s fiscal management. 
 
                                                          
20
 The variable is computed on an additive six-point scale (i.e. values rage from 0 to 6), with 1 given for the 
presence of each of six fiscal conditions for each fiscal year. The conditions, which are based on the six variables 
mentioned earlier, are: (i) non-negative fiscal balance; (ii) improvement in the share of fiscal balance in GDP; 
(iii) non-negative non-resource fiscal balance; (iv) improvement in the share of non-resource fiscal balance in 
GDP; (iv) increase in the share of non-resource revenues in GDP; and (vi) reduction in the ratio of public debt to 
GDP.   
 
21
 These authors focus on oil-producing countries in their study, but their discussion is applicable to resource-
rich countries in general.  
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Furthermore, Sugawara (2014) investigates the impact of stabilization funds on the volatility 
of public expenditure in 68 resource-rich countries including Nigeria, over the period of 1988-
2012. The author employs the panel data approach and finds that stabilization funds limit the 
volatility of government expenditure and enhance the smoothing of expenditure, which is 
consistent with the findings of this chapter. Sugawara (2014) also captures the role of fiscal 
rules, by interacting fiscal rules with stabilization funds in his model. 
 
The impact of Nigeria’s fiscal rule (i.e. oil-price-based fiscal rule) on fiscal management is 
specifically reviewed in Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako (2007) and Okonjo-Iweala 
(2008). The two studies demonstrate the effectiveness of the fiscal rule in delinking 
government expenditure from oil revenue and limiting macroeconomic volatility. For 
example, Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako (2007) show that after the Nigerian fiscal rule 
was introduced in 2004 budgeting was based on rule-based reference prices of $25 per barrel 
in 2004 and $30 per barrel in 2005, although there were higher market prices of $38.3 and 
$54.2 respectively, which led to the separation of government spending from oil revenues and 
the improvement of fiscal balance from deficit of 3.5% of GDP in 2003 to surpluses of about 
10% of GDP and 11% of GDP in 2004 and 2005 respectively.  
 
The findings of Shabsign and Ilahi (2007) on stabilization funds are also consistent with the 
results of this chapter. The authors employ panel data analysis to examine the impact of oil 
funds on macroeconomic stability in 8 oil exporters (i.e. Bahrain, Kuwait, Mexico, Norway, 
Oman, Sudan, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela) and copper-based fund in 1 copper 
exporter (i.e. Chile). The main finding is that the funds are negatively related to the indicators 
of macroeconomic volatility considered, namely inflation, the volatility of broad money, and 
the volatility of prices.  
 
A common feature in the works of Shabsign and Ilahi (2007) and this chapter is the 
consideration of macroeconomic effects of stabilization funds. Shabsign and Ilahi (2007) 
explore the macroeconomic impact of the funds and not the fiscal impact, while both the 
macroeconomic and fiscal impacts are covered in this chapter. As Shabsign and Ilahi (2007) 
argue, studies on stabilization funds (including the ones we have discussed earlier under this 
section) largely focus on the fiscal impact of the funds, yet the whole macroeconomy is 
affected by the funds.  
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The literature clearly shows that oil price volatility hinders growth (e.g. Ebrahim et al., 2014; 
Bleaney and Greenaway, 2001; Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007). The uncertainty 
associated with volatility affects the outcome of the decisions of economic agents and 
eventually hinders growth (Ebrahim et al., 2014). For example, volatile revenue hinders 
growth by affecting the productivity of government spending (Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-
Kwaako, 2007).
22
 
 
Finally, the findings of the present chapter have a link with the findings of chapter 5, as the 
rejection of the decoupling hypothesis and the evidence of the effectiveness of fiscal 
instruments for Nigeria indicate that the resilience of the country to oil shocks does not imply 
the decoupling of the nation from the ADs. Regarding the decoupling debate, the literature 
generally shows that the resilience of the EMDEs to global events originating from the ADs 
does not imply decoupling between the two economic groups (IMF, 2012; Economic and 
Financial Affairs, 2011; Pesce, 2014). 
 
IMF (2012) reviews the factors causing the resilience of the EMDEs, complementing it with a 
multivariate analysis involving parametric duration technique which allows for the modelling 
of durations of expansion ( i.e. increasing economic performance) and recovery (i.e. good 
performance after downturns). The author finds that better policies account for about 60% of 
the resilience.     
 
Economic and Financial Affairs (2011) reviews the vulnerability of the EMDEs to events in 
the ADs, considering inter alia, aggregate growth, growth trends, growth cycles, and the 
channels of cross-country transmissions. The author shows that although the EMDEs have 
stronger resilience to the shocks from the ADs in recent times due to improved 
macroeconomic policies and stronger financial institutions, there is no evidence of the 
desynchronization of the business cycles of the two groups, as there are still strong trade and 
financial linkages between them. In the analysis complementing the review, the author shows 
through causality tests that the stock markets of the US and Euro Area are the dominant forces 
causing changes in the stock markets of the EMDEs. 
 
                                                          
22
 Other studies showing the negative impact of oil price volatility on growth are Elder and Serletis, 2010; Jo, 
2012; Ferderer, 1996; and Guo and Kliesen, 2005. 
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Pesce (2014) examines the subject of resilience empirically by using a time-varying panel 
VAR with factorization of coefficients to examine the average responses of the EMDEs to 
shocks from the ADs, based on a dataset consisting of 21 ADs and 57 EMDEs. The author 
observes that although the resilience of the EMDEs has increased over time, they are still 
vulnerable to the shocks originating from the ADs, suggesting that the resilience does not 
imply decoupling. 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
 
There is little quantitative work on the effectiveness of Nigeria’s stabilization fund and fiscal 
rule, hence this chapter contributes to filling this gap in the literature. The chapter examines 
the impact of the Nigerian stabilization fund and fiscal rule, with respect to their effectiveness 
in limiting the global oil shocks transmitted into the country. The analysis of the chapter 
touches on both the fiscal and broad macroeconomic impacts of the two fiscal instruments.  
 
The main finding of the chapter is that the stabilization fund and the fiscal rule have 
significantly contributed to the reduction of volatility in Nigeria. The chapter aligns with the 
strands of literature focusing on both the fiscal and broad macroeconomic impacts of 
stabilization funds and fiscal rules. In line with the findings of chapter 5, the present chapter 
also shows that the resilience of an EMDE to global shocks initiated by ADs does imply the 
decoupling of the former from the latter. 
 
However, the present chapter does not explore the role of factors like politics or education in 
the impact of stabilization funds and fiscal rules. For example, the decision to introduce 
stabilization fund and fiscal rule may be driven by the level of education of nationals making 
them to seek “explanation” from government about how resource money is spent. It would be 
useful to cover this aspect in future research, as this may provide further insight on 
stabilization fund and fiscal rule.    
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Chapter 7: General Conclusions 
   
7.1. Introduction 
 
Nigeria is an oil dependent country with a high level of integration into the global economy. 
What role does the nexus between the country’s oil dependency and global integration have in 
its economic performance?
23
 The purpose of this thesis is to answer this question by 
examining the international linkages of the country in three areas where there are identified 
research gaps, which form the objectives of the study: 
 
Chapter 4 considers the effects of oil shocks compared to domestic shocks within a global 
framework. Studies on oil shocks relating to the country largely focus on the role of global 
integration in the transmission of the oil shocks, leading to limited empirical work dealing 
with the role of global integration in the transmission of domestic shocks. 
 
Chapter 5 considers whether or not Nigeria has decoupled from its main advanced trade 
partners, paying attention to oil-related growth comovements between Nigeria and its trade 
partners. There are no Nigeria-specific studies in the literature on the decoupling hypothesis 
employing an unobserved factor technique, which has stronger ability compared to other 
techniques to reveal the common and parsimonious movements in a set of series.  
 
Chapter 6 considers whether or not Nigeria’s policy framework of a stabilization fund and an 
oil-price-based fiscal rule is effective in protecting the economy from the adverse 
consequences of oil shocks. Nigeria-specific studies on this subject are largely done from a 
qualitative perspective involving no econometric techniques. Besides, group-specific studies 
on the subject involving Nigeria focus largely on the fiscal impact of the instruments rather 
than both fiscal and the broader macroeconomic impacts. This thesis therefore employs 
econometric techniques to test the effectiveness of the fiscal instruments, focusing on both the 
fiscal and macroeconomic impacts of the instruments. 
 
 
                                                          
23
 The global integration of a country may be defined as the level of the country’s globalization with respect to 
financial and trade openness, political connection with other countries, social connection with other countries, 
etc. 
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In the present chapter, section 7.2 summarizes the findings of the empirical chapters; section 
7.3 presents policy recommendations; while section 7.4 discusses the prospects for future 
research.      
 
7.2. Main Findings 
 
7.2.1. Insignificant Dutch-Disease Effect and Significant Role of Internal Shocks in 
Nigeria 
 
This analysis is designed to explore the relative role of oil-related shocks and domestic 
fluctuations on growth within a framework in which the global integration of the Nigerian 
economy is modelled using the GVAR framework. The results show that on average domestic 
shocks, particularly shocks to real GDP and inflation, have stronger impact on growth than do 
oil shocks. Regarding the oil shocks, we observe statistically insignificant spending effect of 
Dutch disease involving the appreciation of real exchange rate.  
 
The stronger role of domestic shocks over oil shocks suggests that internal macroeconomic 
factors, rather than oil, have a significant role in the fluctuations of the economy. In particular, 
domestically generated variations in real GDP and inflation, which are key macroeconomic 
variables, are important sources of fluctuations of the Nigerian economy. 
 
7.2.2. Growth Comovements between Nigeria and Its Main Industrial Trade Partners 
and the Rejection of the Decoupling Hypothesis for Nigeria 
 
The purpose of the analysis on this subject is to investigate whether or not Nigeria’s business 
cycles have decoupled from the business cycles of the US and Euro Area (i.e. testing the 
decoupling hypothesis for Nigeria). The decoupling hypothesis can be tested for an EMDE by 
exploring international comovements, resilience to shocks from the ADs, or the relative role 
of country-specific factors in economic performance compared to global factors. 
 
We test the hypothesis primarily through growth comovements between Nigeria and its two 
trade partners (i.e. US and Euro Area). However, Nigeria’s resilience to external shocks is 
captured in chapter six through the examination of the effectiveness of the country’s fiscal 
policy instruments in dealing with global oil shocks. 
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The results relating to comovements of growth show a statistically significant degree of 
comovements between Nigeria and its two main industrial trade partners, implying that the 
decoupling hypothesis cannot be accepted for Nigeria. 
 
7.2.3. The Effectiveness of Nigeria’s stabilization Fund and Fiscal Rule 
 
The analysis on this subject focuses on examining the effectiveness of the two fiscal 
instruments in dealing with global oil shocks, which has implications for the level of 
resilience of the country to shocks originating from the ADs. The ADs, particularly the US, 
play a strong role in the transmission of oil shocks.  
 
The findings show that the fiscal instruments are effective, implying the resilience of Nigeria 
to shocks from the ADs. But this resilience does not imply decoupling, bearing in mind the 
findings on decoupling in chapter 5. 
 
7.3. Policy Recommendations 
 
The findings of the thesis have important policy implications for Nigeria, with respect to 
Dutch disease; limiting the effects of the fluctuations in the business cycles of the industrial 
trade partners; and building stronger resilience to external shocks. 
 
First, the findings relating to oil shocks and domestic shocks show that Nigeria should 
maintain the adoption of the flexible exchange rate policy it began to adopt since 1986, as it is 
effective in preventing “false” appreciation of the exchange rate during oil price increases. 
The country moved from pegged exchange rate policy in the 1970s to the flexible exchange 
rate policies since 1986, following the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP). The pegged exchange rate made upward movements in oil price to reflect significantly 
in exchange rate values in form of overvaluation, which had negative effects on the economy. 
Furthermore, there is the need to design policies tailored towards dealing with domestically 
generated shocks, particularly fluctuations in the real sector and price level. 
 
Second, a major policy implication of the findings on decoupling is that Nigeria needs to 
diversify its trade away from the US and the Euro Area, in order to limit the impact of the 
fluctuations of their business cycles, as these industrial countries account for about 63% of the 
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country’s trade based on the trade matrix computed in chapter four. The country can do this 
by increasing its trade with the EMDEs, domestically producing the products it imports from 
the industrial economies, which are mainly capital goods and intermediate inputs. This 
implies the diversification of Nigeria’s production. 
 
Finally, the stabilization fund and fiscal rule of the country have constituted an effective 
source of resilience to global oil shocks. Therefore, these fiscal policy instruments need to be 
maintained and complemented them with more countercyclical macroeconomic policies in the 
country. Introducing oil-price-oriented countercyclical monetary policy instruments and 
coordinating them with the fiscal policy instruments may be a good option. As Shabsign and 
Ilahi (2007) argue, monetary policy variables constitute one of the channels through which oil 
price volatility is transmitted into the economy. This necessitates dealing with the monetary 
policy channel of the transmission of volatility.  
 
7.4. Prospects for Future Research 
 
This thesis has certain limitations which provide prospects for future study. First, the chapter 
on oil shocks focuses on the spending effect of Dutch disease, but due to data limitation is 
unable to analyse the resource relocation effect, which involves the relocation of labour from 
the traditional sector (i.e. agriculture) into the oil sector during oil booms. The GVAR dataset 
employed for the analysis of the chapter does not contain sectoral data (i.e. data on 
agricultural, manufacturing, and labour sectors). During oil booms, statistically significant 
downward and upward trends in employment rates of the traditional (agricultural) and oil 
sectors respectively, point to the existence of the resource relocation effect of Dutch disease. 
It would be useful to include sectoral data in future GVAR research on the impact of oil 
shocks in Nigeria. 
 
Second, the chapter on the decoupling hypothesis focuses mainly on real decoupling. But 
based on the role of the financial channel in cross-country interdependencies, it would be 
useful to examine financial decoupling in future research. This involves investigating the 
existence of cross-country financial contagion between Nigeria and other countries; the 
relative roles of country-specific and global financial factors in the financial sector of Nigeria, 
etc. In particular, agent behaviour plays a key role in cross-border transmission of financial 
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crisis, hence examining financial decoupling from the perspective of contagion would be 
useful. 
 
Finally, the chapter on the stabilization fund and the fiscal rule does not capture the role of 
factors like politics and education in the impact of stabilization funds. For example, political 
tension on how resource money is spent by government may contribute largely to the 
introduction of stabilization fund and fiscal rule. Therefore, it would be useful to explore such 
a factor in future research. It would also be useful to include the role of institutions in future 
research on the two fiscal instruments, in that institution-related challenges, such as the 
voracity effect, may hinder the effectiveness of the instruments. The voracity effect points to 
the negative externalities of channelling public funds into private pockets through the 
mechanism of “false” public projects during resource booms.  
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                                                                                                                                                 Appendix 
 Table A.1: Full Trade Weight of GVAR Model                                                                                                  
countr
y 
Argen
tina 
Austra
lia 
Brazil Canad
a 
China Chile Euro India Indon
esia 
Japan Korea Malay
sia 
Mexic
o 
Nigeri
a 
Norw
ay 
New 
Zealan
d 
Peru Philip
pines 
South  
Africa 
Saudi  
Arabia 
Singap
ore 
Swed
en 
Switze
rland 
Thaila
nd 
Turke
y 
UK USA 
Argen
tina 
0.000 0.001 0.109 0.001 0.007 0.059 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.030 0.004 0.015 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.004 
Austra
lia 
0.005 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.031 0.006 0.014 0.042 0.037 0.048 0.033 0.032 0.003 0.000
4 
0.002 0.244 0.004 0.015 0.025 0.011 0.035 0.010 0.006 0.043 0.006 0.011 0.011 
Brazil 0.314 0.007 0.000 0.006 0.023 0.087 0.025 0.014 0.009 0.010 0.013 0.007 0.016 0.077 0.007 0.003 0.072 0.006 0.019 0.016 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.021 
Canad
a 
0.008 0.012 0.019 0.000 0.021 0.023 0.018 0.015 0.010 0.020 0.014 0.008 0.032 0.009 0.035 0.017 0.058 0.008 0.011 0.010 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.021 0.216 
China 0.125 0.170 0.121 0.061 0.000 0.148 0.125 0.157 0.112 0.227 0.270 0.131 0.056 0.059 0.035 0.112 0.141 0.153 0.110 0.110 0.133 0.040 0.029 0.134 0.086 0.059 0.151 
Chile 0.061 0.002 0.034 0.003 0.010 0.000 0.008 0.009 0.002 0.009 0.012 0.001 0.008 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.068 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.007 
Euro 0.174 0.119 0.229 0.060 0.176 0.198 0.000 0.212 0.092 0.114 0.106 0.100 0.077 0.251 0.449 0.116 0.157 0.110 0.308 0.175 0.097 0.542 0.667 0.100 0.508 0.530 0.153 
India 0.015 0.036 0.015 0.005 0.027 0.024 0.023 0.000 0.038 0.010 0.020 0.027 0.004 0.091 0.004 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.026 0.020 0.036 0.009 0.009 0.020 0.015 0.016 0.015 
Indon
esia 
0.007 0.027 0.007 0.003 0.017 0.004 0.008 0.029 0.000 0.036 0.027 0.041 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.027 0.002 0.021 0.007 0.018 0.101 0.004 0.002 0.039 0.009 0.003 0.008 
Japan 0.019 0.168 0.046 0.031 0.162 0.093 0.050 0.042 0.180 0.000 0.151 0.123 0.033 0.020 0.017 0.106 0.063 0.169 0.099 0.175 0.084 0.021 0.031 0.206 0.024 0.027 0.080 
Korea 0.014 0.063 0.028 0.011 0.112 0.053 0.026 0.043 0.068 0.079 0.000 0.049 0.028 0.027 0.011 0.037 0.035 0.054 0.026 0.096 0.054 0.010 0.007 0.038 0.026 0.012 0.032 
Malay
sia 
0.010 0.035 0.010 0.005 0.032 0.003 0.012 0.032 0.063 0.032 0.025 0.000 0.010 0.002 0.002 0.032 0.003 0.053 0.012 0.011 0.162 0.004 0.003 0.074 0.008 0.007 0.018 
Mexic
o 
0.034 0.006 0.028 0.028 0.010 0.040 0.016 0.009 0.003 0.012 0.015 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.009 0.029 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.133 
Nigeri
a 
0.003 0.000
1 
0.029 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.010 0.032 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.006 9.2E-
05 
0.020 0.000
2 
0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.014 
Norw
ay 
0.001 0.002 0.005 0.011 0.003 0.002 0.036 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.118 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.045 0.004 
New 
Zealan
d 
0.001 0.048 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.000
3 
0.000 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.002 
Peru 0.012 0.001 0.011 0.003 0.004 0.030 0.003 0.001 0.000
4 
0.002 0.003 0.000
2 
0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
3 
0.001 8.2E-
05 
9.9E-
05 
0.001 0.000
4 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 
Philip
pines 
0.005 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.020 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.011 0.017 0.012 0.019 0.003 0.000
1 
0.001 0.012 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.014 0.026 0.001 0.001 0.022 0.001 0.002 0.007 
South 
Africa 
0.014 0.012 0.010 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.016 0.013 0.004 0.012 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.018 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.016 0.016 0.006 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0.005 0.010 0.017 0.003 0.020 0.001 0.019 0.020 0.025 0.045 0.048 0.010 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.040 0.040 0.000 0.026 0.005 0.005 0.030 0.026 0.007 0.020 
Singap
ore 
0.002 0.054 0.011 0.003 0.032 0.002 0.015 0.065 0.167 0.029 0.038 0.185 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.039 0.001 0.104 0.011 0.043 0.000 0.004 0.008 0.068 0.005 0.014 0.017 
Swed
en 
0.004 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.006 0.009 0.058 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.111 0.006 0.007 0.002 0.014 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.010 0.004 0.016 0.025 0.007 
Switze
rland 
0.010 0.009 0.013 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.085 0.011 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.036 0.003 0.019 0.007 0.007 0.012 0.000 0.016 0.041 0.020 0.013 
Thaila
nd 
0.010 0.040 0.010 0.004 0.023 0.007 0.010 0.019 0.042 0.043 0.015 0.060 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.025 0.006 0.045 0.017 0.026 0.048 0.004 0.010 0.000 0.008 0.006 0.012 
Turke
y 
0.006 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.008 0.010 0.039 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.013 0.016 0.002 0.011 0.015 0.005 0.000 0.016 0.005 
UK 0.014 0.050 0.023 0.029 0.027 0.012 0.198 0.051 0.012 0.022 0.018 0.018 0.007 0.033 0.231 0.040 0.011 0.011 0.081 0.022 0.026 0.091 0.051 0.022 0.082 0.000 0.041 
USA 0.127 0.113 0.200 0.713 0.210 0.176 0.173 0.154 0.094 0.207 0.145 0.154 0.695 0.379 0.063 0.127 0.253 0.179 0.114 0.196 0.133 0.074 0.104 0.129 0.083 0.141 0.000 
Note: The trade weights are based on 2006-2008 trade flows. 
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           Table A.2: Unit Root Results for the Endogenous Variables of the GVAR Model   
Dom
estic 
 
Varia
bles 
Stati
stic 
Critic
al  
 
Valu
e 
Arge
ntina 
Aust
ralia 
Brazi
l 
Cana
da 
Chin
a 
Chile Euro India Indo
nesia 
Japa
n 
Kore
a 
Mala
ysia 
Mexi
co 
Nige
ria 
Nor
way 
New 
Zeal
and 
Peru Phili
ppin
es 
Sout
h 
Afric
a 
Saud
i 
Arab
ia 
Sing
apor
e 
Swe
den 
Switz
erlan
d 
Thail
and 
Turk
ey 
UK USA 
y 
(with 
tren
d) 
ADF -3.45 -2.51 -3.24 -2.24 -2.58 -1.76 -2.70 -0.83 -0.98 -1.97 -1.00 -0.70 -1.92 -3.13 -3.54 -1.46 -1.66 -1.19 -2.39 -1.25 -1.89 -1.44 -2.61 -2.45 -1.10 -2.48 -3.17 -2.28 
y 
(with 
tren
d) 
WS -3.24 -2.20 -3.06 -2.39 -2.70 -2.04 -2.40 -1.18 -1.22 -1.80 -0.80 -1.10 -2.21 -3.34 -2.49 -1.80 -1.76 -1.46 -2.18 -1.54 -0.56 -1.49 -2.44 -2.67 -1.36 -2.73 -2.80 -2.45 
y (no 
tren
d) 
ADF -2.89 0.05 -0.09 1.05 -0.58 1.08 -0.17 -1.28 1.95 -0.96 -2.28 -2.35 -0.89 -0.51 0.35 -1.13 0.05 0.47 0.61 1.03 1.31 -1.62 -0.24 -0.06 -1.53 -0.68 -1.28 -0.83 
y (no 
tren
d) 
WS -2.55 -0.18 1.83 1.70 0.97 0.72 1.05 0.87 1.33 2.51 0.83 0.84 1.72 0.95 0.26 2.51 1.41 0.59 0.46 1.26 0.58 1.68 0.65 1.50 1.29 1.47 -0.87 1.23 
Dy ADF -2.89 -5.02 -6.50 -6.55 -4.74 -3.35 -6.16 -3.71 -7.78 -6.94 -3.85 -5.37 -5.32 -4.10 -2.86 -6.82 -6.42 -7.47 -3.40 -5.07 -3.06 -6.03 -4.39 -5.84 -2.86 -7.71 -4.14 -5.00 
Dy WS -2.55 -5.15 -6.47 -6.21 -4.92 -3.54 -6.16 -3.90 -7.92 -7.01 -3.94 -5.24 -5.45 -4.09 -2.97 -6.39 -6.53 -7.63 -3.56 -5.05 -2.95 -6.11 -4.51 -5.19 -3.09 -7.75 -2.97 -4.74 
DDy ADF -2.89 -7.23 -8.88 -8.67 -7.14 -
11.1
1 
-9.56 -7.75 -
10.2
5 
-7.94 -7.01 -8.32 -7.74 -9.51 -8.16 -
11.2
5 
-9.08 -9.00 -9.68 -8.08 -
17.3
1 
-8.29 -7.84 -8.15 -9.17 -8.98 -
12.6
9 
-7.89 
DDy WS -2.55 -7.36 -9.10 -7.81 -7.31 -
11.1
9 
-9.68 -7.76 -
10.4
4 
-8.17 -7.19 -7.51 -7.94 -9.75 -8.41 -
10.8
3 
-9.33 -9.10 -9.94 -7.87 -
17.6
3 
-8.57 -8.03 -8.17 -9.40 -9.14 -
12.6
9 
-7.66 
Dp 
(with 
tren
d) 
ADF -3.45 -3.60 -3.61 -2.69 -3.46 -2.99 -5.30 -2.88 -5.52 -5.77 -4.18 -4.47 -5.32 -3.90 -4.39 -4.79 -4.06 -3.26 -5.04 -4.14 -4.40 -4.13 -3.85 -4.52 -4.60 -2.39 -5.20 -4.27 
Dp 
(with 
tren
d) 
WS -3.24 -3.70 -3.67 -2.71 -3.48 -3.04 -5.06 -2.01 -5.69 -5.84 -3.16 -2.86 -5.45 -3.80 -4.48 -4.75 -3.81 -3.35 -5.17 -4.27 -4.47 -3.78 -3.69 -4.67 -3.07 -2.25 -2.65 -1.34 
Dp 
(no 
tren
d) 
ADF -2.89 -2.37 -2.90 -2.18 -2.15 -2.85 -3.16 -3.15 -5.33 -5.79 -3.54 -4.69 -5.08 -2.55 -4.32 -2.05 -3.34 -2.93 -4.47 -2.69 -3.12 -4.10 -3.09 -3.62 -4.72 -2.29 -5.03 -4.40 
Dp 
(no 
tren
d) 
WS -2.55 -2.61 -2.42 -2.45 -1.21 -3.02 -1.87 -0.68 -5.39 -5.85 -1.53 -2.18 -5.11 -2.81 -4.46 -2.03 -2.40 -3.13 -4.40 -2.80 -3.34 -3.43 -2.06 -3.52 -2.50 -1.57 -1.41 0.04 
DDp ADF -2.89 -
12.1
6 
-9.59 -6.09 -7.57 -6.63 -7.05 -6.57 -8.73 -8.57 -7.60 -7.34 -8.75 -5.55 -7.61 -8.36 -7.35 -7.76 -6.71 -8.11 -8.72 -9.84 -6.76 -
10.5
5 
-9.59 -8.03 -7.77 -8.46 
DDp WS -2.55 -
12.3
6 
-9.80 -6.30 -7.61 -6.85 -7.05 -6.66 -9.00 -8.68 -7.57 -6.82 -8.91 -5.76 -7.78 -7.86 -7.49 -7.99 -6.86 -8.31 -8.79 -9.86 -6.84 -
10.6
7 
-7.78 -7.84 -8.25 -8.64 
DDD
p 
ADF -2.89 -
14.6
2 
-9.90 -8.62 -
10.0
3 
-8.53 -
10.8
0 
-9.01 -9.43 -8.49 -
10.8
6 
-8.20 -
11.4
3 
-
14.6
1 
-
10.9
4 
-9.66 -9.11 -9.87 -8.51 -9.91 -9.47 -9.84 -8.90 -9.04 -
10.5
0 
-
10.4
9 
-
11.6
2 
-9.70 
DDD
p 
WS -2.55 -
14.9
1 
-
10.0
5 
-8.86 -
10.0
3 
-8.78 -
11.0
3 
-8.89 -9.48 -8.68 -
11.0
3 
-8.46 -
11.7
9 
-
14.8
8 
-9.99 -9.71 -9.35 -
10.1
3 
-8.72 -9.11 -9.61 -9.44 -8.42 -9.42 -8.71 -
10.4
1 
-
10.3
9 
-9.43 
eq 
(with 
tren
d) 
ADF -3.45 -3.69 -4.47  -3.11  -2.06 -2.21 -3.51  -2.18 -2.51 -2.84   -4.14 -2.75  -1.57 -4.45  -4.26 -2.89 -2.13 -1.58  -1.54 -1.46 
eq 
(with 
tren
WS -3.24 -3.26 -4.52  -2.86  -2.30 -2.45 -3.67  -1.85 -2.74 -3.02   -4.05 -2.38  -1.75 -4.59  -3.83 -2.92 -2.11 -1.79  -1.77 -1.75 
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d) 
eq 
(no 
tren
d) 
ADF -2.89 -2.65 -1.35  -0.74  -0.81 -1.61 -1.53  -2.53 -1.65 -2.15   -1.16 -3.03  -1.25 -0.97  -3.06 -1.73 -0.96 -1.28  -1.91 -1.28 
eq 
(no 
tren
d) 
WS -2.55 -2.77 -0.74  -0.76  -0.33 -0.93 -0.87  -1.67 -1.64 -1.90   -0.97 -1.69  -1.46 -0.29  -1.80 -0.38 -0.65 -1.57  -0.75 -0.61 
Deq ADF -2.89 -7.05 -6.00  -6.00  -5.44 -6.62 -7.04  -4.88 -5.64 -6.06   -7.78 -5.95  -4.40 -8.39  -6.24 -6.73 -6.43 -5.15  -7.34 -6.12 
Deq WS -2.55 -6.76 -5.69  -6.21  -5.08 -6.76 -7.22  -5.06 -5.71 -6.15   -7.83 -6.16  -4.51 -8.42  -6.39 -6.86 -6.57 -5.02  -7.13 -6.24 
DDe
q 
ADF -2.89 -8.20 -8.11  -8.30  -7.97 -9.76 -8.94  -8.47 -
13.0
6 
-9.72   -
14.0
6 
-
12.9
7 
 -
12.9
0 
-7.77  -
10.0
0 
-
12.4
1 
-
12.0
9 
-
10.1
2 
 -7.55 -7.84 
DDe
q 
WS -2.55 -8.09 -8.34  -8.53  -7.43 -9.96 -9.16  -8.71 -
13.1
3 
-9.90   -
14.2
6 
-
13.1
8 
 -
13.0
7 
-7.44  -
10.1
7 
-
12.6
0 
-
12.2
7 
-
10.3
4 
 -7.40 -8.02 
ep 
(with 
tren
d) 
ADF -3.45 -2.02 -2.41 -1.91 -2.04 -1.79 -2.08 -2.13 -0.91 -2.32 -2.08 -2.62 -2.28 -3.51 -2.06 -2.47 -2.64 -1.74 -1.96 -2.92 -1.52 -1.62 -2.28 -2.26 -2.59 -2.17 -3.06  
ep 
(with 
tren
d) 
WS -3.24 -2.26 -2.62 -2.17 -1.78 -1.25 -2.33 -2.36 -1.22 -2.59 -2.05 -2.82 -2.20 -3.70 -2.32 -2.66 -2.85 -1.80 -2.13 -3.12 -1.97 -1.44 -2.53 -2.49 -2.47 -1.35 -3.29  
ep 
(no 
tren
d) 
ADF -2.89 -1.85 -0.49 -0.99 -1.03 -1.57 -1.20 -0.55 -0.31 -2.41 -1.84 -1.65 -1.74 -1.39 -2.10 -0.87 -1.04 -1.53 -0.99 -2.14 -0.80 -0.97 -1.38 -0.67 -1.71 0.09 -0.84  
ep 
(no 
tren
d) 
WS -2.55 -2.09 0.29 -1.00 1.14 -1.23 -1.18 -0.16 -0.26 -2.64 -0.30 -0.94 -0.87 -0.80 -2.32 0.04 -0.39 0.38 -0.24 -2.00 -1.13 1.49 -1.11 -0.15 -0.70 -0.37 -0.10  
Dep ADF -2.89 -7.15 -7.73 -7.09 -7.30 -6.96 -6.85 -6.80 -5.73 -7.93 -5.12 -5.40 -7.14 -7.00 -6.51 -7.13 -6.39 -8.49 -5.97 -4.72 -3.02 -6.43 -6.93 -7.37 -5.77 -5.85 -6.10  
Dep WS -2.55 -7.24 -7.88 -7.25 -7.46 -7.08 -6.91 -6.83 -5.65 -8.10 -5.24 -5.60 -7.25 -7.12 -6.66 -7.24 -6.55 -8.61 -6.00 -4.79 -2.86 -6.37 -6.99 -7.48 -5.55 -5.97 -5.59  
DDe
p 
ADF -2.89 -9.07 -8.94 -8.25 -7.51 -
10.5
7 
-
10.5
5 
-9.88 -
11.9
4 
-
10.9
5 
-7.57 -8.49 -8.66 -
10.1
7 
-8.51 -8.08 -7.69 -8.43 -7.26 -
15.3
0 
-
10.8
1 
-8.00 -7.78 -9.91 -8.76 -9.73 -7.83  
DDe
p 
WS -2.55 -9.33 -9.18 -8.35 -7.70 -
10.8
0 
-
10.7
3 
-
10.0
3 
-
12.1
3 
-
11.1
8 
-7.47 -8.73 -8.91 -
10.3
9 
-8.75 -8.37 -7.92 -8.68 -7.47 -
15.5
1 
-
11.0
4 
-8.30 -8.14 -
10.0
6 
-8.99 -9.97 -8.86  
r 
(with 
tren
d) 
ADF -3.45 -2.65 -3.73 -2.95 -3.89 -1.78 -5.04 -3.15 -2.96 -3.92 -2.96 -2.65 -2.43 -2.98 -1.96 -3.75 -3.11 -3.29 -3.57 -3.63  -2.91 -4.49 -2.42 -3.56 -2.21 -3.17 -3.64 
r 
(with 
tren
d) 
WS -3.24 -2.71 -3.29 -2.79 -4.08 -1.63 -5.00 -3.04 -3.03 -4.10 -3.20 -2.59 -2.12 -2.03 -1.86 -2.91 -3.12 -3.39 -3.37 -2.89  -3.11 -2.28 -2.20 -3.69 -1.48 -3.35 -3.76 
r (no 
tren
d) 
ADF -2.89 -2.01 -1.66 -2.48 -1.40 -1.04 -2.12 -1.08 -2.51 -3.86 -2.08 -2.03 -1.88 -1.53 -2.36 -1.27 -1.75 -2.96 -2.28 -3.21  -2.01 -0.90 -1.91 -2.06 -2.18 -1.36 -2.25 
r (no 
tren
d) 
WS -2.55 -2.27 -1.95 -2.65 -1.17 -1.43 -1.04 -1.18 -2.70 -4.05 -1.80 -0.88 -1.99 -1.78 -1.81 -1.57 -1.95 -3.18 -2.51 -2.84  -1.48 -1.29 -2.08 -2.11 -1.49 -1.18 -1.65 
Dr ADF -2.89 -
15.6
4 
-7.32 -8.97 -5.71 -5.97 -6.56 -4.84 -6.50 -6.18 -9.13 -8.01 -6.73 -6.09 -6.98 -8.35 -7.95 -4.24 -7.78 -5.84  -4.91 -8.22 -5.06 -6.04 -8.91 -7.03 -3.58 
Dr WS -2.55 -
15.8
8 
-7.47 -9.18 -5.86 -6.13 -6.76 -3.91 -6.66 -6.42 -4.94 -7.80 -6.87 -6.25 -7.20 -8.36 -8.15 -4.45 -7.94 -5.93  -4.57 -7.95 -4.93 -6.29 -9.08 -6.63 -3.70 
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DDr ADF -2.89 -
12.6
0 
-
10.8
0 
-
11.0
7 
-9.54 -7.66 -8.32 -8.55 -8.35 -
11.8
5 
-6.07 -8.94 -8.35 -
10.6
3 
-8.61 -8.41 -9.20 -8.69 -9.48 -7.93  -8.63 -
10.3
6 
-8.15 -7.51 -8.82 -9.06 -6.02 
DDr WS -2.55 -
12.9
2 
-
11.0
1 
-
11.3
6 
-9.28 -7.90 -8.51 -8.37 -8.59 -
12.0
4 
-5.33 -9.40 -8.58 -
10.9
1 
-8.86 -8.53 -9.45 -8.94 -9.74 -8.14  -8.16 -
10.6
1 
-8.42 -7.85 -9.07 -8.83 -7.24 
lr 
(with 
tren
d) 
ADF -3.45  -3.51  -3.99   -3.13   -2.26 -3.51    -2.98 -1.90   -2.97   -4.56 -3.49   -2.81 -3.92 
lr 
(with 
tren
d) 
WS -3.24  -2.08  -3.54   -3.05   -2.50 -2.46    -1.43 -2.02   -0.69   -3.51 -2.58   -3.03 -3.98 
lr (no 
tren
d) 
ADF -2.89  -0.76  -1.21   -1.05   -1.90 -3.06    -0.83 -0.95   -1.66   -0.32 -1.36   -1.45 -1.61 
lr (no 
tren
d) 
WS -2.55  -1.22  -1.28   -1.02   -0.85 -0.34    -1.28 -0.96   -1.50   -0.70 -1.70   -0.43 -1.51 
Dlr ADF -2.89  -5.72  -5.78   -5.36   -5.78 -7.28    -7.12 -7.37   -8.21   -6.79 -6.37   -8.60 -5.89 
Dlr WS -2.55  -5.64  -5.69   -5.14   -5.44 -6.73    -7.08 -7.58   -8.38   -6.92 -5.91   -7.98 -5.83 
DDlr ADF -2.89  -8.86  -8.43   -8.22   -7.85 -9.33    -7.55 -8.83   -8.12   -7.68 -7.53   -8.28 -7.04 
DDlr WS -2.55  -9.10  -8.58   -8.40   -7.99 -9.20    -7.73 -9.09   -8.30   -8.04 -7.72   -8.60 -7.73 
Note: The unit root tests are based on the 5% Level of Significance. 
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  Table A.3: Unit Root Results for the Foreign Variables of the GVAR Model 
Forei
gn  
 
Varia
bles 
Stati
stic 
Critic
-al  
 
Valu
e 
Arge
ntina 
Aust
ralia 
Brazi
l 
Cana
da 
Chin
a 
Chile Euro India Indo
nesia 
Japa
n 
Kore
a 
Mala
ysia 
Mexi
co 
Nige
ria 
Nor
way 
New 
Zeal
and 
Peru Phili
ppin
es 
Sout
h 
Afric
a 
Saud
i 
Arab
ia 
Sing
apor
e 
Swe
den 
Switz
erlan
d 
Thail
and 
Turk
ey 
UK USA 
ys 
(with 
tren
d) 
ADF -3.45 -3.42 -1.82 -4.25 -2.29 -0.54 -3.56 -4.02 -2.40 -1.00 -3.01 -3.13 -1.14 -2.22 -2.90 -2.62 -2.12 -3.85 -1.02 -2.79 -0.96 -2.01 -2.02 -1.44 -1.96 -2.75 -1.90 -4.47 
ys 
(with 
tren
d) 
WS -3.24 -3.05 -2.13 -3.42 -2.36 -1.13 -3.42 -3.66 -2.53 -1.38 -3.05 -3.29 -1.50 -2.34 -2.95 -2.40 -2.43 -3.62 -1.44 -2.65 -1.40 -2.27 -2.18 -1.70 -2.20 -2.54 -2.11 -4.41 
ys 
(no 
tren
d) 
ADF -2.89 0.92 -1.11 0.23 -0.71 -1.64 0.04 -0.26 -0.59 -1.50 -0.23 -0.07 -1.41 -0.74 -0.49 -0.98 -0.93 -0.14 -1.34 -0.54 -1.54 -0.71 -0.84 -1.11 -1.04 -0.73 -0.91 -0.25 
ys 
(no 
tren
d) 
WS -2.55 1.65 1.07 1.33 1.36 0.97 1.56 1.35 1.11 1.14 1.14 0.54 1.14 1.30 1.34 0.90 1.13 1.48 1.20 1.22 1.03 1.57 0.98 1.05 1.22 1.15 1.34 1.28 
Dys ADF -2.89 -5.74 -4.29 -4.67 -4.93 -5.28 -4.68 -4.96 -4.54 -5.64 -4.62 -4.13 -5.71 -4.88 -4.75 -4.53 -4.58 -4.55 -4.43 -4.30 -4.40 -5.65 -3.17 -4.20 -5.72 -4.22 -4.50 -5.06 
Dys WS -2.55 -5.80 -4.37 -4.77 -4.73 -5.45 -4.82 -4.84 -4.61 -5.83 -4.68 -4.32 -5.89 -4.66 -4.77 -4.27 -4.70 -4.69 -4.58 -4.34 -4.41 -5.83 -3.30 -4.28 -5.87 -4.26 -4.64 -5.25 
DDy ADF -2.89 -8.14 -9.48 -7.31 -7.39 -7.65 -8.02 -7.74 -7.98 -8.36 -7.76 -
10.1
1 
-8.45 -7.14 -7.36 -7.19 -7.82 -8.96 -7.90 -7.90 -7.78 -8.70 -9.02 -8.03 -9.02 -7.99 -8.29 -7.89 
DDy WS -2.55 -7.62 -9.59 -7.40 -7.45 -7.82 -8.03 -7.91 -8.14 -8.54 -7.92 -
10.0
2 
-8.65 -7.34 -7.32 -7.24 -8.01 -8.53 -8.08 -8.05 -7.95 -8.82 -8.92 -8.15 -9.06 -8.12 -8.33 -8.04 
Dps 
(with 
tren
d) 
ADF -3.45 -2.64 -2.86 -3.39 -3.38 -3.02 -2.74 -2.57 -2.93 -2.70 -2.55 -2.98 -3.19 -3.37 -2.28 -3.02 -3.37 -2.85 -2.90 -2.74 -2.70 -4.56 -3.43 -3.04 -3.49 -2.67 -3.43 -2.59 
Dps 
(with 
tren
d) 
WS -3.24 -2.68 -2.73 -3.54 -2.55 -3.20 -2.74 -2.81 -3.14 -2.66 -2.71 -3.16 -2.94 -3.24 -2.49 -2.55 -3.03 -2.93 -2.73 -2.95 -2.59 -4.42 -3.12 -2.60 -3.61 -2.74 -3.21 -2.33 
Dps 
(no 
tren
d) 
ADF -2.89 -2.08 -2.33 -2.47 -2.67 -2.36 -1.98 -2.03 -2.29 -2.33 -2.03 -1.70 -2.59 -2.51 -1.78 -2.72 -2.39 -2.07 -2.49 -2.00 -2.31 -3.70 -2.36 -2.52 -2.13 -2.16 -2.29 -1.15 
Dps 
(no 
tren
d) 
WS -2.55 -2.36 -1.17 -2.66 -0.45 -1.70 -2.24 -1.85 -2.03 -1.36 -1.51 -1.75 -1.38 -1.38 -1.97 -0.78 -0.88 -2.28 -1.39 -1.95 -1.18 -3.01 -0.72 -0.60 -1.47 -1.18 -0.72 -1.44 
DDps ADF -2.89 -6.01 -7.59 -
11.9
0 
-8.16 -6.99 -7.41 -7.12 -6.31 -7.35 -7.31 -6.93 -7.56 -
10.5
1 
-8.71 -6.73 -7.62 -8.63 -7.48 -6.35 -7.23 -7.78 -6.91 -6.97 -6.97 -6.59 -6.92 -5.83 
DDps WS -2.55 -6.23 -7.73 -
12.0
8 
-8.31 -7.05 -7.57 -7.05 -6.36 -7.46 -7.49 -7.11 -7.24 -
10.6
7 
-8.89 -6.97 -7.54 -8.80 -7.60 -6.42 -7.38 -7.84 -6.61 -7.08 -7.16 -6.75 -7.00 -5.95 
DDD
p 
ADF -2.89 -8.55 -9.33 -
10.1
8 
-9.89 -8.85 -7.75 -9.37 -8.15 -9.48 -9.71 -9.19 -9.44 -9.35 -9.04 -8.61 -9.30 -8.70 -9.54 -8.04 -9.35 -9.60 -8.90 -9.09 -9.31 -8.90 -8.87 -
10.5
1 
DDD
p 
WS -2.55 -8.77 -9.55 -
10.4
5 
-9.60 -8.70 -7.92 -8.90 -8.36 -9.36 -9.60 -9.37 -9.74 -9.21 -9.08 -8.10 -9.39 -8.86 -9.58 -8.00 -9.00 -9.78 -8.54 -8.61 -9.59 -8.94 -8.67 -
10.7
7 
eqs 
(with 
tren
d) 
ADF -3.45 -1.92 -2.39 -3.42 -1.59 -2.31 -3.00 -2.15 -2.45 -2.77 -2.33 -2.26 -2.56 -1.74 -2.15 -2.09 -2.67 -2.24 -2.51 -2.25 -2.24 -2.44 -2.27 -2.14 -2.55 -2.18 -2.31 -3.05 
eqs WS -3.24 -2.19 -2.54 -3.64 -1.88 -2.54 -3.26 -2.41 -2.67 -2.87 -2.55 -2.42 -2.73 -2.01 -2.41 -2.33 -2.88 -2.47 -2.66 -2.48 -2.45 -2.66 -2.52 -2.39 -2.66 -2.43 -2.55 -3.25 
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(with 
tren
d) 
eqs 
(no 
tren
d) 
ADF -2.89 -1.36 -1.86 -1.26 -1.35 -1.59 -1.55 -1.45 -1.53 -1.94 -1.26 -1.79 -1.79 -1.31 -1.40 -1.63 -1.57 -1.25 -1.85 -1.61 -1.69 -1.52 -1.48 -1.58 -1.90 -1.53 -1.49 -1.39 
eqs 
(no 
tren
d) 
WS -2.55 -0.38 -0.91 -0.63 -0.59 -0.82 -0.77 -0.51 -0.67 -1.02 -0.65 -0.75 -0.90 -0.59 -0.56 -0.67 -0.70 -0.51 -0.93 -0.77 -0.87 -0.83 -0.77 -0.81 -0.92 -0.74 -0.73 -0.78 
Deqs ADF -2.89 -6.60 -6.96 -5.77 -6.30 -6.83 -7.11 -6.86 -6.99 -7.06 -6.94 -6.94 -7.12 -6.37 -6.69 -6.77 -6.89 -6.57 -7.04 -6.90 -6.84 -7.12 -6.82 -6.72 -6.92 -6.76 -6.77 -7.03 
Deqs WS -2.55 -6.76 -7.09 -5.95 -6.42 -6.96 -7.26 -6.97 -7.13 -7.20 -7.07 -7.09 -7.25 -6.50 -6.81 -6.86 -7.05 -6.73 -7.19 -7.03 -6.97 -7.27 -6.97 -6.85 -7.07 -6.89 -6.92 -7.19 
DDe
q 
ADF -2.89 -9.72 -
11.9
7 
-
13.3
9 
-7.78 -
11.9
4 
-
12.9
0 
-9.42 -9.44 -
11.8
4 
-
12.0
8 
-9.51 -9.36 -7.79 -9.43 -9.73 -7.77 -
11.8
3 
-9.30 -
12.3
5 
-9.30 -
12.1
4 
-9.70 -9.73 -9.27 -9.65 -9.56 -7.76 
DDe
q 
WS -2.55 -9.93 -
12.1
6 
-
13.5
5 
-7.97 -
12.1
2 
-
13.0
6 
-9.63 -9.65 -
12.0
3 
-
12.2
7 
-9.72 -9.56 -7.99 -9.64 -9.95 -7.99 -
12.0
2 
-9.51 -
12.5
5 
-9.51 -
12.3
3 
-9.90 -9.94 -9.47 -9.86 -9.77 -7.98 
eps 
(with 
tren
d) 
ADF -3.45 -1.67 -2.21 -2.11 -2.18 -1.89 -1.83 -2.44 -1.95 -1.95 -1.90 -2.00 -1.98 -1.91 -1.95 -2.31 -2.15 -1.88 -2.03 -2.12 -2.00 -2.22 -2.20 -2.12 -2.04 -2.17 -2.08 -2.01 
eps 
(with 
tren
d) 
WS -3.24 -1.92 -2.45 -2.31 -2.37 -2.12 -2.07 -2.63 -2.18 -2.18 -2.07 -2.15 -2.23 -2.17 -2.19 -2.54 -2.40 -2.10 -2.29 -2.34 -2.26 -2.47 -2.44 -2.35 -2.30 -2.39 -2.31 -2.28 
eps 
(no 
tren
d) 
ADF -2.89 -0.18 -0.33 -0.53 -0.11 -0.64 -0.20 -0.30 -0.06 -0.39 -0.02 0.14 -0.28 -0.13 -0.11 -0.64 -0.27 -0.08 -0.30 -0.22 -0.38 -0.57 -0.48 -0.45 -0.34 -0.37 -0.36 -0.14 
eps 
(no 
tren
d) 
WS -2.55 -0.04 0.35 -0.29 0.41 0.50 0.22 0.17 0.27 0.73 -0.03 0.29 0.61 0.41 0.27 -0.05 0.43 0.24 0.48 0.28 0.38 -0.20 0.06 0.02 0.49 0.06 0.07 0.86 
Deps ADF -2.89 -6.38 -7.07 -7.34 -7.35 -6.84 -6.55 -7.41 -7.26 -7.08 -6.67 -7.22 -6.82 -6.76 -6.50 -7.02 -7.04 -6.68 -7.17 -7.34 -7.08 -6.59 -6.99 -6.90 -7.23 -7.03 -6.91 -7.45 
Deps WS -2.55 -6.48 -7.17 -7.31 -7.36 -6.94 -6.58 -7.39 -7.25 -7.19 -6.65 -7.32 -6.88 -6.82 -6.51 -7.01 -7.14 -6.71 -7.28 -7.37 -7.18 -6.67 -7.01 -6.92 -7.36 -7.03 -6.93 -7.50 
DDe
p 
ADF -2.89 -9.40 -7.72 -8.82 -
10.8
4 
-7.39 -8.59 -7.73 -7.67 -7.78 -8.48 -7.78 -7.67 -7.34 -7.99 -9.67 -7.50 -8.25 -7.86 -7.53 -7.47 -8.49 -9.87 -9.95 -7.73 -
10.0
0 
-9.92 -
10.5
1 
DDe
p 
WS -2.55 -9.66 -8.14 -9.07 -
11.0
5 
-7.69 -8.84 -8.19 -8.06 -8.16 -8.73 -8.19 -8.05 -7.70 -8.23 -9.80 -7.90 -8.50 -8.25 -7.96 -7.79 -8.73 -
10.0
4 
-
10.1
0 
-8.10 -
10.1
5 
-
10.0
8 
-
10.7
3 
rs 
(with 
tren
d) 
ADF -3.45 -2.90 -2.57 -2.60 -3.36 -2.67 -2.98 -2.58 -2.70 -2.74 -2.56 -2.54 -3.30 -3.18 -2.89 -3.14 -3.36 -2.72 -3.09 -2.87 -2.64 -3.03 -3.30 -3.29 -2.69 -2.66 -3.31 -2.88 
rs 
(with 
tren
d) 
WS -3.24 -2.72 -2.24 -2.53 -3.31 -2.14 -2.70 -1.86 -2.18 -2.42 -2.16 -1.67 -3.11 -3.15 -2.64 -2.23 -2.83 -2.41 -2.96 -2.44 -1.99 -2.48 -2.12 -2.18 -2.19 -2.22 -1.98 -1.09 
rs 
(no 
tren
d) 
ADF -2.89 -2.33 -0.73 -1.55 -1.09 -0.94 -1.98 -1.03 -0.90 -0.96 -0.77 -0.65 -1.18 -1.32 -1.96 -0.58 -1.02 -1.64 -1.22 -1.25 -0.72 -0.94 -0.28 -0.34 -0.87 -0.76 -0.45 -0.46 
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rs 
(no 
tren
d) 
WS -2.55 -2.52 -0.98 -1.83 -1.12 -1.30 -2.25 -1.38 -1.26 -1.23 -1.10 -1.09 -1.34 -1.45 -2.22 -0.85 -1.30 -1.93 -1.36 -1.58 -1.10 -1.26 -0.71 -0.76 -1.21 -1.07 -0.86 -0.96 
Drs ADF -2.89 -8.86 -6.04 -
14.8
3 
-4.79 -
10.3
3 
-6.26 -
10.4
6 
-6.51 -5.92 -6.38 -9.94 -5.46 -6.51 -
10.6
3 
-6.49 -5.02 -
10.8
6 
-5.25 -6.23 -
10.3
7 
-7.35 -8.95 -9.12 -6.24 -6.08 -6.51 -
11.5
8 
Drs WS -2.55 -9.07 -5.62 -
15.0
5 
-4.84 -
10.4
6 
-6.44 -
10.6
1 
-6.51 -5.59 -6.32 -
10.0
5 
-5.03 -6.42 -
10.8
1 
-5.95 -4.58 -
11.0
4 
-4.63 -6.31 -
10.4
9 
-7.41 -8.87 -9.07 -6.08 -5.86 -6.22 -
11.7
3 
DDr ADF -2.89 -
11.0
3 
-8.66 -
12.2
1 
-
10.0
5 
-
10.5
2 
-9.89 -
10.4
3 
-9.92 -9.50 -9.29 -
10.0
7 
-8.67 -
10.2
0 
-
11.0
4 
-9.42 -8.04 -
10.3
9 
-8.57 -9.80 -
10.5
8 
-
10.4
7 
-9.70 -
10.2
2 
-9.69 -9.52 -9.98 -
10.5
0 
DDr WS -2.55 -
11.3
2 
-8.77 -
12.5
2 
-9.75 -
10.7
8 
-
10.1
5 
-
10.6
9 
-
10.1
3 
-9.67 -9.45 -
10.3
0 
-8.68 -
10.2
7 
-
11.3
2 
-9.46 -8.11 -
10.6
6 
-8.56 -
10.0
4 
-
10.8
2 
-
10.6
9 
-9.81 -
10.3
6 
-9.89 -9.67 -
10.1
2 
-
10.7
5 
lrs 
(with 
tren
d) 
ADF -3.45 -2.92 -2.43 -2.78 -3.90 -2.47 -2.46 -3.88 -2.63 -2.42 -2.85 -3.15 -2.47 -3.93 -3.02 -2.76 -2.71 -2.93 -2.47 -2.45 -2.51 -2.44 -2.77 -2.64 -2.44 -2.61 -2.82 -3.23 
lrs 
(with 
tren
d) 
WS -3.24 -2.78 -2.73 -2.76 -3.97 -2.75 -2.65 -3.88 -2.64 -2.72 -3.00 -3.20 -2.71 -4.04 -3.04 -2.66 -2.29 -2.98 -2.74 -2.53 -2.79 -2.69 -2.40 -2.53 -2.68 -2.53 -2.48 -3.32 
lrs 
(no 
tren
d) 
ADF -2.89 -1.01 -1.47 -1.09 -1.30 -1.55 -1.33 -0.95 -1.06 -1.64 -1.22 -1.15 -1.39 -1.34 -1.17 -0.92 -0.87 -1.21 -1.54 -1.12 -1.54 -1.37 -0.89 -1.01 -1.38 -0.99 -0.90 -1.18 
lrs 
(no 
tren
d) 
WS -2.55 -0.84 -0.43 -0.80 -1.13 -0.54 -0.67 -0.62 -0.68 -0.58 -0.58 -0.88 -0.63 -1.10 -0.89 -0.70 -0.80 -0.85 -0.66 -0.72 -0.58 -0.56 -0.85 -0.89 -0.71 -0.80 -0.89 -0.85 
Dlrs ADF -2.89 -5.70 -6.06 -5.77 -5.85 -6.04 -5.93 -5.91 -6.02 -5.80 -6.30 -5.45 -5.94 -5.87 -5.61 -5.75 -5.98 -5.67 -5.77 -5.79 -5.91 -6.14 -5.73 -5.56 -5.66 -5.75 -5.66 -5.39 
Dlrs WS -2.55 -5.64 -5.79 -5.69 -5.75 -5.73 -5.76 -5.81 -5.86 -5.34 -6.17 -5.29 -5.68 -5.75 -5.61 -5.61 -5.69 -5.59 -5.50 -5.58 -5.62 -5.88 -5.55 -5.40 -5.33 -5.56 -5.56 -5.12 
DDlr ADF -2.89 -7.56 -7.94 -7.60 -7.17 -7.78 -7.63 -7.61 -7.66 -7.84 -7.81 -7.88 -7.63 -7.21 -7.47 -7.71 -7.68 -7.68 -7.59 -7.68 -7.69 -7.70 -7.57 -7.42 -7.72 -7.50 -7.46 -8.57 
DDlr WS -2.55 -7.98 -8.29 -8.01 -7.84 -8.00 -7.92 -8.21 -8.03 -8.01 -8.12 -8.34 -7.92 -7.82 -8.01 -8.23 -7.96 -8.04 -7.85 -8.08 -7.95 -7.98 -8.00 -7.75 -8.02 -7.86 -7.81 -8.60 
Note: The unit root tests are based on the 5% Level of Significance. 
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  Table A.4: Test for Weak Exogeneity  
Country F test Fcrit_0.05 ys Dps eqs eps rs lrs poil 
ARGENTINA F(2,100) 3.09 1.38 1.77 0.44  5.89 0.42 0.51 
AUSTRALIA F(4,102) 2.46 1.12 1.08 0.87  0.68 0.94 0.14 
BRAZIL F(1,103) 3.93 0.08 0.00 2.91  0.93 0.33 0.10 
CANADA F(4,102) 2.46 2.13 2.07 1.03  1.28 0.47 0.25 
CHINA F(2,106) 3.08 0.94 0.51 0.42  0.65 1.30 0.55 
CHILE F(2,100) 3.09 0.20 2.45 2.24  1.15 0.51 0.63 
EURO F(2,98) 3.09 1.52 1.76 0.37  2.30 1.32 0.53 
INDIA F(1,101) 3.94 0.21 4.69 0.10  4.98 0.04 0.28 
INDONESIA F(3,101) 2.69 1.51 1.24 0.84  0.39 0.63 0.63 
JAPAN F(2,98) 3.09 1.13 0.19 0.22  1.88 3.70 1.71 
KOREA F(4,96) 2.47 1.15 0.14 3.18  0.58 0.88 2.16 
MALAYSIA F(1,106) 3.93 2.13 0.17 0.13  1.13 0.24 1.58 
MEXICO F(2,106) 3.08 1.49 1.98 1.77  0.70 1.38 2.59 
NIGERIA F(1,103) 3.93 1.07 0.03 0.22  0.89 0.10 0.57 
NORWAY F(3,97) 2.70 1.72 2.43 1.39  0.43 2.11 0.57 
NEW 
ZEALAND 
F(3,97) 2.70 1.81 0.76 1.12  1.35 0.55 0.77 
PERU F(3,101) 2.69 0.91 1.30 0.31  0.87 0.97 0.59 
PHILIPPINES F(2,100) 3.09 0.97 2.16 1.22  0.70 1.42 3.13 
SOUTH 
AFRICA 
F(2,98) 3.09 0.24 0.77 0.42  1.18 2.25 4.20 
SAUDI ARABIA F(2,104) 3.08 1.08 3.59 5.08  0.47 0.93 0.46 
SINGAPORE F(2,100) 3.09 1.53 0.02 0.57  1.22 0.36 0.66 
SWEDEN F(2,98) 3.09 0.00 0.49 0.02  0.03 0.23 0.17 
SWITZERLAND F(3,97) 2.70 2.36 1.93 1.17  0.27 0.41 0.26 
THAILAND F(2,100) 3.09 0.31 1.91 0.23  0.86 0.77 0.11 
TURKEY F(1,103) 3.93 0.15 3.24 0.00  0.18 0.07 0.09 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
F(2,104) 3.08 2.67 1.48 0.24  1.34 0.25 1.41 
USA F(2,102) 3.09 0.77 3.44  1.54    
  Notes: The test is based on the 5% Significance Level and the F Statistic. 
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  Table A.5: VARX* Order and Cointegrating Relationships of the Country-Specific Models                    
 p q Cointegrating Relations 
ARGENTINA 2 1 2 
AUSTRALIA 1 1 4 
BRAZIL 2 1 1 
CANADA 1 1 4 
CHINA 1 1 2 
CHILE 2 1 2 
EURO 2 1 2 
INDIA 2 1 1 
INDONESIA 2 1 3 
JAPAN 2 1 2 
KOREA 2 1 4 
MALAYSIA 1 1 1 
MEXICO 1 1 2 
NIGERIA 2 1 1 
NORWAY 2 1 3 
NEW ZEALAND 2 1 3 
PERU 2 1 3 
PHILIPPINES 2 1 2 
SOUTH AFRICA 2 1 2 
SAUDI ARABIA 2 1 2 
SINGAPORE 2 1 2 
SWEDEN 2 1 2 
SWITZERLAND 2 1 3 
THAILAND 2 1 2 
TURKEY 2 1 1 
UNITED KINGDOM 1 1 2 
USA 2 1 2 
  Note: p and q are the lag orders of the domestic and foreign variables of the country specific VARX models of  
  the GVAR model respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
